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Mystics exult in mystery and want
it to stay mysterious. Scientists
exult in mystery for a different
reason: it gives them something to
do.
Richard Dawkins
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Abstrat
This thesis concerns the optimal behaviour of agents in unknown computable
environments, also known as universal artificial intelligence. These theoretical
agents are able to learn to perform optimally in many types of environments.
Although they are able to optimally use prior information about the environ-
ment if it is available, in many cases they also learn to perform optimally in
the absence of such information. Moreover, these agents can be proven to up-
per bound the performance of general purpose computable agents. Clearly such
agents are extremely powerful and general, hence the name universal artificial
intelligence.
That such agents can be mathematically defined at all might come as a sur-
prise to some. Surely then artificial intelligence has been solved? Not quite. The
problem is that the theory behind these universal agents assumes infinite compu-
tational resources. Although this greatly simplifies the mathematical definitions
and analysis, it also means that these models cannot be directly implemented
as artificial intelligence algorithms. Efforts have been made to scale these ideas
down, however as yet none of these methods have produced practical algorithms
that have been adopted by the mainstream. The main use of universal artificial
intelligence theory thus far has been as a theoretical tool with which to mathe-
matically study the properties of machine super intelligence.
The foundations of universal intelligence date back to the origins of philoso-
phy and inductive inference. Universal artificial intelligence proper started with
the work of Ray J. Solomonoff in the 1960’s. Solomonoff was considering the
problem of predicting binary sequences. What he discovered was a formulation
for an inductive inference system that can be proven to very rapidly learn to op-
timally predict any sequence that has a computable probability distribution. Not
only is this theory astonishingly powerful, it also brings together and elegantly
formalises key philosophical principles behind inductive inference. Furthermore,
by considering special cases of Solomonoff’s model, one can recover well known
statistical principles such as maximum likelihood, minimum description length
and maximum entropy. This makes Solomonoff’s model a kind of grand unified
theory of inductive inference. Indeed, if it were not for its incomputability, the
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problem of induction might be considered solved. Whatever practical concerns
one may have about Solomonoff’s model, most would agree that it is nonetheless
a beautiful blend of mathematics and philosophy.
The main theoretical limitation of Solomonoff induction is that it only addresses
the problem of passive inductive learning, in particular sequence prediction.
Whether the agent’s predictions are correct or not has no effect on the future
observed sequence. Thus the agent is passive in the sense that it is unable to
influence the future. An example of this might be predicting the movement of
the planets across the sky, or maybe the stock market, assuming that one is not
wealthy enough to influence the market.
In the more general active case the agent is able to take actions which may
affect the observed future. For example, an agent playing chess not only ob-
serves the other player, it is also able to make moves itself in order to increase
its chances of winning the game. This is a very general setting in which seem-
ingly any kind of goal directed problem can be framed. It is not necessary to
assume, as is typically done in game theory, that the environment, in this case
other player, plays optimally. We also do not assume that the behaviour of the
environment is Markovian, as is typically done in control theory and reinforce-
ment learning.
In the late 1990’s Marcus Hutter extended Solomonoff’s passive induction
model to the active case by combining it with sequential decision theory. This
produced a theory of universal agents, and in particular a universal agent for a
very general class of interactive environments, known as the AIXI agent. Hutter
was able to prove that the behaviour of universal agents converges to optimal
in any setting where this is at all possible for a general agent, and that these
agents are Pareto optimal in the sense that no agent can perform as well in
all environments and strictly better in at least one. These are the strongest
known results for a completely general purpose agent. Given that AIXI has such
generality and extreme performance characteristics, it can be considered to be a
theoretical model of a super intelligent agent.
Unfortunately, even stronger results showing that AIXI converges to optimal
behaviour rapidly, similar to Solomonoff’s convergence result, have been shown
to be impossible in some settings, and remain open questions in others. Indeed,
many questions about universal artificial intelligence remain open. In part this is
because the area is quite new with few people working in it, and partly because
proving results about universal intelligent agents seems to be difficult.
The goal of this thesis is to explore some of the open issues surrounding
universal artificial intelligence. In particular: In which settings the behaviour of
universal agents converges to optimal, the way in which AIXI theory relates to
the concept and definition of intelligence, the limitations that computable agents
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face when trying to approximate theoretical super intelligent agents such as AIXI,
and finally some of the big picture implications of super intelligent machines and
whether this is a topic that deserves greater study.
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Prefae
Thesis outline
Much of the work presented in this thesis comes from prior publications. In some
cases whole chapters are heavily based on prior publications, in other cases prior
work is only mentioned in passing. Furthermore, while I wrote the text of the
thesis, naturally not all of the ideas and work presented are my own. Besides the
presented background material, many of the results and ideas in this thesis have
been developed through collaboration with various colleagues, in particular my
supervisor Marcus Hutter. This section outlines the contents of the thesis and
also provides some guidance on the nature of my contribution to each chapter.
1) Nature and Measurement of Intelligene. Chapter 1 begins the thesis with
the most fundamental question of all: What is intelligence? Amazingly, books
and papers on artificial intelligence rarely delve into what intelligence actually
is, or what artificial intelligence is trying to achieve. When they do address the
topic they usually just mention the Turing test and that the concept of intelli-
gence is poorly defined, before moving on to algorithms that presumably have
this mysterious quality. As this thesis concerns theoretical models of systems that
we claim to be extremely intelligent, we must first explore the different tests and
definitions of intelligence that have been proposed for humans, animals and ma-
chines. We draw from these an informal definition of intelligence that we will
use throughout the rest of the thesis.
This overview of the theory, definition and testing of intelligence is my own
work. This chapter is based on [Legg and Hutter, 2007c], in particular the parts
which built upon [Legg and Hutter, 2007b,a].
2) Universal Artiial Intelligene. At present AIXI is not widely known in aca-
demic circles, though it has captured the imagination of a community interested
in new approaches to general purpose artificial intelligence, so called artificial
general intelligence (AGI). However even within this community, it is clear that
xv
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there is some confusion about AIXI and universal artificial intelligence. This may
be attributable in part to the fact that current expositions of AIXI are difficult for
non-mathematicians to digest. As such, a less technical introduction to the sub-
ject would be helpful. Not only should this help clear up some misconceptions, it
may also serve as an appetiser for the more technical treatments that have been
published by Hutter. Chapter 2 provides such an introduction. It starts with the
basics of inductive inference and slowly builds up to the AIXI agent and its key
theoretical properties.
This introduction to universal artificial intelligence has not been published
before, though small parts of it were derived from [Hutter et al., 2007] and [Legg,
1997]. Section 2.6 is largely based on the material in [Hutter, 2007b], and the
sections that follow this on [Hutter, 2005].
3) Optimality of AIXI. Hutter has proven that universal agents converge to op-
timal behaviour in any environment where this is possible for a general agent.
He further showed that the result holds for certain types of Markov decision
processes, and claimed that this should generalise to related classes of envi-
ronments. Formally defining these environments and identifying the additional
conditions for the convergence result to hold was left as an open problem. In-
deed, it seems that nobody has ever documented the many abstract environment
classes that are studied and formally shown how they are related to each other.
In Chapter 3 we create such a taxonomy and identify the environment classes
in which universal agents are able to learn to behave optimally. The diversity of
these classes of environments adds weight to our claim that AIXI is super intelli-
gent.
Most of the classes of environments are well known, though their exact for-
malisations as presented are my own. The proofs of the relationships between
them and the resulting taxonomy of environment classes is my work. This chap-
ter is largely based on [Legg and Hutter, 2004].
4) Universal Intelligene Measure. If AIXI really is an optimally intelligent ma-
chine, this suggests that we may be able to turn the problem around and use
universal artificial intelligence theory to formally define a universal measure of
machine intelligence. In Chapter 4 we take the informal definition of intelli-
gence from Chapter 1 and abstract and formalise it using ideas from the theory
of universal artificial intelligence in Chapter 2. The result is an alternate charac-
terisation of Hutter’s intelligence order relation. This gives us a formal definition
of machine intelligence that we then compare with other formal definitions and
tests of machine intelligence that have been proposed.
The specific formulation of the universal intelligence measure is of my own
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creation. The chapter is largely based on [Legg and Hutter, 2007c], in particular
the parts of this paper which build upon [Legg and Hutter, 2005b, 2006].
5) Limits of Computational Agents. One of the key reasons for studying in-
computable but elegant theoretical models, such as Solomonoff induction and
AIXI, is that it is hoped that these will someday guide us towards powerful com-
putable models of artificial intelligence. Although there have been a number of
attempts at converting these universal theories into practical methods, the re-
sulting methods have all been a mere shadow of their original founding theory.
Is this because we have not yet seen how to properly convert these theories into
practical algorithms, or are there more fundamental limitations at work?
Chapter 5 explores this question mathematically. Specifically, it looks at the
existence and nature of computable agents which are powerful and extremely
general. The results reveal a number of fundamental constraints on any endeav-
our to construct very general artificial intelligence algorithms.
The elementary results at the start of the chapter are already well known,
nevertheless the proofs given are my own. The more significant results towards
the end are entirely original and are my own work. The chapter is based pri-
marily on [Legg, 2006b] which built upon the results in [Legg, 2006a]. The
core results also appear with other related work in the book chapter [Legg et al.,
2008].
6) Fundamental Temporal Dierene Learning. Although deriving practical
theories based on universal artificial intelligence is problematic, there still exist
many opportunities for theory to contribute to the development of new learning
techniques, albeit on a somewhat less grand scale. In Chapter 6 we derive an
equation for temporal difference learning from statistical principles. We start
with the variational principle and then bootstrap to produce an update-rule for
discounted state value estimates. The resulting equation is similar to the stan-
dard equation for temporal difference learning with eligibility traces, so called
TD(λ), however it lacks the parameter that specifies the learning rate. In the
place of this free parameter there is now an equation for the learning rate that
is specific to each state transition. We experimentally test this new learning rule
against TD(λ). Finally, we make some preliminary investigations into how to
extend our new temporal difference algorithm to reinforcement learning.
The derivation of the temporal difference learning rate comes from a collec-
tion of unpublished derivations by Hutter. I went through this collect of hand-
written notes, checked the proofs and took out what seemed to be the most
promising candidate for a new learning rule. The presented proof has some
reworking for improved presentation. The implementation and testing of this
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update-rule is my own work, as is the extension to reinforcement learning by
merging it with Sarsa(λ) and Q(λ). These results were published in [Hutter and
Legg, 2007].
7) Disussion The concluding discussion on the future development of machine
intelligence is my own. This has not been published before.
Appendix A A description of the mathematical notation used.
Appendix B A convergence proof for ergodic MDPs needed for key results in
Chapter 2
Appendix C This collection of definitions of intelligence, seemly the largest in
existence, is my own work. This section of the appendix was based on [Legg and
Hutter, 2007a].
Some of my other publications which are only mentioned in passing in this
thesis include [Smith et al., 1994; Legg, 1996; Cleary et al., 1996; Calude et al.,
2000; Legg et al., 2004; Legg and Hutter, 2005a; Hutter and Legg, 2006]. Cover-
age of the research in this thesis in the popular scientific press includes New Sci-
entistmagazine [Graham-Rowe, 2005], Le Monde de l’intelligence [Fiévet, 2005],
as well as numerous blog and online newspaper articles.
Prerequisite knowledge
The thesis aims to be fairly self contained, however some knowledge of mathe-
matics, statistics and theoretical computer science is assumed. From mathemat-
ics the reader should be familiar with linear algebra, calculus, basic set theory
and logic. From statistics, basic probability theory and elementary distributions
such as the uniform and binomial distributions. A knowledge of measure theory
would be beneficial, but is not essential. From theoretical computer science a
knowledge of the basics such as Turing computation, universal Turing machines,
incomputability and the halting problem are needed. The mathematical notation
and conventions adopted are described in Appendix 7.3. The reader may want
to consult this before beginning Chapter 2 as this is where the mathematical
material begins.
Lugano, Switzerland, June 2008 Shane Legg
Chapter 1
Nature and Measurement of Intelligene
“Innumerable tests are available for measuring intelligence, yet no
one is quite certain of what intelligence is, or even just what it is that
the available tests are measuring.” Gregory [1998]
What is intelligence? It is a concept that we use in our daily lives that seems
to have a fairly concrete, though perhaps naive, meaning. We say that our friend
who got an A in his calculus test is very intelligent, or perhaps our cat who has
learnt to go into hiding at the first mention of the word “vet”. Although this
intuitive notion of intelligence presents us with no difficulties, if we attempt to
dig deeper and define it in precise terms we find the concept to be very diffi-
cult to nail down. Perhaps the ability to learn quickly is central to intelligence?
Or perhaps the total sum of one’s knowledge is more important? Perhaps com-
munication and the ability to use language play a central role? What about
“thinking” or the ability to perform abstract reasoning? How about the ability
to be creative and solve problems? Intelligence involves a perplexing mixture of
concepts, many of which are equally difficult to define.
Psychologists have been grappling with these issues ever since humans first
became fascinated with the nature of the mind. Debates have raged back and
forth concerning the correct definition of intelligence and how best to measure
the intelligence of individuals. These debates have in many instances been very
heated as what is at stake is not merely a scientific definition, but a fundamen-
tal issue of how we measure and value humans: Is one employee smarter than
another? Are men on average more intelligent than women? Are white peo-
ple smarter than black people? As a result intelligence tests, and their creators,
have on occasion been the subject of intense public scrutiny. Simply determin-
ing whether a test, perhaps quite unintentionally, is partly a reflection of the
race, gender, culture or social class of its creator is a subtle, complex and of-
ten politically charged issue [Gould, 1981; Herrnstein and Murray, 1996]. Not
1
2surprisingly, many have concluded that it is wise to stay well clear of this topic.
In reality the situation is not as bad as it is sometimes made out to be. Al-
though the details of the definition are debated, in broad terms a fair degree
of consensus has been achieved about the scientific definition of human intelli-
gence and how to measure it [Gottfredson, 1997b; Sternberg and Berg, 1986].
Indeed it is widely recognised that when standard intelligence tests are correctly
applied and interpreted, they all measure approximately the same thing [Got-
tfredson, 1997b]. Furthermore, what they measure is both stable over time in
individuals and has significant predictive power, in particular for future aca-
demic performance and other mentally demanding pursuits. The issues that
continue to draw debate are questions such as whether the tests test only a part
or a particular type of intelligence, or whether they are somehow biased towards
a particular group or set of mental skills. Great effort has gone into dealing with
these issues, but they are difficult problems with no easy solutions.
Somewhat disconnected from this exists a parallel debate over the nature
of intelligence in the context of machines. While the debate is less politically
charged, in some ways the central issues are even more difficult. Machines can
have physical forms, sensors, actuators, means of communication, information
processing abilities and exist in environments that are totally unlike those that
we experience. This makes the concept of “machine intelligence” particularly
difficult to get a handle on. In some cases, a machine may have properties that
are similar to human intelligence, and so it might be reasonable to describe the
machine as also being intelligent. In other situations this view is far too limited
and anthropocentric. Ideally we would like to be able to measure the intelligence
of a wide range of systems: humans, dogs, flies, robots or even disembodied
systems such as chat-bots, expert systems, classification systems and prediction
algorithms [Johnson, 1992; Albus, 1991].
One response to this problem might be to develop specific kinds of tests for
specific kinds of entities, just as intelligence tests for children differ to intelli-
gence tests for adults. While this works well when testing humans of different
ages, it comes undone when we need to measure the intelligence of entities
which are profoundly different to each other in terms of their cognitive capaci-
ties, speed, senses, environments in which they operate, and so on. To measure
the intelligence of such diverse systems in a meaningful way we must step back
from the specifics of particular systems and establish fundamentally what it is
that we are really trying to measure.
The difficulty of forming a highly general notion of intelligence is readily ap-
parent. Consider, for example, that memory and numerical computation tasks
were once regarded as defining hallmarks of human intelligence. We now know
that these tasks are absolutely trivial for a machine and do not test its intel-
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ligence in any meaningful sense. Indeed, even the mentally demanding task
of playing chess can now be largely reduced to brute force search [Hsu et al.,
1995]. What else may in time be possible with relatively simple algorithms run-
ning on powerful machines is hard to say. What we can be sure of is that, as
technology advances, our concept of intelligence will continue to evolve with it.
How then are we to develop a concept of intelligence that is applicable to all
kinds of systems? Any proposed definition must encompass the essence of hu-
man intelligence, as well as other possibilities, in a consistent way. It should not
be limited to any particular set of senses, environments or goals, nor should it be
limited to any specific kind of hardware, such as silicon or biological neurons. It
should be based on principles which are fundamental and thus unlikely to alter
over time. Furthermore, the definition of intelligence should ideally be formally
expressed, objective, and practically realisable as an effective test. Before at-
tempting to construct such a formal definition in Chapter 4, in this chapter we
will first survey existing definitions, tests and theories of intelligence. We are
particularly interested in common themes and general perspectives on intelli-
gence that could be applicable to many kinds of systems, including machines.
1.1 Theories of intelligene
A central question in the study of intelligence concerns whether intelligence
should be viewed as one ability, or many. On one side of the debate are the the-
ories that view intelligence as consisting of many different components and that
identifying these components is important to understanding intelligence. Differ-
ent theories propose different ways to do this. One of the first was Thurstone’s
“multiple-factors” theory which considers seven “primary mental abilities”: ver-
bal comprehension, word fluency, number facility, spatial visualisation, asso-
ciative memory, perceptual speed and reasoning [Thurstone, 1938]. Another
approach is Sternberg’s “Triarchic Mind” which breaks intelligence down into
analytical intelligence, creative intelligence, and practical intelligence [Stern-
berg, 1985], however this model is now considered outdated, even by Sternberg
himself.
Taking the number of components to an extreme is Guilford’s “Structure of
Intellect” theory. Under this theory there are three fundamental dimensions:
contents, operations, and products. Together these give rise to 120 different cat-
egories [Guilford, 1967]. In later work this increased to 150 categories. This
theory has been criticised due to the fact that measuring such precise combina-
tions of cognitive capacities in individuals seems to be infeasible and thus it is
difficult to experimentally study such a fine-grained model of intelligence.
A recently popular approach is Gardner’s “multiple intelligences” where he
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argues that the components of human intelligence are sufficiently separate that
they are actually different “intelligences”[Gardner, 1993]. Based on the struc-
ture of the human brain he identifies these intelligences to be linguistic, musi-
cal, logical-mathematical, spatial, bodily kinaesthetic, intra-personal and inter-
personal intelligence. Although Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences has
certainly captured the imagination of the public, it remains to be seen to what
degree it will have a lasting impact in professional circles.
At the other end of the spectrum is the work of Spearman and those that have
followed in his approach. Here intelligence is seen as a very general mental abil-
ity that underlies and contributes to all other mental abilities. As evidence they
point to the fact that an individual’s performance levels in reasoning, association,
linguistic, spatial thinking, pattern identification etc. are positively correlated.
Spearman called this positive statistical correlation between different mental
abilities the “g-factor”, where g stands for “general intelligence”[Spearman,
1927]. Because standard IQ tests measure a range of key cognitive abilities,
from a collection of scores on different cognitive tasks we can estimate an indi-
vidual’s g-factor. Some who consider the generality of intelligence to be primary
take the g-factor to be the very definition of intelligence [Gottfredson, 2002].
A well known refinement to the g-factor theory due to Cattell is to distinguish
between “fluid intelligence”, which is a very general and flexible innate abil-
ity to deal with problems and complexity, and “crystallized intelligence”, which
measures the knowledge and abilities that an individual has acquired over time
[Cattell, 1987]. For example, while an adolescent may have a similar level of
fluid intelligence to that of an adult, their level of crystallized intelligence is
typically lower due to less life experience [Horn, 1970]. Although it is diffi-
cult to determine to what extent these two influence each other, the distinction
is an important one because it captures two distinct notions of what the word
“intelligence” means.
As the g-factor is simply the statistical correlation between difference kinds
of mental abilities, it is not fundamentally inconsistent with the view that intel-
ligence can have multiple aspects or dimensions. Thus a synthesis of the two
perspectives is possible by viewing intelligence as a hierarchy with the g-factor
at its apex and increasing levels of specialisation for the different aspects of in-
telligence forming branches [Carroll, 1993]. For example, an individual might
have a high g-factor, which contributes to all of their cognitive abilities, but
also have an especially well developed musical sense. This hierarchical view of
intelligence is now quite popular [Neisser et al., 1996].
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“Viewed narrowly, there seem to be almost as many definitions of
intelligence as there were experts asked to define it." R. J. Sternberg
quoted in [Gregory, 1998]
In this section and the next we will overview a range of definitions of in-
telligence that have been given by psychologists. For an even more extensive
collection of definitions of intelligence, indeed the largest collection that we are
aware of, see Appendix .4 or visit our online collection [Legg and Hutter, 2007a].
Although definitions differ, there are many reoccurring features; in some cases
these are explicitly stated, while in others they are more implicit. We start by
considering ten definitions that take a similar perspective:
“It seems to us that in intelligence there is a fundamental faculty, the
alteration or the lack of which, is of the utmost importance for practi-
cal life. This faculty is judgement, otherwise called good sense, prac-
tical sense, initiative, the faculty of adapting oneself to circumstances.”
Binet and Simon [1905]
“The capacity to learn or to profit by experience.” Dearborn quoted in [Stern-
berg, 2000]
“Ability to adapt oneself adequately to relatively new situations in life.”
Pinter quoted in [Sternberg, 2000]
“A person possesses intelligence insofar as he has learned, or can learn, to
adjust himself to his environment.” Colvin quoted in [Sternberg, 2000]
“We shall use the term ‘intelligence’ to mean the ability of an organism to
solve new problems . . . ” Bingham [1937]
“A global concept that involves an individual’s ability to act purposefully,
think rationally, and deal effectively with the environment.” Wechsler
[1958]
“Individuals differ from one another in their ability to understand complex
ideas, to adapt effectively to the environment, to learn from experience,
to engage in various forms of reasoning, to overcome obstacles by taking
thought.” American Psychological Association [Neisser et al., 1996]
“. . . I prefer to refer to it as ‘successful intelligence.’ And the reason is that
the emphasis is on the use of your intelligence to achieve success in your
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life. So I define it as your skill in achieving whatever it is you want to attain
in your life within your sociocultural context — meaning that people have
different goals for themselves, and for some it’s to get very good grades in
school and to do well on tests, and for others it might be to become a very
good basketball player or actress or musician.” Sternberg [2003]
“Intelligence is part of the internal environment that shows through at
the interface between person and external environment as a function of
cognitive task demands.” R. E. Snow quoted in [Slatter, 2001]
“. . . certain set of cognitive capacities that enable an individual to adapt
and thrive in any given environment they find themselves in, and those
cognitive capacities include things like memory and retrieval, and problem
solving and so forth. There’s a cluster of cognitive abilities that lead to
successful adaptation to a wide range of environments.” Simonton [2003]
Perhaps the most elementary common feature of these definitions is that
intelligence is seen as a property of an individual who is interacting with an ex-
ternal environment, problem or situation. Indeed, at least this much is common
to practically all proposed definitions of intelligence.
Another common feature is that an individual’s intelligence is related to their
ability to succeed or profit. This implies the existence of some kind of objective
or goal. What the goal is, is not specified, indeed individuals’ goals may be
varied. The important thing is that the individual is able to carefully choose
their actions in a way that leads to them accomplishing their goals. The greater
this capacity to succeed with respect to various goals, the greater the individual’s
intelligence.
The strong emphasis on learning, adaption and experience in these defini-
tions implies that the environment is not fully known to the individual and may
contain new situations that could not have been anticipated in advance. Thus
intelligence is not the ability to deal with a fully known environment, but rather
the ability to deal with some range of possibilities which cannot be wholly antic-
ipated. What is important then is that the individual is able to quickly learn and
adapt so as to perform as well as possible over a wide range of environments,
situations, tasks and problems. Collectively we will refer to these as “environ-
ments”, similar to some of the definitions above.
Bringing these key features together gives us what we believe to be the
essence of intelligence in its most general form:
Intelligence measures an agent’s ability to achieve goals in a wide range
of environments.
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We take this to be our informal working definition of intelligence for this thesis.
The remainder of this section considers a range of other definitions that are
not as strongly connected to our adopted definition. Usually it is not that they
are entirely incompatible with our definition, but rather they stress different
aspects of intelligence. The following definition is an especially interesting def-
inition as it was given as part of a group statement signed by 52 experts in the
field. As such it obviously represents a fairly mainstream perspective:
“Intelligence is a very general mental capability that, among other things,
involves the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, com-
prehend complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience.” Got-
tfredson [1997b]
Reasoning, planning, solving problems, abstract thinking, learning from ex-
perience and so on, these are all mental abilities that allow us to successfully
achieve goals. If we were missing any one of these capacities, we would clearly
be less able to successfully deal with such a wide range of environments. Thus,
these capacities are implicit in our definition also. The difference is that our defi-
nition does not attempt to specify what capabilities might be needed, something
which is clearly very difficult and would depend on the particular tasks that the
agent must deal with. Our approach is to consider intelligence to be the effect
of capacities such as those listed above. It is not the result of having any spe-
cific set of capacities. Indeed, intelligence could also be the effect of many other
capacities, some of which humans may not have. In summary, our definition is
not in conflict with the above definition, rather it is that our definition is more
abstract and general.
“. . . in its lowest terms intelligence is present where the individual ani-
mal, or human being, is aware, however dimly, of the relevance of his
behaviour to an objective. Many definitions of what is indefinable have
been attempted by psychologists, of which the least unsatisfactory are 1.
the capacity to meet novel situations, or to learn to do so, by new adap-
tive responses and 2. the ability to perform tests or tasks, involving the
grasping of relationships, the degree of intelligence being proportional to
the complexity, or the abstractness, or both, of the relationship.” Drever
[1952]
This definition has many similarities to ours. Firstly, it emphasises the agent’s
ability to choose its actions so as to achieve an objective, or in our terminology,
a goal. It then goes on to stress the agent’s ability to deal with situations which
have not been encountered before. In our terminology, this is the ability to deal
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with a wide range of environments. Finally, this definition highlights the agent’s
ability to perform tests or tasks, something which is entirely consistent with our
performance orientated perspective of intelligence.
“Intelligence is not a single, unitary ability, but rather a composite of sev-
eral functions. The term denotes that combination of abilities required for
survival and advancement within a particular culture.” Anastasi [1992]
This definition does not specify exactly which capacities are important, only
that they should enable the individual to survive and advance with the culture.
As such this is a more abstract “success” orientated definition of intelligence,
like ours. Naturally, culture is a part of the agent’s environment, though only
complex environments with other agents would have true culture.
“The ability to carry on abstract thinking.” L. M. Terman quoted in [Stern-
berg, 2000]
This is not really much of a definition as it simply shifts the problem of defin-
ing intelligence to the problem of defining abstract thinking. The same is true
of many other definitions that refer to things such as imagination, creativity or
consciousness. The following definition has a similar problem:
“The capacity for knowledge, and knowledge possessed.” Henmon [1921]
What exactly constitutes “knowledge”, as opposed to perhaps data or infor-
mation? For example, does a library contain a lot of knowledge, and if so, is it
intelligent? Or perhaps the internet? Modern concepts of the word knowledge
stress the fact that the information has to be in some sense properly contextu-
alised so that it has meaning. Defining this more precisely appears to be difficult
however. Because this definition of intelligence dates from 1921, perhaps it re-
flects pre-information age thinking when computers with vast storage capacities
did not exist.
Nonetheless, our definition of intelligence is not entirely inconsistent with
the above definition in that an individual may be required to know many things,
or have a significant capacity for knowledge, in order to perform well in some
environments. However, our definition is narrower in that knowledge, or the
capacity for knowledge, is not by itself sufficient. We require that the knowledge
can be used effectively. Indeed, unless information can be effectively utilised for
various purposes, it seems reasonable to consider it to be merely “data”, rather
than “knowledge”.
“The capacity to acquire capacity.” H. Woodrow quoted in [Sternberg,
2000]
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The definition of Woodrow is typical of those that emphasise not the current
ability of the individual, but rather the individual’s ability to expand and develop
new abilities. This is a fundamental point of divergence for many views on
intelligence. Consider the following question: Is a young child as intelligent as
an adult? From one perspective, children are very intelligent because they can
learn and adapt to new situations quickly. On the other hand, a child is unable
to do many things due to a lack of knowledge and experience and thus will make
mistakes an adult would know to avoid. These need not just be physical acts,
they could also be more subtle things like errors in reasoning as their mind, while
very malleable, has not yet matured. In which case, perhaps their intelligence is
currently low, but will increase with time and experience?
Fundamentally, this difference in perspective is a question of time scale: Must
an agent be able to tackle some task immediately, or perhaps after a short period
of time during which learning can take place, or perhaps it only matters that
they can eventually learn to deal with the problem? Being able to deal with a
difficult problem immediately is a matter of experience, rather than intelligence.
While being able to deal with it in the very long run might not require much
intelligence at all, for example, simply trying a vast number of possible solutions
might eventually produce the desired results. Intelligence then seems to be the
ability to adapt and learn as quickly as possible given the constraints imposed
by the problem at hand.
“Intelligence is a general factor that runs through all types of performance.”
A. Jensen
At first this might not look like a definition of intelligence, but it makes an
important point: Intelligence is not really the ability to do anything in particular,
rather it is a very general ability that affects many kinds of performance. Con-
versely, by measuring many different kinds of performance we can estimate an
individual’s intelligence. This is consistent with our definition’s emphasis on the
agent’s ability to perform well in many environments.
“Intelligence is what is measured by intelligence tests.” Boring [1923]
Boring’s famous definition of intelligence takes this idea a step further. If
intelligence is not the ability to do anything in particular, but rather an abstract
ability that indirectly affects performance in many tasks, then perhaps it is most
concretely described as the ability to do the kind of abstract problems that ap-
pear in intelligence tests? In which case, Boring’s definition is not as facetious
as it first appears. This definition also highlights the fact that the concept of in-
telligence, and how it is measured, are intimately related. In the context of this
paper we refer to these as definitions of intelligence, and tests of intelligence,
respectively, although in some cases the distinction is not sharp.
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The following sample of informal definitions of machine intelligence capture a
range of perspectives. There also exist several formal definitions and tests of
machine intelligence, however we will deal with those in Chapter 4. We begin
with five definitions that have clear connections to our informal definition:
“. . . the mental ability to sustain successful life.” K. Warwick quoted in [Aso-
han, 2003]
“. . . doing well at a broad range of tasks is an empirical definition of ‘intelligence’ ”
Masum et al. [2002]
“Intelligence is the computational part of the ability to achieve goals in the
world. Varying kinds and degrees of intelligence occur in people, many
animals and some machines.” McCarthy [2004]
“Any system . . . that generates adaptive behaviour to meet goals in a range
of environments can be said to be intelligent.” Fogel [1995]
“. . . the ability of a system to act appropriately in an uncertain environ-
ment, where appropriate action is that which increases the probability of
success, and success is the achievement of behavioral subgoals that sup-
port the system’s ultimate goal.” Albus [1991]
The position taken by Albus is especially similar to ours. Although the quote
above does not explicitly mention the need to be able to perform well in a wide
range of environments, at a later point in the same paper he mentions the need
to be able to succeed in a “large variety of circumstances”.
“Intelligent systems are expected to work, and work well, in many different
environments. Their property of intelligence allows them to maximize the
probability of success even if full knowledge of the situation is not avail-
able. Functioning of intelligent systems cannot be considered separately
from the environment and the concrete situation including the goal.” Gud-
win [2000]
While this definition is consistent with the position we have taken, when
trying to actually test the intelligence of an agent Gudwin does not believe that
a “black box” behaviour based approach is sufficient, rather his approach is to
look at the “. . . architectural details of structures, organizations, processes and
algorithms used in the construction of the intelligent systems,” [Gudwin, 2000].
Our perspective is simply to not care whether an agent looks intelligent on the
inside. If it is able to perform well in a wide range of environments, that is all
that matters.
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“We define two perspectives on artificial system intelligence: (1) native in-
telligence, expressed in the specified complexity inherent in the informa-
tion content of the system, and (2) performance intelligence, expressed in
the successful (i.e., goal-achieving) performance of the system in a com-
plicated environment.” Horst [2002]
Here we see two distinct notions of intelligence, a performance based one
and an information content one. This is similar to the distinction between fluid
intelligence and crystallized intelligence made by the psychologist Cattell (see
Section 1.1). The performance based notion of intelligence is similar to our
definition with the exception that performance is measured in a complex en-
vironment rather than across a wide range of environments. This perspective
appears in some other definitions also,
“. . . the ability to solve hard problems.” Minsky [1985]
“Achieving complex goals in complex environments” Goertzel [2006]
The emphasis on complex goals and environments is not really so different
to our “wide range of environments” in that any agent which could not achieve
simple goals in simple environments presumably would not be considered in-
telligent. One might argue that the ability to achieve truly complex goals in
complex environments requires the ability to achieve simple ones, in which case
the two perspectives are equivalent.
Some definitions emphasise not just the ability to perform well, but also the
need for efficiency:
“[An intelligent agent does what] is appropriate for its circumstances and
its goal, it is flexible to changing environments and changing goals, it
learns from experience, and it makes appropriate choices given perceptual
limitations and finite computation.” Poole et al. [1998]
“. . . in any real situation behavior appropriate to the ends of the system
and adaptive to the demands of the environment can occur, within some
limits of speed and complexity.” Newell and Simon [1976]
“Intelligence is the ability to use optimally limited resources – including
time – to achieve goals.” Kurzweil [2000]
“Intelligence is the ability for an information processing agent to adapt to
its environment with insufficient knowledge and resources.” Wang [1995]
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We consider the addition of resource limitations to the definition of intel-
ligence to be either superfluous, or wrong. In the first case, if limited com-
putational resources are a fundamental and unavoidable part of reality, which
certainly seems to be the case, then their addition to the definition of intelligence
is unnecessary. Perhaps the first three definitions above fall into this category.
On the other hand, if limited resources are not a fundamental restriction, for
example a new model of computation was discovered that was vastly more pow-
erful than the current model, then it would be odd to claim that the unbelievably
powerful machines that would then result were not intelligent. Normally we do
not judge the intelligence of something relative to the resources it uses. For ex-
ample, if a rat had human level learning and problem solving abilities, we would
not think of the rat as being more intelligent than a human due to the fact that
its brain was much smaller.
While we do not consider efficiency to be a part of the definition of intelli-
gence, this is not to say that considering the efficiency of agents is unimportant.
Indeed, a key goal of artificial intelligence is to find algorithms which have the
greatest efficiency of intelligence, that is, which achieve the most intelligence
per unit of computational resources consumed.
1.4 Intelligene testing
Having explored what intelligence is, we now turn to how it is measured. Con-
trary to popular public opinion, most psychologists believe that standard psy-
chometric tests of intelligence, such as IQ tests, reliably measure something im-
portant in humans [Neisser et al., 1996; Gottfredson, 1997a]. In fact, standard
intelligence tests are among the most statistically stable and reliable psychologi-
cal tests. Furthermore, it is well known that these scores are a good predictor of
various things, such as academic performance. The question then is not whether
these tests are useful or measure something meaningful, but rather whether
what they measure is indeed “intelligence”. Some experts believe that they do,
while others think that they only succeed in measuring certain aspects of, or
types of, intelligence.
There are many properties that a good test of intelligence should have. One
important property is that the test should be repeatable, in the sense that it
consistently returns about the same score for a given individual. For example,
the test subject should not be able to significantly improve their performance if
tested again a short time later. Statistical variability can also be a problem in
short tests. Longer tests help in this regard, however they are naturally more
costly to administer.
Another important reliability factor is the bias that might be introduced by
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the individual administering the test. Purely written tests avoid this problem
as there is minimal interaction between the tested individual and the tester.
However, this lack of interaction also has disadvantages as it may mean that
other sources of bias, such as cultural differences, language problems or even
something as simple as poor eyesight, might not be properly identified. Thus,
even with a written test the individual being tested should first be examined by
an expert in order to ensure that the test is appropriate.
Cultural bias in particular is a difficult problem, and tests should be designed
to minimise this problem where possible, or at least detect potential bias prob-
lems when they occur. One way to do this is to test each ability in multiple ways,
for example both verbally and visually. While language is an obvious potential
source of cultural bias, more subtle forms of bias are difficult to detect and rem-
edy. For example, different cultures emphasise different cognitive abilities and
thus it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to compare intelligence scores in a way
that is truly objective. Indeed, this choice of emphasis is a key issue for any
intelligence test, it depends on the perspective taken on what intelligence is.
An intelligence test should be valid in the sense that it appears to be test-
ing what it claims it is testing for. One way to check this is to show that the
test produces results consistent with other manifestations of intelligence. A test
should also have predictive power, for example the ability to predict future aca-
demic performance, or performance in other cognitively demanding tasks. This
ensures that what is being measured is somehow meaningful, beyond just the
ability to answer the questions in the test. Standard intelligence tests are thor-
oughly tested for years on the above criteria, and many others, before they are
ready for wide spread use.
Finally, when testing large numbers of individuals, for example when testing
army recruits, the cost of administering the test becomes important. In these
cases less accurate but more economical test procedures may be used, such as
purely written tests without any direct interaction between the individuals being
tested and a psychologist.
Standard intelligence tests, such as those described in the next section, are
all examples of “static tests”. By this we mean that they test an individual’s
knowledge and ability to solve one-off problems. They do not directly measure
the ability to learn and adapt over time. If an individual was good at learning
and adapting then we might expect this to be reflected in their total knowledge
and thus be picked up in a static test. However, it could be that an individual has
a great capacity to learn, but that this is not reflected in their knowledge due to
limited education. In which case, if we consider the capacity to learn and adapt
to be a defining characteristic of intelligence, rather than the sum of knowledge,
then to class an individual as unintelligent due to limited access to education
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would be a mistake.
What is needed is a more direct test of an individual’s ability to learn and
adapt: a so called “dynamic test”[Sternberg and Grigorenko, 2002] (for related
work see also Johnson-Laird and Wason, 1977). In a dynamic test the individual
interacts over a period of time with the tester, who now becomes a kind of
teacher. The tester’s task is to present the test subject with a series of problems.
After each attempt at solving a problem, the tester provides feedback to the
individual who then has to adapt their behaviour accordingly in order to solve
the next problem.
Although dynamic tests could in theory be very powerful, they are not yet
well established due to a number of difficulties. One of the drawbacks is that
they require a much greater degree of interaction between the test subject and
the tester. This makes dynamic testing more costly to perform and increases the
danger of tester bias.
1.5 Human intelligene tests
The first modern style intelligence test was developed by the French psychologist
Alfred Binet in 1905. Binet believed that intelligence was best studied by look-
ing at relatively complex mental tasks, unlike earlier tests developed by Francis
Galton which focused on reaction times, auditory discrimination ability, physical
coordination and so on. Binet’s test consisted of 30 short tasks related to every-
day problems such as: naming parts of the body, comparing lengths and weights,
counting coins, remembering digits and definitions of words. For each task cate-
gory there were a number of problems of increasing difficulty. The child’s results
were obtained by normalising their raw score against peers of the same age. Ini-
tially his test was designed to measure the mental performance of children with
learning problems [Binet and Simon, 1905]. Later versions were also developed
for normal children [Binet, 1911]. It was found that Binet’s test results were a
good predictor of children’s academic performance.
Lewis Terman of Stanford University developed a version of Binet’s test in
English. As the age norms for French children did not correspond well with
American children, he revised Binet’s test in various ways, in particular he in-
creased the upper age limit. This resulted in the now famous Stanford-Binet test
[Terman and Merrill, 1950]. This test formed the basis of a number of other in-
telligence tests, such as the Army Alpha and Army Beta tests which were used to
classify recruits. Since its development, the Stanford-Binet has been periodically
revised, with updated versions being widely used today.
David Wechsler believed that the original Binet tests were too focused on
verbal skills and thus disadvantaged certain otherwise intelligent individuals,
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for example the deaf or people who did not speak the test language as a first
language. To address this problem, he proposed that tests should contain a
combination of both verbal and nonverbal problems. He also believed that in
addition to an overall IQ score, a profile should be produced showing the perfor-
mance of the individual in the various areas tested. Borrowing significantly from
the Stanford-Binet, the US army Alpha test, and others, he developed a range
of tests targeting specific age groups from preschoolers up to adults [Wechsler,
1958]. Due in part to problems with revisions of the Stanford-Binet test in the
1960’s and 1970’s, Wechsler’s tests became the standard. They continue to be
well respected and widely used.
Modern versions of the Wechsler and the Stanford-Binet have a similar ba-
sic structure [Kaufman, 2000]. Both test the individual in a number of verbal
and non-verbal ways. In the case of a Stanford-Binet the test is broken up into
five key areas: fluid reasoning, knowledge, quantitative reasoning, visual-spatial
processing, and working memory. In the case of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale (WAIS-III), the verbal tests include areas such as knowledge, basic arith-
metic, comprehension, vocabulary, and short term memory. Non-verbal tests
include picture completion, spatial perception, problem solving, symbol search
and object assembly.
As part of an effort to make intelligence tests more culture neutral John
Raven developed the progressive matrices test [Raven, 2000]. In this test each
problem consists of a short sequence of basic shapes. For example, a circle in a
box, then a circle with a cross in the middle followed by a circle with a triangle
inside. The test subject then has to select from a second list the image that best
continues the pattern. Simple problems have simple patterns, while difficult
problems have more subtle and complex patterns. In each case, the simplest
pattern that can explain the observed sequence is the one that correctly predicts
its continuation. Thus, not only is the ability to recognise patterns tested, but
also the ability to evaluate the complexity of different explanations and then
correctly apply the philosophical principle of Occam’s razor (see Section 2.1).
This will play a key role for us in later chapters.
Today several different versions of the Raven test exist designed for different
age groups and ability levels. As the tests depend strongly on the ability to iden-
tify abstract patterns, rather than knowledge, they are considered to be some
of the most “g-loaded” intelligence tests available (see Section 1.1). The Raven
tests remain in common use today, particularly when it is thought that culture
or language bias could be an issue. The universality of abstract sequence predic-
tion tests makes them potentially useful in the context of machine intelligence,
indeed we will see that some tests of machine intelligence take this approach.
The intelligence quotient, or IQ, was originally introduced by Stern [1912].
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It was computed by taking the age of a child as estimated by their performance
in an intelligence test, and then dividing this by their true biological age and
multiplying by 100. Thus a 10 year old child whose mental performance was
equal to that of a normal 12 year old, had an IQ of 120. As the concept of men-
tal age has now been discredited, and was never applicable to adults anyway,
modern IQ scores are simply normalised to a Gaussian distribution with a mean
of 100. The standard deviation used varies: in the United States 15 is commonly
used, while in Europe 25 is common. For children the normalising Gaussian is
based on peers of the same age.
Whatever normalising distribution is used, by definition an individual’s IQ
is always an indication of their cognitive performance relative to some larger
group. Clearly this would be problematic in the context of machines where the
performance of some machines could be many orders of magnitude greater than
others. Furthermore, the distribution of machine performance would be contin-
ually changing due to advancing technology. Thus, for machine intelligence, an
absolute measure is more meaningful than a traditional IQ type of measure.
For an overview of the history of intelligence testing and the structure of
modern tests, see [Kaufman, 2000].
1.6 Animal intelligene tests
Testing the intelligence of animals is of particular interest to us as it moves
beyond strictly human focused concepts of intelligence and testing methods.
Difficult problems in human intelligence testing, such as bias due to language
differences or physical handicap, become even more difficult if we try to compare
animals with different perceptual and cognitive capacities. Even within a single
species measurement is difficult as it is not always obvious how to conduct the
tests, or even what should be tested for. Furthermore, as humans devise the tests,
there is a persistent danger that the tests may be biased in terms of our sensory,
motor, and motivational systems [Macphail, 1985]. For example, it is known
that rats can learn some types of relationships much more easily through smell
rather than other senses [Slotnick and Katz, 1974]. Furthermore, while an IQ
test for children might in some sense be validated by its ability to predict future
academic or other success, it is not always clear how to validate an intelligence
test for animals: if survival or the total number of offspring was a measure of
success, then bacteria would be the most intelligent life on earth!
As is often the case when we try to generalise concepts, abstraction is nec-
essary. When attempting to measure the intelligence of lower animals it is nec-
essary to focus on simple things like short and long term memory, the forming
of associations, the ability to generalise simple patterns and make predictions,
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simple counting and basic communication. It is only with relatively intelligent
social animals, such as birds and apes, that more sophisticated properties such
as deception, imitation and the ability to recognise oneself are relevant. For sim-
pler animals, the focus is more on the animal’s essential information processing
capacity. For example, the work on measuring the capacity of ants to remember
patterns [Reznikova and Ryabko, 1986].
One interesting difficulty when testing animal intelligence is that we are un-
able to directly explain to the animal what its goal is. Instead, we have to guide
the animal towards a problem by carefully rewarding selected behaviours with
something like food. In general, when testing machine intelligence we face a
similar problem in that we cannot assume that a machine will have a sufficient
level of language comprehension to be able to understand commands. A simple
solution is to use basic “rewards” to guide behaviour, as we do with animals. Al-
though this approach is extremely general, one difficulty is that solving the task,
and simply learning what the task is, become confounded and thus the results
need to be interpreted carefully [Zentall, 1997].
For good overviews of animal intelligence research see [Zentall, 2000], [Her-
man and Pack, 1994] or [Reznikova, 2007].
1.7 Mahine intelligene tests
This section surveys proposed tests of machine intelligence. Given that the mea-
surement of machine intelligence is fundamental to the field of artificial intelli-
gence, it is remarkable that few researchers are aware of research in this area
beyond the Turing test and some of its variants. Indeed, to the best of our
knowledge the survey presented in this section (derived from Legg and Hutter,
2007b) is the only general survey of tests of machine intelligence that has been
published!
Turing test and derivatives. The classic approach to determining whether a
machine is intelligent is the so called Turing test [Turing, 1950] which has been
extensively debated over the last 50 years [Saygin et al., 2000]. Turing realised
how difficult it would be to directly define intelligence and thus attempted to
side step the issue by setting up his now famous imitation game: if human
judges cannot effectively discriminate between a computer and a human through
teletyped conversation then we must conclude that the computer is intelligent.
Though simple and clever, the test has attracted much criticism. Block and
Searle argue that passing the test is not sufficient to establish intelligence [Block,
1981; Searle, 1980; Eisner, 1991]. Essentially they both argue that a machine
could appear to be intelligent without having any “real intelligence”, perhaps by
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using a very large table of answers to questions. While such a machine would be
impossible in practice, due to the vast size of the table required, it is not logically
impossible. Thus, an unintelligent machine could, at least in theory, consistently
pass the Turing test. Some consider this to bring the validity of the test into
question.
In response to these challenges, even more demanding versions of the Tur-
ing test have been proposed such as the total Turing test in which the machine
must respond to all forms of input that a human could, rather than just tele-
typed text [Harnad, 1989]. For example, the machine should have sensorimotor
capabilities. Going further, the truly total Turing test demands the performance
of not just one
machine, but of the whole “race” of machines over an extended period of
time [Schweizer, 1998]. Another extension is the inverted Turing test in which
the machine takes the place of a judge and must be able to distinguish between
humans and machines [Watt, 1996]. Dowe argues that the Turing test should
be extended by ensuring that the agent has a compressed representation of the
domain area, thus ruling out look-up table counter arguments [Dowe and Hajek,
1998]. Of course these attacks on the Turing test can be applied to any test
of intelligence that considers only a system’s external behaviour, that is, most
intelligence tests.
A more common criticism is that passing the Turing test is not necessary
to establish intelligence. Usually this argument is based on the fact that the
test requires the machine to have a highly detailed model of human knowledge
and patterns of thought, making it a test of humanness rather than intelligence
[French, 1990; Ford and Hayes, 1998]. Indeed, even small things like pretend-
ing to be unable to perform complex arithmetic quickly and faking human typing
errors become important, something which clearly goes against the purpose of
the test.
The Turing test has other problems as well. Current AI systems are a long
way from being able to pass an unrestricted Turing test. From a practical point of
view this means that the full Turing test is unable to offer much guidance to our
work. Indeed, even though the Turing test is the most famous test of machine
intelligence, almost no current research in artificial intelligence is specifically di-
rected towards passing it. Simply restricting the domain of conversation in the
Turing test to make the test easier, as is done in the Loebner competition [Loeb-
ner, 1990], is not sufficient. With restricted conversation possibilities the most
successful Loebner entrants are even more focused on faking human fallibility,
rather than anything resembling intelligence [Hutchens, 1996]. Finally, the Tur-
ing test returns different results depending on who the human judges are. Its
unreliability has in some cases lead to clearly unintelligent machines being clas-
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sified as human, and at least one instance of a human actually failing a Turing
test. When queried about the latter, one of the judges explained that “no hu-
man being would have that amount of knowledge about Shakespeare”[Shieber,
1994].
Compression tests. Mahoney has proposed a particularly simple solution to the
binary pass or fail problem with the Turing test: replace the Turing test with a
text compression test [Mahoney, 1999]. In essence this is somewhat similar to
a “Cloze test” where an individual’s comprehension and knowledge in a domain
is estimated by having them guess missing words from a passage of text.
While simple text compression can be performed with symbol frequencies,
the resulting compression is relatively poor. By using more complex models that
capture higher level features such as aspects of grammar, the best compressors
are able to compress text to about 1.5 bits per character for English. How-
ever humans, which can also make use of general world knowledge, the logical
structure of the argument etc., are able to reduce this down to about 1 bit per
character. Thus the compression statistic provides an easily computed measure
of how complete a machine’s models of language, reasoning and domain knowl-
edge are, relative to a human.
To see the connection to the Turing test, consider a compression test based on
a very large corpus of dialogue. If a compressor could perform extremely well on
such a test, this is mathematically equivalent to being able to determine which
sentences are probable at a give point in a dialogue, and which are not (for the
equivalence of compression and prediction see Bell et al., 1990). Thus, as failing
a Turing test occurs when a machine (or person!) generates a sentence which
would be improbable for a human, extremely good performance on dialogue
compression implies the ability to pass a Turing test.
A recent development in this area is the Hutter Prize [Hutter, 2006]. In this
test the corpus is a 100 MB extract from Wikipedia. The idea is that this should
represent a reasonable sample of world knowledge and thus any compressor that
can perform very well on this test must have a good model of not just English,
but also world knowledge in general.
One criticism of compression tests is that it is not clear whether a powerful
compressor would easily translate into a general purpose artificial intelligence.
Also, while a young child has a significant amount of elementary knowledge
about how to interact with the world, this knowledge would be of little use when
trying to compress an encyclopedia full of abstract “adult knowledge” about the
world.
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Linguisti omplexity. A more linguistic approach is taken by the HAL project
at the company Artificial Intelligence NV [Treister-Goren and Hutchens, 2001].
They propose to measure a system’s level of conversational ability by using tech-
niques developed to measure the linguistic ability of children. These methods
examine things such as vocabulary size, length of utterances, response types,
syntactic complexity and so on. This would allow systems to be “. . . assigned an
age or a maturity level beside their binary Turing test assessment of ‘intelligent’
or ‘not intelligent’ ”[Treister-Goren et al., 2000]. As they consider communi-
cation to be the basis of intelligence, and the Turing test to be a valid test of
machine intelligence, in their view the best way to develop intelligence is to re-
trace the way in which human linguistic development occurs. Although they do
not explicitly refer to their linguistic measure as a test of intelligence, because it
measures progress towards what they consider to be a valid intelligence test, it
acts as one.
Multiple ognitive abilities. A broader developmental approach is being taken
by IBM’s Joshua Blue project [Alvarado et al., 2002]. In this project they mea-
sure the performance of their system by considering a broad range of linguistic,
social, association and learning tests. Their goal is to first pass what they call
a toddler Turing test, that is, to develop an AI system that can pass as a young
child in a similar set up to the Turing test.
Another company pursuing a similar developmental approach based on mea-
suring system performance through a broad range of cognitive tests is the a2i2
project at Adaptive AI [Voss, 2005]. Rather than toddler level intelligence, their
current goal is to work toward a level of cognitive performance similar to that
of a small mammal. The idea being that even a small mammal has many of the
key cognitive abilities required for human level intelligence working together in
an integrated way.
Competitive games. The Turing Ratio method of Masum et al. has more em-
phasis on tasks and games rather than cognitive tests. Similar to our own defi-
nition, they propose that “. . . doing well at a broad range of tasks is an empirical
definition of ‘intelligence’."[Masum et al., 2002] To quantify this they seek to
identify tasks that measure important abilities, admit a series of strategies that
are qualitatively different, and are reproducible and relevant over an extended
period of time. They suggest a system of measuring performance through pair-
wise comparisons between AI systems that is similar to that used to rate play-
ers in the international chess rating system. The key difficulty however, which
the authors acknowledge is an open challenge, is to work out what these tasks
should be, and to quantify just how broad, important and relevant each is. In
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our view these are some of the most central problems that must be solved when
attempting to construct an intelligence test. Thus we consider this approach to
be incomplete in its current state.
Colletion of psyhometri tests. An approach called Psychometric AI tries to
address the problem of what to test for in a pragmatic way. In the view of
Bringsjord and Schimanski, “Some agent is intelligent if and only if it excels at all
established, validated tests of [human] intelligence.”[Bringsjord and Schiman-
ski, 2003] They later broaden this to also include “tests of artistic and literary
creativity, mechanical ability, and so on.” With this as their goal, their research is
focused on building robots that can perform well on standard psychometric tests
designed for humans, such as the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale and Raven
Progressive Matrices (see Section 1.5).
As effective as these tests are for humans, we believe that they are unlikely
to be adequate for measuring machine intelligence. For a start they are highly
anthropocentric. Another problem is that they embody basic assumptions about
the test subject that are likely to be violated by computers. For example, consider
the fundamental assumption that the test subject is not simply a collection of
specialised algorithms designed only for answering common IQ test questions.
While this is obviously true of a human, or even an ape, it may not be true of
a computer. The computer could be nothing more than a collection of specific
algorithms designed to identify patterns in shapes, predict number sequences,
write poems on a given subject or solve verbal analogy problems — all things
that AI researchers have worked on. Such a machine might be able to obtain
a respectable IQ score [Sanghi and Dowe, 2003], even though outside of these
specific test problems it would be next to useless. If we try to correct for these
limitations by expanding beyond standard tests, as Bringsjord and Schimanski
seem to suggest, this once again opens up the difficulty of exactly what, and
what not, to test for. Thus we consider Psychometric AI, at least as it is currently
formulated, to only partially address this central question.
C-Test. One perspective among psychologists is that intelligence is “the abil-
ity to deal with complexity”[Gottfredson, 1997a]. Thus, in a test of intelligence,
the most difficult questions are the ones that are the most complex because these
will, by definition, require the most intelligence to solve. It follows then that if
we could formally define and measure the complexity of test problems using
complexity theory we could construct a formal test of intelligence. The possibil-
ity of doing this was perhaps first suggested by Chaitin [1982]. While this path
requires numerous difficulties to be dealt with, we believe that it is the most nat-
ural and offers many advantages: it is formally motivated and precisely defined,
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and potentially could be used to measure the performance of both computers
and biological systems on the same scale without the problem of bias towards
any particular species or culture.
The C-Test consists of a number of sequence prediction and abduction prob-
lems similar to those that appear in many standard IQ tests [Hernández-Orallo,
2000b]. This test has been successfully applied to humans with interesting
results showing a positive correlation between individual’s IQ test scores and
C-Test scores [Hernández-Orallo and Minaya-Collado, 1998; Hernández-Orallo,
2000a]. Similar to standard IQ tests, the C-Test always ensures that each ques-
tion has an unambiguous answer in the sense that there is always one hypothesis
that is consistent with the observed pattern that has significantly lower complex-
ity than the alternatives. Other than making the test easier to score, it has the
added advantage of reducing the test’s sensitivity to changes in the reference
machine used to define the complexity measure.
The key difference to sequence problems that appear in standard intelligence
tests is that the questions are based on a formally expressed measure of complex-
ity. As Kolmogorov complexity is not computable (see Section 2.5), the C-Test
instead uses Levin’s related K t complexity [Levin, 1973]. In order to retain the
invariance property of Kolmogorov complexity, Levin complexity requires the
additional assumption that the universal Turing machines are able to simulate
each other in linear time, for example, pointer machines. As far as we know, this
is the only formal definition of intelligence that has so far produced a usable test
of intelligence.
To illustrate the C-Test, below are some example problems taken from [Hernández-
Orallo and Minaya-Collado, 1998]. Beside each question is its complexity, natu-
rally more complex patterns are also more difficult:
Sequence Prediction Test
Complexity Sequence Answer
9 a, d, g, j, _ , . . . m
12 a, a, z, c, y, e, x, _ , . . . g
14 c, a, b, d, b, c, c, e, c, d, _ , . . . d
Sequence Abduction Test
Complexity Sequence Answer
8 a, _ , a, z, a, y, a, . . . a
10 a, x, _ , v, w, t, u, . . . y
13 a, y, w, _ , w, u, w, u, s, . . . y
Our main criticism of the C-Test is that it does not require the agent to be
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able to deal with problems that require interacting with an environment. For
example, an agent could have a very high C-Test score due to being a very
good sequence predictor, and yet be unable to deal with more general kinds
of problems. This falls short of what is required by our informal definition of
intelligence, that is, the ability to achieve goals in a wide range of environments.
Smith's Test. Another complexity based formal definition of intelligence that
appeared recently in an unpublished report is due to Smith [2006]. His ap-
proach has a number of connections to our work, indeed Smith states that his
work is largely a “. . . rediscovery of recent work by Marcus Hutter”. Perhaps this
is over stating the similarities because while there are some connections, there
are also many important differences.
The basic structure of Smith’s definition is that an agent faces a series of
problems that are generated by an algorithm. In each iteration the agent must
try to produce the correct response to the problem that it has been given. The
problem generator then responds with a score of how good the agent’s answer
was. If the agent so desires it can submit another answer to the same problem.
At some point the agent requests the problem generator to move onto the next
problem and the score that the agent received for its last answer to the current
problem is then added to its cumulative score. Each interaction cycle counts as
one time step and the agent’s intelligence is then its total cumulative score con-
sidered as a function of time. In order to keep things feasible, the problems must
all be in the complexity class P, that is, decision problems which can be solved
by a deterministic Turing machine using a polynomial amount of computation
time.
We have three main criticisms of Smith’s definition. Firstly, while for practical
reasons it might make sense to restrict problems to be in P, we do not see why this
practical restriction should be a part of the very definition of intelligence. If some
breakthrough meant that agents could solve difficult problems in not just P but
sometimes also in the larger complexity class NP, then surely these new agents
would be more intelligent? We had similar objections to informal definitions of
machine intelligence that included efficiency requirements in Section 1.3.
Our second criticism is similar to that of the C-Test. Although there is some
interaction between the agent and the environment, this interaction is rather
limited. The problem-answer format of the test is too limited to fully test an
agent’s capabilities.
The final criticism is that while the definition is somewhat formally defined,
it still leaves open the important question of what exactly the individual tests
should be. Smith suggests that researchers should dream up tests and then
contribute them to some common pool of tests. As such, this intelligence test is
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not fully specified.
1.8 Conlusion
Although this chapter provides only a short treatment of the complex topic of
intelligence, for a work on artificial intelligence to devote more than a few para-
graphs to the topic is rare. We believe that this is a mistake: if artificial in-
telligence research is ever to produce systems with real intelligence, questions
of what intelligence actually means and how to measure it in machines need
to be taken seriously. At present practically nobody is doing this. The reason,
it appears, is that the definition and measurement of intelligence are viewed
as being too difficult. We accept that the topic is difficult, however we do not
accept that the topic is so difficult as to be hopeless and best avoided. As we
have seen in our survey of definitions, there are many commonalities across the
various proposals. This leads to our informal definition of intelligence that we
argue captures the essence of these. Furthermore, although intelligence tests for
humans are widely treated with suspicion by the public, by various metrics these
tests have proven to be very effective and reliable when correctly applied. This
gives us hope that useful tests of machine intelligence may also be possible. At
present only a handful of researchers are working on these problems, mostly in
obscurity. No doubt these fundamental issues will someday return to the fore
when the field is more advanced.
Chapter 2
Universal Artiial Intelligene
Having reviewed what intelligence is and how it is measured, we now turn our
attention to artificial systems that appear to be intelligent, at least in theory. The
problem is that although machines and algorithms are becoming progressively
more powerful, as yet no existing system can be said to have true intelligence
— they simply lack the power, and in particular the breadth, to really be called
intelligent. However, among theoretical models which are free of practical con-
cerns such as computational resource limitations, intelligent machines can be
defined and analysed. In this chapter we introduce a very powerful theoretical
model: Hutter’s universal artificial intelligence agent, known as AIXI.
A full treatment of this topic requires a significant amount of technical math-
ematics. The goal here is to explain the foundations of the topic and some of
the key results in the area in a relatively easy to understand fashion. For the full
details, including precise mathematical definitions, proofs and connections to
other fields, see [Hutter, 2005], or for a more condensed presentation [Hutter,
2007a]. At this point the reader may wish to browse Appendix 7.3 that describes
the mathematical notation and conventions used in this thesis.
2.1 Indutive inferene
Inductive inference is the process by which one observes the world and then in-
fers the causes behind what has been observed. This is a key process by which
we try to understand the universe and so naturally examples of it abound. In-
deed much of science can be viewed as a process of inductively inferring natural
causes. For example, at a microscopic level, one may fire sub-atomic particles
into a gas chamber, observe the patterns they trace out, and then try to infer
what the underlying principles are that govern these events. At a larger scale
one may observe that global temperatures are changing along with other atmo-
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spheric conditions, and from this information attempt to infer what processes
may be driving climate change.
Science is not the only domain where inductive inference is important. A
businessman may observe stock prices over time and then attempt to infer a
model of this process in order to predict the market. A parent may return home
from work to discover a chair propped against the refrigerator with the cookie
jar on top a little emptier. Whether we are a detective trying to catch a thief, a
scientist trying to discover a new physical law, or a businessman attempting to
understand a recent change in demand, we are all in the process of collecting
information and trying to infer the underlying causes.
Formally we can abstract the inductive inference problem as follows: An
agent has observed some data D := x1, x2, . . . x t and has a set of hypotheses
H := h1,h2, . . ., some of which may be good models of the unknown process µ
that is generating D. The task is to decide which hypothesis, or hypotheses inH
are the most likely to accurately reflect µ. For example, x1, x2, . . . might be the
market value of a stock over time andH might consist of a set of mathematical
models of the stock price. Once we have identified which model or models
are likely to accurately describe the price behaviour, we may want to use this
information to predict future stock prices. Typically this is the case: Often our
goal is not just to understand our observations, but also to be able to predict
future observations. It is in prediction that good models become truly useful.
Inductive inference has a long history in philosophy. An early thinker on the
subject was the Greek philosopher Epicurus (342? B.C. – 270 B.C.) who noted
that there typically exist many hypotheses which are consistent with all of the
available data. Logically then, we cannot use the data to rule out any of these
hypotheses; they must all be kept as potential explanations. This is known as
Epicurus’ principle of multiple explanations and is often stated as,
Keep all hypotheses that are consistent with the data.
To illustrate this, consider the cookie jar example again and place yourself
in the position of the parent returning home from work. Having observed the
chair by the refrigerator and missing cookies, one seemingly likely hypothesis is
that your daughter has pushed the chair over to the refrigerator, climbed on top
of it, and then removed some cookies. Another hypothesis is that a hungry but
unusually short thief picked the lock on the back door, saw the cookie jar and
decided to move the chair over to the refrigerator in order to get some cookies.
Although this seems much less likely, you cannot completely rule out this pos-
sibility, or even more elaborate explanations, based solely on the scene in the
kitchen. Philosophically this leaves you in the uncomfortable situation of having
to consider all sorts of strange explanations as being theoretically possible given
the information available. The need to keep these hypotheses would become
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clear if you were then to walk into the living room and notice that your new
television and other expensive items were also missing — suddenly the unlikely
seems more plausible.
Although we may accept that all hypotheses which are consistent with the
observed facts should be considered at least possible, it is intuitively clear that
some hypotheses are much more likely than others. For example, if you had pre-
viously observed similar techniques being employed by your daughter to access
the cookie jar, but had never been burgled, it would be natural to consider that
the small thief in question was of your own flesh and blood, rather than a career
criminal. However, you are basing this judgement on your experience prior to
returning home. What if you really had very little prior knowledge? How then
should you judge the relative likelihood of different hypotheses?
2.1.1 Example. Consider the following sequence:
1, 3, 5, 7
What process do you think is generating these numbers? What do you predict
will come next?
An obvious hypothesis is that these are the positive odd numbers. If this is
true then the next number is going to be 9. A more complex hypotheses is that
the sequence is being generated by the equation 2n−1+(n−1)(n−2)(n−3)(n−
4) for n ∈ N. In this case the next number would be 33. Even when people are
aware that this equation generates a sequence consistent with the digits above,
most would not consider it to be very likely at all. 3
The philosophical principle behind this intuition was first clearly stated by
the English logician and Franciscan friar, William of Ockham (1285 – 1349, also
spelt Occam). He argued that when inferring a cause one should not include
in the explanation anything that is not strictly required to explain the obser-
vations. Or as originally stated, “entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessi-
tatem”, which translates as “entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity”.
A more modern and perhaps clearer expression is,
Among all hypotheses consistent with the observations, the simplest is
the most likely.
This philosophical principle is known as Occam’s razor as it allows one to cut
away unnecessary baggage from explanations. If we consider the number pre-
diction problem again, it is clear that the principle of Occam’s razor agrees with
our intuition: the simple hypothesis seemed to be more likely, a priori, than
the complex hypothesis. As we saw in the previous chapter, the ability to apply
Occam’s razor is a standard feature of intelligence tests.
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2.2 Bayes' rule
Although fundamental, the principles of Epicurus and Occam by themselves are
insufficient to provide us with a mechanism for performing inductive inference.
A major step forward in this direction came from the English mathematician and
Presbyterian minister, Thomas Bayes (1702 – 1761).
In inductive inference we seek to find the most likely hypothesis, or hypothe-
ses, given the data. Expressed in terms of probability, we seek to find h ∈ H
such that the probability of h given D, written P(h|D), is high. From the defini-
tion of conditional probability, P(h|D) := P(h∩ D)/P(D). Rearranging this we
get P(h|D)P(D) = P(h∩D) = P(D|h)P(h), from which it follows that,
P(h|D) =
P(D|h)P(h)
P(D)
=
P(D|h)P(h)∑
h′∈H
P(D|h′)P(h′)
.
This equation is known as Bayes’ rule. It allows one to compute the probability of
different hypotheses h ∈ H given the observed data D, and a distribution P(h)
over H . The probability of the observed data, P(D), is known as the evidence.
P(h) is known as the prior distribution as it is the distribution over the space of
hypotheses before taking into account the observed data. The distribution P(h|D)
is known as the posterior distribution as it is the distribution after taking the data
into account. Thus in essence, Bayes’ rule takes some beliefs that we may have
about the world and updates these according to some observed data. In the
above formulation we have assumed that the set of hypotheses H is countable.
For uncountable sets the sum is replaced by an integral.
Despite its elegance and simplicity, Bayesian inference is controversial. To
this day professional statisticians can be roughly divided into Bayesians who
accept the rule, and classical statisticians who do not. The debate is a subtle
and complex one and there are many different positions within each of the two
camps. At the core of the debate is the very notion of what probability means,
and in particular what the prior probability P(h) means.
How can one talk about the probability of a hypothesis before seeing any
data? Even if this prior probability is meaningful, how can one know what its
value is? We need to take this question seriously because in Bayes’ rule the
choice of prior affects the relative values of P(h|D) for each h, and thus influ-
ences the inference results. Indeed, if Bayesians are free to choose the prior over
H , how can they claim to have objective results?
Bayesians respond to this in a number of ways. Firstly, they point out that
the problem is generally small, in the sense that with a reasonable prior and
quantity of data, the posterior distribution P(h|D) depends almost entirely on D
rather than the chosen prior P(h). In fact on any sizable data set, not only does
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the choice of prior not especially matter, but Bayesian and classical statistical
methods typically produce similar results, as one would expect. It is only with
relatively small data sets or complex models that the choice of prior becomes an
issue.
If classical statistical methods could avoid the problem of prior bias when
dealing with small data sets then this would be a significant argument in their
favour. However Bayesians argue that all systems of inductive inference that
obey some basic consistency principles define, either explicitly or implicitly, a
prior distribution over hypotheses. Thus, methods from classical statistics make
assumptions that are in effect equivalent to defining a prior. The difference is
that in Bayesian statistics these assumptions take the form of an explicit prior
distribution. In other words, it is not that prior bias in Bayesian statistics is nec-
essarily any better or worse than in classical statistics, it is simply more trans-
parent.
In practical terms, if priors cannot be avoided, one strategy to reduce the po-
tential for prior selection abuse is to use well known priors whenever possible.
To this end many standard prior distributions have been developed. The key
desirable property is that a prior should not strongly influence the posterior dis-
tribution and thus unduly affect the inference results. This means that the prior
should express a high degree of impartiality by treating the various hypotheses
somewhat equally. For example, when the set H is finite, an obvious choice is
to assign equal prior probability to each hypothesis, formally, P(h) := 1
|H |
for
all h ∈ H . Things become more problematic in infinite hypothesis spaces as it
is then mathematically impossible to assign an equal finite probability to each
of the hypotheses in H , and still have P(H ) = 1. Some Bayesians abandon
this condition and use so called improper priors which are not true probability
distributions. For the classical statistician, such a radical departure from the def-
inition of probability does not really solve the problem of the unknown prior,
rather it suggests that something is fundamentally amiss.
Instead of mathematical tricks or other workarounds, what Bayesians would
ideally like is to solve the unknown prior problem once and for all by having
a universal prior distribution. Only then would the Bayesian approach be truly
complete. The principles of Epicurus and Occam provide some hints on how this
might be done. From Epicurus, whenever a hypothesis is consistent with the
data, that is P(D|h) > 0, we should keep this hypothesis by having P(h|D) > 0.
From Bayes’ rule this requires that ∀h ∈ H : P(h) > 0. From Occam we see
that P(h) should decrease with the complexity of h, and thus we need a way to
measure the complexity of hypotheses. However before continuing with this, we
first consider the inference problem from another perspective.
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2.3 Binary sequene predition
An alternate characterisation of inductive inference can be made in terms of bi-
nary sequence prediction. One reason this is useful is that binary sequences and
strings provide a more natural setting in which to deal with issues of computabil-
ity. The problem can be formulated as follows: There is an unknown probability
distribution µ over the space of binary sequences B∞. From this distribution a
sequence ω is drawn one bit at a time. At time t ∈ N we have observed the
initial string ω1:t := ω1ω2 . . .ωt , and our task is to predict what the next bit in
the sequence will be, that is, ωt+1. To do this we select a model, or models, from
a set of potential models that explain the observed sequence so far and that, we
hope, will be good at predicting future bits in the sequence.
In terms of inductive inference the observed initial binary string ω1:t is the
observed data D, and our set of potential models of the data is the set of hy-
pothesesH . We would like to find a model ν ∈H , or models, that are as close
as possible to the unknown true model of the data µ, in the sense that ν will
allow us to predict future bits in the sequence as accurately as possible.
We begin by clarifying what we mean by a probability distribution. In math-
ematical statistics a probability distribution is known as a probability measure as
it belongs to the class of functions known as measures. Over the space of binary
strings these can be defined as follows:
2.3.1 Definition. A probability measure is a function ν : B∗→ [0,1] such that,
ν(ε) = 1,
∀x ∈ B∗ ν(x) = ν(x0) + ν(x1).
In this thesis we will interpret ν(x) to mean the probability that a binary
sequence sampled according to the distribution ν begins with the string x ∈ B∗.
As all strings and sequences begin with the null string ε, by definition, the first
condition above simply says that the ν probability that a sequence belongs to the
set of all sequences is 1. The second condition says that the ν probability that
a sequence begins with string x0, plus the ν probability that it begins with x1,
is equal to the ν probability that it begins with x . This makes sense given that
all sequences that begin with x must have either a 0 or a 1 as their next bit and
so we would expect the probabilities of these sets of sequences to add up. This
style of notation for measures will be convenient for our purposes, however it
is somewhat unusual. To see how it relates to conventional measure theory see
Appendix 7.3.
Sequence prediction forms a large part of this thesis and thus we will often
be interested in what comes next in a sequence given an initial string. More
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precisely, if a sequence ω has been sampled from the distribution µ, and ω be-
gins with the string y ∈ B∗, what is the probability that the next bits from ω
will be the string x ∈ B∗? For this will we adopt the following notation for
the conditional probability, µ(y x) := µ(y x)/µ(y). The benefit of this notation
will become apparent later when we need to deal with complex interaction se-
quences. Not only does it preserve the order in which the sequence occurs, it
also allows for more compact expressions when we need to condition on only
certain parts of a sequence.
As noted earlier in this section, sequence prediction can be viewed as an
inductive inference problem. Thus, we can use Bayes’ rule to estimate how
likely some model ν ∈H is given the observed sequence ω1:t:
P
 
ν
ω1:t= P(ω1:t |ν)P(ν)
P(ω
1:t
)
=
ν(ω
1:t
)P(ν)∑
̺∈H ̺(ω1:t)P(̺)
.
2.3.2 Example. Consider the problem of inferring whether a coin is a normal
fair coin based on a sample of coin flips. To simplify things, assume that the coin
is either heads on both sides, tails on both sides, or a normal fair coin. Further
assume that t = 4 and we have the observed data D = head,head,head,head.
In terms of binary sequence prediction, the outcome of t coin tosses can be
expressed as a string ω1:t ∈ B
t , with each tail being represented as a 0 bit, and
each head as a 1 bit. Thus we have ω1:4 = 1111.
LetH be the set of models consisting of the distributions νp(ω1:t) := p
r(1−
p)t−r , where p ∈
¦
0, 1
2
, 1
©
and r :=
∑t
i=1
ωi is the number of observed heads. As
there are just three models inH , assume a uniform prior, that is, ∀p ∈
¦
0, 1
2
, 1
©
let P(νp) :=
1
3
. Now from Bayes’ rule,
P(ν 1
2
|ω1:4 = 1111) =
1
3

1
2
4 
1− 1
2
0
1
3
h
04(1− 0)0+

1
2
4 
1− 1
2
0
+ 14(1− 1)0
i = 1
17
.
Similarly, P(ν0|ω1:4 = 1111) = 0 and P(ν1|ω1:4 = 1111) =
16
17
. Thus the results
clearly point towards the coin being double headed, as we would expect having
just observed four heads in a row. 3
More complex examples could involve data collected from medical measure-
ments, music or weather satellite images. Good models would then have to
describe biological processes, music styles, or the dynamics of weather systems
respectively. In each case the binary string representing D could be simply the
string of bits as they would appear in a computer file. However, finding a good
prior over such spaces is not trivial. Furthermore, actually computing Bayes’ rule
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and finding the most likely models, as we did in the example above, can become
very computationally difficult and may need to be approximated. In any case,
Bayes’ rule at least tells us how to solve the induction problem in theory, so long
as we have a prior distribution.
Rather than just estimating which model or models are the most likely, we
may be interested in actually predicting the sequence. One possibility is to cal-
culate the probability that the next bit is a 1 based on the most likely model. The
full Bayesian approach, however, is to consider each possible model ν ∈ H and
weight the prediction made by each according to how confident we are about
each model, i.e. P(ν |ω1:t). This gives us the mixture model predictor,
P(ω1:t1) =
∑
ν∈H
P(ν |ω1:t)ν(ω1:t1)
=
∑
ν∈H
ν(ω
1:t
)P(ν)
P(ω
1:t
)
ν(ω
1:t
1)
ν(ω
1:t
)
=
P(ω
1:t
1)
P(ω
1:t
)
.
As we can see, the Bayes mixture predictor reduces to the definition of condi-
tional probability. This has removed the prior over H , and in its place we now
have the related prior over D, in this setting the space of binary sequences. The
fact that we can use one prior to define the other means that the two unknown
priors are in fact two perspectives on the same fundamental problem of specify-
ing our prior knowledge.
2.3.3 Example. Continuing Example 2.3.2, we can compute the prior distribu-
tion over sequences from the prior distribution overH ,
P(ω
1:t
) =
∑
ν∈H
ν(ω
1:t
)P(ν)
=
1
3

0t(1− 0)t−r +

1
2
t 
1−
1
2
t−r
+ 1t(1− 1)t−r

=
1
3

1
2
2t−r
+δt r

.
where r :=
∑t
i=1
ωi is the number of observed heads, and the Kronecker delta
symbol δab is defined to be 1 if a = b, and 0 otherwise. Thus, given that ω1:4 =
1111, according to the mixture model the probability that the next bit is a 1 is,
P(11111) =
1
3
h
1
2
2(5)−5
+δ5,5
i
1
3
h
1
2
2(4)−4
+δ4,4
i =

1
2
5
+ 1
1
2
4
+ 1
=
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2.4 Solomono's prior and Kolmogorov omplexity
In the 1960’s Ray J. Solomonoff (1926–) investigated the problem of inductive
inference from the perspective of binary sequence prediction [Solomonoff, 1964,
1978]. He was interested in a very general form of the problem, specifically,
learning to predict a binary sequence that has been sampled from an arbitrary
unknown computable distribution. Solomonoff defined his prior distribution
over sequences as follows: The prior probability that a sequence begins with a
string x ∈ B∗ is the probability that a universal Turing machine running a ran-
domly generated program computes a sequence that begins with x . By randomly
generated, we mean that the bits of the program have a uniform distribution, for
example, they could come from flipping a fair coin. Formally,
2.4.1 Definition. The Solomonoff prior probability that a sequence begins with
the string x ∈ B∗ is,
M(x) :=
∑
p:U (p)=x∗
2−ℓ(p),
where U (p) = x∗ means that the universal Turing machine U computes an
output sequence that begins with x ∈ B∗ when it runs the program p.
Note that the 2−ℓ(p) term in this definition comes from the fact that the prob-
ability of p under a uniform distribution halves for each additional bit.
We will assume that U is a prefix universal Turing machine. This means that
no valid program for U is a prefix of any other. More precisely, if p,q ∈ B∗ are
valid programs onU , then there does not exist a string x ∈ B∗ such that p = qx .
Prefix universal Turing machines have technical properties that we will need and
so throughout this thesis we will assume thatU is of this type. Technically,U is
actually a type of prefix universal Turing machine known as amonotone universal
Turing machine (see Section 5.1). For the moment we can safely gloss over these
details.
2.4.2 Example. Rather than a classic universal Turing machine running a
program specified by a binary string on an input tape, it is often more intuitive
to think in terms of a program written in a high level programing language that
is being executed on a real computer. Indeed, if a computer had infinite memory
and never broke down it would be technically equivalent to a universal Turing
machine. Consider a short program in C that prints a binary sequence of all 1’s:
main(){while(1)printf("1");}
As far as C programs go, this is nearly as simple as they get. This is not surprising
given that the output is also very simple. If we want a program that generates
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a more complex sequence, such as an infinite sequence of successive digits of
the mathematical constant π = 3.141592 . . ., such a program would be at least
ten times as long. It follows then that the probability of randomly generating
a program that outputs all 1’s is far higher than the probability of randomly
generating a program that computes π. Thus, Solomonoff’s prior assigns much
higher probability to the sequences of all 1’s than to the sequence for π. More
complex sequences would require still larger programs and thus have even lower
prior probability. 3
Although Solomonoff’s definition requires nothing more than random bits
being fed into a universal Turing machine, we can see that the resulting distri-
bution over sequences neatly formalises Occam’s razor. Specifically, sets of se-
quences that have short programs, and are thus in some sense simple, are given
higher prior probability than sets of sequences that have only long programs.
The idea that the complexity of a sequence is related to the length of the
shortest program that generates the sequence motivates the following definition:
2.4.3 Definition. The Kolmogorov complexity of a sequence ω ∈ B∞ is,
K(ω) := min
p∈B∗
{ℓ(p) : U (p) =ω},
where U is a prefix universal Turing machine. If no such p exists, we define
K(ω) =∞. For a string x ∈ B∗, we define K(x) to be the length of the shortest
program that outputs x and then halts.
Kolmogorov complexity has many powerful theoretical properties and is a
central ingredient in the theory of universal artificial intelligence. Its most im-
portant property is that the complexity it assigns to strings and sequences does
not depend too much on the choice of the universal Turing machine U . This
comes from the fact that universal Turing machines are universal in the sense
that they are able to simulate each other with a constant number of additional
input bits. Thus, if we change U above to some other universal Turing machine
U
′, the minimal value of ℓ(p) and thus K(x), can only change by a bounded
number of bits. This bound depends on U and U ′, but not on x .
The biggest problem with Kolmogorov complexity is that the value of K is
not in general computable. It can only be approximated from above. The rea-
son for this is that in general we cannot find the shortest program to compute
a string x on U due to the halting problem. Intuitively, there might exist a
very short program p∗ such that U (p∗) = x , however we do not know this be-
cause p∗ takes such a long time to run. Nevertheless, in theoretical applications
the simplicity and theoretical power of Kolmogorov complexity often outweighs
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this computability problem. In practical applications Kolmogorov complexity is
approximated, for example by using a compression algorithm to estimate the
length of the shortest program [Cilibrasi and Vitányi, 2005].
2.5 Solomono-Levin prior
Besides the prior described in the previous section, Solomonoff also suggested
to define a universal prior by taking a mixture of distributions [Solomonoff,
1964]. In the 1970’s this alternate approach was generalised and further devel-
oped [Zvonkin and Levin, 1970; Levin, 1974]. As Leonid Levin (1948–) played
an important role in this, here we will refer to this as the Solomonoff-Levin prior.
It is closely related to the universal prior in the previous section: they lie within
a multiplicative constant of each other and share key technical properties.
Although taking mixtures is perhaps less intuitive, it has the advantage of
making important theoretical properties of the prior more transparent. It also
gives an explicit prior over both the hypothesis space and the space of sequences.
The topic is quite technical, however it is worth spending some time on as it lies
at the heart of universal artificial intelligence.
The hypotheses we have been working with up to now have all been proba-
bility measures. These can be generalised as follows:
2.5.1 Definition. A semi-measure is a function ν : B∗→ [0,1] such that,
ν(ε)≤ 1,
∀x ∈ B∗ ν(x)≥ ν(x0) + ν(x1).
Intuitively one may think of a semi-measure that is not a probability measure
as being a kind of defective probability measure whose probabilities do not quite
add up as they should. This defect can be fixed in the sense that a semi-measure
can be built up to be a probability measure by appropriately normalising things.
Intuitively, a function is enumerable if it can be progressively approximated
from below. More formally, f : X → R is enumerable if there exists a computable
function g : X ×N→ Q such that ∀x ∈ X ,∀i ∈ N : gi+1(x)≥ gi(x) and ∀x ∈ X :
limi→∞ gi(x) = f (x). Enumerability is weaker than computability because for
any x ∈ X we only ever have the lower bound gi(x) on the value of f (x). Thus
we can never know for sure how far our bound is from the true value of f (x),
that is, we do not know how large f (x)− gi(x) might be.
If a similar condition holds, but with the approximation function converging
to f from above rather than below, we say that f is coenumerable. One exam-
ple of such a function is the Kolmogorov complexity function K in the previous
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section. If a function is both enumerable and coenumerable, then we have both
upper and lower bounds and thus can compute the value of f to any required
accuracy. In this case we simply say that f is a real valued computable func-
tion. Clearly then, the enumerable functions are a super set of the computable
functions.
Our task is to construct a prior distribution over the enumerable semi-measures.
To do this we need to formalise Occam’s razor, and for that we need to define a
way to measure the complexity of enumerable semi-measures. Solomonoff mea-
sured the complexity of sequences according to the length of their programs,
here we can do something similar.
By definition, all enumerable functions can be approximated from below by
a computable function. Thus, it is not too hard to prove that the set of enumer-
able functions can be indexed by a Turing machine, and that this can be further
restricted to just the set of enumerable semi-measures. More precisely, there
exists a Turing machine T that for any enumerable semi-measure µ there exists
an index i ∈ N such that ∀x ∈ B∗ : µ(x) = νi(x) := limk→∞ T (i, k, x) with T
increasing in k. In effect, the index i is a description of µ in that once we know i
we can approximate the value of µ from below for any x by using the Turing ma-
chine T . As k increases, these approximations increase towards the true value of
µ(x). For details on how all this is done see Section 4.5 of [Li and Vitányi, 1997]
or [Legg, 1997]. The main thing we will need is the computable enumeration of
enumerable semi-measures itself, which we will denote by Me := ν1,ν2,ν3, . . ..
As all probability measures are semi-measures by definition, and all computable
functions are enumerable, it follows that the set of enumerable semi-measures
is a super set of the set of computable probability measures. We write Mc to
denote an enumeration of just the computable measures.
Note the two uses of the word “enumerable” above. When we say that a set
can be enumerated, what we mean is that there exists a way to step though all
the elements in this set. When we say that an individual function is enumerable,
such as a semi-measure, what we mean is that it can be approximated from be-
low by a series of computable functions. Some authors avoid this dual usage by
referring to enumerable functions as lower semi-computable. In this terminology,
what Me provides is a computable enumeration of the lower semi-computable
semi-measures. In any case, it is still a mouthful!
We can now return to the question of how to measure the complexity of an
enumerable semi-measure. As noted above, for νi ∈ Me the index i is in effect
a description of νi. At this point, it might seem that the natural thing to do is
to take the value of an enumerable semi-measure’s index to be its complexity.
The problem, however, is that some extremely large index values, such as 21000,
contain a lot less information than far smaller index values which are not as
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easily described: for example, an index whose binary representation is a string
of 100 random bits. The solution is that we must measure not the value, but
the information content of the index in order to measure the complexity of the
enumerable semi-measure it describes. We do this by taking the Kolmogorov
complexity of the index. That is, we define the complexity of an enumerable
semi-measure to be the length of the shortest program that computes its index.
Formally,
2.5.2 Definition. The Kolmogorov complexity of µ ∈Me is,
K(µ) := min
p∈B∗
{ℓ(p) : U (p) = i },
where µ is the i th element in the recursive enumeration of all enumerable semi-
measuresMe, and U is a prefix universal Turing machine.
In essence this is just an extension of the Kolmogorov complexity function for
strings and sequences (Definition 2.4.3), to enumerable semi-measures. Indeed,
all the key theoretical properties of the complexity function remain the same.
We can again see echos of Solomonoff’s prior for sequences in that enumerable
semi-measures that can be described by short programs are considered to be
simple, while ones that require long programs are complex.
Having defined a suitable complexity measure for enumerable semi-measures,
we can now construct a prior distribution over Me in a way that is similar to
what Solomonoff did. As each enumerable semi-measure µ has some shortest
program p ∈ B∗ that specifies its index, we can set the prior probability of µ to
be the probability of randomly generating p by flipping a coin to get each bit.
Formally:
2.5.3 Definition. The algorithmic prior probability of µ ∈Me is,
PMe(µ) := 2
−K(µ).
As K is coenumerable, from the definition above we can see that PMe is enu-
merable. Thus, this distribution can only be approximated from below.
With K as the definition of hypothesis complexity, PMe clearly respects Oc-
cam’s razor as each hypothesis µ ∈ Me is assigned a prior probability that is
a decreasing function of its complexity. Furthermore, every enumerable semi-
measure has some shortest program that specifies its index and so ∀µ ∈ Me :
K(µ) > 0 and thus ∀µ ∈Me : PMe(µ) > 0. It follows then that for an induction
system based on Bayes’ rule and the prior PMe , the value of P(ν |D) will be non-
zero whenever D is consistent with ν , that is, P(D|ν)> 0. Such systems will not
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discard hypotheses that are consistent with the data and thus respect Epicurus’
principle of multiple explanations.
With a prior over our hypothesis space Me, we can now take a mixture to
define a prior over the space of sequences, just as we did in Example 2.3.3:
2.5.4 Definition. The Solomonoff-Levin prior probability of a binary sequence
beginning with the string x ∈ B∗ is,
ξ(x) :=
∑
ν∈Me
PMe(ν) ν(x).
Clearly this distribution respects Occam’s razor as sets of sequences which
have high probability under some simple distribution ν , will also have high prob-
ability under ξ, and vice versa.
It is easy to see that the presence of just one semi-measure in the above
mixture is sufficient to cause ξ to also be a semi-measure, rather than a prob-
ability measure. Furthermore, it can be proven that ξ is enumerable but not
computable. Thus, we have that ξ ∈ Me. The fact that ξ is not a probability
measure is not too much of a problem because, as mentioned earlier, it is pos-
sible to normalise a semi-measure to convert it into a probability measure. In
situations where we need a universal probability measure the normalised ver-
sion of ξ is useful. Its main drawback is that it is no longer enumerable, and
thus no longer a member of Me. In most theoretical applications it is usual to
work with the plain ξ as defined above.
A fundamental result is that the two priors are strongly related:
2.5.5 Theorem. The Solomonoff prior M and Solomonoff-Levin prior ξ lie within
a multiplicative constant of each other. That is, M
×
= ξ.
Due to this relation, in many theoretical applications the differences between
the two priors are unimportant. Indeed, it is their shared property of dominance
that is the key to their theoretical power:
2.5.6 Definition. For some set of semi-measures M , we say that ν ∈ M is
dominant if ∀̺ ∈ M there exists a constant c̺ > 0 such that ∀x : c̺ ν(x) ≥
̺(x). Or more compactly, ∀̺ ∈M : ν ≥
×
̺.
It is easy to see that ξ is dominant over the set of enumerable semi-measures
from its construction: for x ∈ B∗ we have ξ(x) ≥ PMe(µ)µ(x) = 2
−K(µ)µ(x).
It follows then that ∀µ ∈ Me,∀x ∈ B
∗ : 2K(µ)ξ(x) ≥ µ(x). As M
×
= ξ, we see
that M is also dominant. We call distributions that are dominant over large
spaces, such asMe, universal priors. This is due to their extreme generality and
performance as prior distributions, something that we will explore in the next
two sections: firstly in the context of Bayesian theory in general, and then in the
context of sequence prediction.
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As we saw in Section 2.2, Bayes’ rule partially solves the induction problem
by providing an equation for updating beliefs. This is only a partial solution
because it leaves open two important issues: how do we choose the class of
hypotheses H , and what prior distribution PH should we use over this class?
Various principles and methods have been proposed to solve these problems,
however they tend to run into trouble, especially for large H . In this section
we will look at how taking the universal prior PMe over the hypothesis spaceMe
theoretically solves these problems.
When approaching an inductive inference problem from a Bayesian perspec-
tive, the first step is to define H . The most obvious consideration is that H
should be large enough to contain the correct hypothesis, or at least a suffi-
ciently close one. Being forced to expand our initial H due to new evidence is
problematic as both the redistribution of the prior probabilities, and the way in
which H is extended, can bias the induction process. In order to avoid these
problems, we should make sure that H is large enough to contain a good hy-
pothesis to start with. One solution is to simply choose H to be very large,
as we did in the previous section where we set H = Me. As this contains all
computable stochastic hypotheses, a larger hypothesis space should never be
required.
Having selected H , the next problem is to define a good prior distribution
over this space. Essentially, a prior distribution PH over a space of hypotheses
H is an expression of how likely we think different hypotheses are before tak-
ing the data into account. If this prior knowledge is easily quantifiable we can
use it to construct a prior. In the case of PMe this simply means taking the con-
ditional form of the Kolmogorov complexity function and conditioning on this
prior information.
More often, however, we either have insufficient prior information to con-
struct a prior, or we simply wish the data to ‘speak for itself’. The latter case is
important when we want to present our findings to others who may not share
our prior beliefs. The standard solution is to select a prior that is in some sense
neutral about the relative likelihood of different hypotheses. This is known as
the indifference principle. It is what we applied in the coin estimation problem
in Example 2.3.2 when we set P(νp) := |H |
−1 = 1
3
. That is, we simply assumed
that a priori all hypotheses were equally likely.
The indifference principle works well for small discrete H , however if we
extend the concept to even small continuous parametrised classes by defining a
probability density function in terms of the volume ofH , problems start to arise.
Consider again the coin problem, however this time allow the bias of the coin to
be θ ∈ [0,1]. By the indifference principle the prior is the uniform probability
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density P(νθ ) = 1. Now consider what happens if we look at this coin estimation
problem in a different way, where the parameter of interest is actually θ ′ :=
p
θ .
Obviously, if we take a uniform prior over θ ′ this is not equivalent to taking a
uniform prior over θ . In other words, the way in which we view a problem, and
thus the way in which we parametrise it, affects the prior probabilities assigned
by a ‘uniform prior’. Obviously this is not as neutral and objective as we would
like.
Consider how the algorithmic prior probability PMe behaves under a simple
reparametrisation. Let H := {νθ ∈ Mc : θ ∈ Θ} be a set of probability mea-
sures indexed by a parameter θ ∈ Θ, and define θ ′ := f (θ ) where f is a com-
putable bijection. It is an elementary fact of Kolmogorov complexity theory that
K( f (θ )) <
+
K(θ ) + K( f ), and similarly K( f −1(θ ′)) <
+
K(θ ′) + K( f ), from which
it follows that K(θ )
+
= K(θ ′). With a straight forward extension, the same ar-
gument can be applied to the Kolmogorov complexity of the indexed measures,
resulting in K(νθ )
+
= K(νθ ′). From Definition 2.5.3 we then see that,
PMe(νθ ) := 2
−K(νθ )
×
= 2−K(νθ ′ ) =: PMe(νθ ′).
That is, for any bijective reparametrisation f the algorithmic prior probability
assigned to parametrised hypotheses is invariant up to a multiplicative constant.
If f is simple this constant is small and thus quickly washes out in the posterior
distribution, leaving the inference results essentially unaffected by the change.
A more difficult version of the above problem occurs when the transforma-
tion is non-bijective. For example, define the new parameter θ ′ := (θ − 1
2
)2.
Now θ = 1
4
and θ = 3
4
both correspond to the same value of θ ′. Unlike
in the bijective case, non-bijective transformations also cause problems for fi-
nite discrete hypothesis spaces. For example, we might have three hypotheses,
H3 := {heads biased, tails biased, fair}. Alternatively, we could regroup
to have just two hypotheses, H2 := {biased, fair}. Both H3 and H2 cover the
full range of possibilities for the coin. However, a uniform prior overH3 assigns
a prior probability of 1
3
to the coin being fair, while a uniform prior over H2
assigns a prior probability of just 1
2
to the same thing.
The standard Bayesian approach is to try to find a symmetry group for the
problem and a prior that is invariant under group transformations. However,
in some cases there may be no obvious symmetry, and even if there is the re-
sulting prior may be improper, meaning that the area under the distribution is
no longer 1. Invariance under group transformations is a highly desirable but
difficult property to attain. Remarkably, under simple group transformations
PMe can be proven to be invariant, again up to a small multiplicative constant.
For a proof of this, as well as further powerful properties of the universial prior
distribution, see the paper that this section is based on [Hutter, 2007b].
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Given a prior distribution ξ over B∞, it is straightforward to predict the con-
tinuation of a binary sequence using the same approach as we used in Sec-
tion 2.3. Given prior distribution ξ and the observed string ω1:t ∈ B
∞ from a
sequence ω ∈ B∞ that has been sampled from an unknown computable distri-
bution µ ∈Mc, our estimate of the probability that the next bit will be 0 is,
ξ(ω1:t0) =
ξ(ω
1:t
0)
ξ(ω
1:t
)
.
Is this predictor based on ξ any good? By definition, the best possible predic-
tor would be based on the unknown true distribution µ thatω has been sampled
from. That is, the true probability that the next bit is a 0 given an observed initial
string ω1:t is,
µ(ω1:t0) =
µ(ω
1:t
0)
µ(ω
1:t
)
.
As this predictor is optimal by construction, it can be used to quantify the relative
performance of the predictor based on ξ. For example, consider the expected
squared error in the estimated probability that the t th bit will be a 0:
St =
∑
x∈Bt−1
µ(x)
 
ξ(x0)−µ(x0)
2
.
If ξ is a good predictor, then its predictions should be close to those made by the
optimal predictor µ, and thus St will be small.
Solomonoff 1978 was able to prove the following remarkable convergence
theorem:
2.7.1 Theorem. For any computable probability measure µ ∈Mc,
∞∑
t=1
St ≤
ln2
2
K(µ).
That is, the total of all the prediction errors over the length of the infinite
sequence ω is bounded by a constant. This implies rapid convergence for any
unknown hypothesis that can be described by a computable distribution (for a
precise analysis see Hutter, 2007b). This set includes all computable hypotheses
over binary strings, which is essentially the set of all well defined hypotheses. If
it were not for the fact that the universal prior ξ is not computable, Solomonoff
induction would be the ultimate all purpose universal predictor.
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Although we will not present Solomonoff’s proof, the following highlights
the key step required to obtaining the convergence result. For any probability
measure µ the following relation can be proven,
n∑
t=1
St ≤
1
2
∑
x∈Bn
µ(x) ln
µ(x)
ξ(x)
.
This in fact holds for any semi-measure ξ, thus no special properties of the
universal distribution have been used up to this point in the proof. Now, by the
universal dominance property of ξ, we know that ∀x ∈ B∗ : ξ(x) ≥ 2−K(µ)µ(x).
Substituting this into the above equation,
n∑
t=1
St ≤
1
2
∑
x∈Bn
µ(x) ln
µ(x)
2−K(µ)µ(x)
=
ln2
2
K(µ)
∑
x∈Bn
µ(x) =
ln2
2
K(µ).
As this holds for all n ∈ N, the result follows. It is this application of dominance
to obtain powerful convergence results that lies at the heart of Solomonoff in-
duction, and indeed universal artificial intelligence in general.
Although Solomonoff induction is not computable and is thus impractical, it
nevertheless has many connections to practical principles and methods that are
used for inductive inference. Clearly, if we define a computable prior rather than
ξ, we recover normal Bayesian inference. If we define our prior to be uniform,
for example by assuming that all models have the same complexity, then the re-
sult is maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimation, which in turn is related to maxi-
mum likelihood (ML) estimation. Relations can also be established to Minimum
Message Length (MML), Minimum Description Length (MDL), and Maximum
entropy (ME) based prediction (see Chapter 5 of Li and Vitányi, 1997). Thus,
although Solomonoff induction does not yield a prediction algorithm itself, it
does provide a theoretical framework that can be used to understand various
practical inductive inference methods. It is a kind of ideal, but unattainable,
model of optimal inductive inference.
2.8 Agent-environment model
Up to this point we have only considered the inductive inference problem, either
in terms of inferring hypotheses, or predicting the continuation of a sequence.
In both cases the agents were passive in the sense that they were unable to take
actions that affect the future. Obviously this greatly limits them. More powerful
is the class of active agents which not only observe their environment, they are
also able to take actions that may affect the environment. Such agents are able to
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agent environment
reward
observation
action
Figure 2.1: The agent and the environment interact by sending action, observa-
tion and reward signals to each other.
explore and achieve goals in their environment. We will need to consider active
agents in order to satisfy our definition of intelligence, that is, the ability to
achieve goals in a wide range of environments. Solomonoff induction, although
extremely powerful for sequence prediction, operates in too limited a setting.
2.8.1 Example. Consider an agent that plays chess. It is not sufficient for
the agent to merely observe the other player. The agent actually has to decide
which moves to make, so as to win the game. Of course an important part of
this will be to carefully observe the other player, infer the strategy they are using,
and then predict which moves they are likely to make in the future. Clearly then,
inductive inference still plays an important role in the active case. Now, however,
the agent has to somehow take this inferred knowledge and use it to develop a
strategy of moves that will likely lead to winning the game. This second part
may not be easy. Indeed, even if the agent knew the other player’s strategy in
detail, it might take considerable effort to find a way to overcome the other
player’s strategy and win the game. 3
The framework in which we describe active agents is what we call the agent-
environment model. The model consists of two entities called the agent and the
environment. The agent receives input information from the environment, which
we will refer to as perceptions, and sends output information back to the environ-
ment, which we call actions. The environment on the other hand receives actions
from the agent as input and generates perceptions as output. Each perception
consists of an observation component and a reward component. Observations
are just regular information, however rewards have a special significance be-
cause the goal of the agent is to try to gain as much reward as possible from the
environment. The basic structure of this agent-environment interaction model
is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
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The only way that the agent can influence the environment, and thus the
rewards it receives, is through its action signals. Thus a good agent is one that
carefully selects its actions so as to cause the environment to generate as much
reward as possible. Presumably such an agent will make good use of any useful
information contained in past rewards, actions and observations. For example,
the agent might find that certain actions tend to produce rewards while others
do not. In more complex environments the relationship between the agent’s
actions, what it observes and the rewards it receives might be very difficult to
discover.
The agent-environment model is the framework used in the area of artificial
intelligence known as reinforcement learning. It is equivalent to the controller-
plant framework used in control theory, where the controller takes the place of
the agent, and the plant is the environment that must be controlled. With a little
imagination, a huge variety of problems can be expressed in this framework:
everything from playing a game of chess, to landing an aeroplane, to writing
an award winning novel. Furthermore, the model says nothing about how the
agent or the environment work, it only describes their role within the framework
and thus many different environments and agents are possible.
2.8.2 Example. (Two coins game) To illustrate the agent-model consider the
following game. In each cycle two 50¢ coins are tossed. Before the coins settle
the player must guess at the number of heads that will result: either 0, 1, or 2.
If the guess is correct the player gets to keep both coins and then two new coins
are produced and the game repeats. If the guess is incorrect the player does not
receive any coins, and the game is repeated.
In terms of the agent-environment model, the player is the agent and the
system that produces all the coins, tosses them and distributes the reward when
appropriate, is the environment. The agent’s actions are its guesses at the num-
ber of heads in each iteration of the game: 0, 1 or 2. The observation is the state
of the coins when they settle, and the reward is either $0 or $1.
It is easy to see that for unbiased coins the most likely outcome is 1 head
and thus the optimal strategy for the agent is to always guess 1. However, if the
coins are significantly biased it might be optimal to guess either 0 or 2 heads
depending on the bias. 3
Having introduced the framework, we now formalise it. The agent sends
information to the environment by sending symbols from some finite alphabet
of symbols, for example, {left,right,up,down}. We call this set the action
space and denote it byA . Similarly, the environment sends signals to the agent
with symbols from an alphabet called the perception space, which we denote X .
The reward space, denoted by R , is always a subset of the rational unit interval
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[0,1] ∩Q. Restricting to ration numbers is a technical detail to ensure that the
information contained in each perception is finite. Every perception consists
of two separate parts: an observation and a reward. For example, we might
have X := {(old, 0.0), (warm, 1.0), (hot, 0.3)} where the first part describes
what the agent observes (old, warm or hot) and the second part describes the
reward (0.0, 1.0 or 0.3).
To denote symbols being sent we use the lower case variable names a, o and
r for actions, observations and rewards respectively. We index these in the order
in which they occur, thus a1 is the agent’s first action, a2 is the second action and
so on. The agent and the environment take turns at sending symbols, starting
with the agent. This produces a history of actions, observations and rewards
which can be written, a1o1r1a2o2r2a3o3r3 . . .. As we refer to interaction histories
a lot, we need to be able to represent these compactly. Firstly, we introduce the
symbol x ∈ X to stand for a perception that consists of an observation and a
reward. That is, ∀k : xk := okrk. Our second trick is to squeeze symbols together
and then index them as blocks of symbols. For the complete interaction history
up to and including cycle t, we can write ax1:t := a1x1a2x2a3 . . . at x t . For the
history before cycle t we use ax<t := ax1:t−1.
Before this section all our strings and sequences have been binary, now we
have strings and sequences from potentially larger alphabets, such as A and
X . Either we can encode symbols from these alphabets as uniquely identifiable
binary strings, or we can extend our previous definitions of strings, measures
etc. to larger alphabets in the obvious way. In some results technical problems
can arise, for example, it takes some work to extend Theorem 2.7.1 to arbitrary
alphabets [Hutter, 2001]. Here we can safely ignore these technical issues and
simply extend our previous definitions to general alphabets.
Formally, the agent is a function, denoted by π, which takes the current his-
tory as input and chooses the next action as output. We do not want to restrict
the agent in any way, in particular we do not require that it is deterministic. A
convenient way of representing the agent then is as a probability measure over
actions conditioned on the complete interaction history. Thus, π(ax1a2) is the
probability of action a2 in the second cycle, given that the current history is ax1.
A deterministic agent is simply one that always assigns a probability of 1 to a
single action for any given history. As the history that the agent can use to se-
lect its action expands indefinitely, the agent need not be Markovian. Indeed,
how the agent produces its distribution over actions for any given history is left
open. In practical artificial intelligence the agent will of course be a machine
and so π will be a computable function. In general however, the system gen-
erating the probabilities for different actions could be just about anything: An
algorithm that generates probabilities according to successive digits of
p
e, an
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incomputable function, or even a human pushing buttons on a keyboard.
We define the environment, denoted by µ, in a similar way. Specifically, for
all k ∈ N the probability of xk, given the current interaction history ax<kak, is
given by the conditional probability measure µ(ax<kax k).
Technically, neither µ nor π completely define a measure over the space of
interaction sequences. They only define the conditional probability of certain
symbols given an interaction history: π defines the conditional probability over
the actions, and µ of the perceptions. However, taken together they do define a
measure over the interaction sequences that we will denote π
µ
. Specifically, we
can chain together the conditional probabilities defined by π and µ to work out
the probability of any interaction. For example,
π
µ
(ax
1:2
) := π(a
1
)µ(ax
1
)π(ax1a2)µ(ax1ax2).
When we need to take an expectation over interaction sequences this is the mea-
sure we will use. However in most other cases we will only need the conditional
probabilities defined by π or µ.
2.8.3 Example. To illustrate this formalism, consider again the Two Coins Game
introduced in Example 2.8.2. Let X := {0,1,2}× {0,1} be the perception space
representing the number of heads after tossing the two coins and the value of the
received reward. Likewise letA := {0,1,2} be the action space representing the
agent’s guess at the number of heads that will occur. Assuming two fair coins,
and recalling that xk := okrk, we can represent this environment by defining
∀k ∈ N:
µ(ax<kax k) :=

1
4
if ak = 0∧ ok = 0∧ rk = 1,
3
4
if ak = 0∧ ok 6= 0∧ rk = 0,
1
2
if ak = 1∧ ok = 1∧ rk = 1,
1
2
if ak = 1∧ ok 6= 1∧ rk = 0,
1
4
if ak = 2∧ ok = 2∧ rk = 1,
3
4
if ak = 2∧ ok 6= 2∧ rk = 0,
0 otherwise.
An agent that performs well in this environment would be,
π(ax<kak) :=

1 for ak = 1,
0 otherwise.
That is, always guess that one head will be the result of the two coins being
tossed. A more complex agent might keep count of how many heads occur in
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each cycle and then adapt its strategy if it seems that the coins are sufficiently
biased. For example, a Bayesian agent might use techniques similar to those
used to predict coin flips in Examples 2.3.2 and 2.3.3. 3
2.9 Optimal informed agents
In the agent-environment model, the agent’s goal is to receive as much reward
as possible. Unfortunately, this is not sufficiently precise as there may be many
possible reward sequences in a given environment and it is not clear which is
preferred.
2.9.1 Example. Consider the following two agents: Agent π1 immediately finds
a way to get a reward of 0.5 and does so in every cycle. Thus, after 100 cycles it
has received a total reward of 50. Agent π2, however, spends the first 90 cycles
trying to find the best possible way to receive reward in each cycle. During this
time it gets an average reward of 0.1 in each cycle. At cycle 90 it works out
the optimal behaviour and then receives a reward of 1 in every cycle thereafter.
Thus, after 100 cycles it has received a total reward of 90 × 0.1 + 10 = 19.
In terms of the total reward received after 100 cycles, π1 is superior to π2.
However, after 1,000 cycles this has reversed as π1 has a total reward of 500,
while π2 has a total reward of 919. 3
Which of these two agents is the better one? The answer depends on how
we value reward at different points in the future. In some situations we may
want our agent to perform well quickly, and thus place more value on short
term rewards. In others, we might only care that it eventually reaches a level
of performance that is as high as possible, and thus place relatively high value
on rewards far into the future. Before we can define an optimal agent, we first
need to formally express our temporal preferences.
A general approach is to weight, or discount, each reward in a way that
depends on which cycle it occurs in. Let γ1,γ2, . . . be the discounts we apply
to the reward in each successive cycle, where ∀i : γi ≥ 0, and
∑
∞
i=1
γi < ∞ in
order to avoid infinite weighted sums. Now define the expected future discounted
reward for agent π interacting with environment µ given interaction history ax<t
to be,
Vπµ
γ
(ax<t) := E
 
∞∑
i=t
γi ri
 ax<t
!
= lim
m→∞
∑
ax t:m
(γt rt + · · ·+ γmrm)
π
µ
(ax<t ax t:m).
48 2.9 Optimal informed agents
As the sum is monotonically increasing in m, and finitely upper bounded, the
limit always exists. For t = 1 we drop the interaction history from the notation
and simply write Vπµ
γ
.
One of the most common ways to set the discount parameters is to decrease
them geometrically into the future. That is, set ∀i : γi := α
i for some discount
rate α ∈ (0,1). By increasing α towards 1 we weight long term rewards more
heavily, conversely by reducing it we weight them less so. Thus, the parameter
α controls how short term greedy, or long term farsighted, the agent should be.
2.9.2 Example. Consider again the two agents from Example 2.9.1. As the
rewards are deterministic for π1 we can drop the expectation,
Vπ
1µ
γ
=
∞∑
i=1
αi0.5= 0.5A,
where A := α
1−α
is from the standard formulae for geometric series. On the other
hand for agent π2,
Vπ
2µ
γ
=
90∑
i=1
αi0.1+
∞∑
i=91
αi = 0.1A(1−α90) + Aα90.
Equating the two and then solving, we find that π2 has higher expected future
discounted reward than π1 when α > 90
p
4/9≈ 0.991. 3
A major advantage of geometric discounting is that it is mathematically con-
venient to work with. Indeed, it is what we will use in Chapter 6 for our re-
inforcement learning algorithm. In the present context, however, we want to
keep the development fairly general and thus we will leave the structure of
γ unspecified. An even more general approach is to consider the space of all
bounded enumerable discount sequences. We will take this approach when for-
mally defining intelligence in Chapter 4 as it will allow us to completely remove
γ from the model. Here we will follow the more conventional approach to AIXI
and simply take γ to be a free parameter.
Having formalised the agent’s temporal preference in terms of γ, we can now
define the optimal agent:
2.9.3 Definition. The optimal agent for an environment µ and discounting γ is
the agent πµ that has maximal expected future discounted reward. Formally,
πµ := argmax
π
Vπµ
γ
.
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The superscript µ emphasises the fact that the agent is optimal with respect
to the specific environment µ. This optimality is possible because the agent was
constructed using µ. In a sense the agent knows what its environment is before
it has even interacted with it. This is similar to Section 2.7 where the optimal
sequence predictor was defined using the distribution that was generating the
sequence to be predicted.
To understand how the optimal agent πµ behaves in each cycle, we first
express the value function in a recursive form for an arbitrary agent π. From the
definition of V ,
Vπµ
γ
(ax<t) = lim
m→∞
∑
ax t:m
(γt rt + · · ·+ γmrm)
π
µ
(ax<t ax t:m)
=
∑
ax t

lim
m→∞
∑
ax t+1:m
 
γt rt + · · ·+ γmrm

π
µ
(ax1:t ax t+1:m)

π
µ
(ax<t ax t)
=
∑
ax t
h
γt rt + V
πµ
γ
(ax1:t)
i
π
µ
(ax<t ax t). (2.1)
In the first step we broke cycle t off both the sum and π
µ
. As these do not
involve m, we pushed them outside the square brackets and moved the limit
inside. In the second step we broke off the first discounted reward and dropped
the sum for this term as it was redundant. The remaining discounted rewards
are just V with t advanced by one, thus producing the desired recursion in V .
This is essentially a discrete time form of the Bellman equation commonly
used in control theory, finance, reinforcement learning and other fields con-
cerned with optimising dynamic systems [Bellman, 1957; Sutton and Barto,
1998]. Usually it is assumed that the environment is Markovian and thus only
a limited history needs to be taken into account. Here, however, we include
the entire interaction history and thus are able to avoid these restrictions on the
environment. Again, this is to keep the model as general as possible.
Consider now how at is chosen by the optimal agent π
µ. By definition, the
optimal action is the one that maximises V . Therefore πµ(ax<t at) = 1 for the
expected future discounted reward maximising action, and zero otherwise (ties
can be broken arbitrarily). Thus, after expanding Equation (2.1) with π replaced
by πµ, we can replace
∑
at
and πµ(ax<t at) with simply a maximum over the
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possible actions,
Vπ
µµ
γ
(ax<t) =
∑
at
∑
x t
h
γt rt + V
πµµ
γ
(ax1:t)
i
πµ(ax<t at)µ(ax<t ax t)
= max
at
∑
x t
h
γt rt + V
πµµ
γ
(ax1:t)
i
µ(ax<t ax t)
= max
at
∑
x t
· · ·max
am
∑
xm
h
γt rt+· · ·+γmrm+V
πµµ
γ
(ax1:m)
i
µ(ax<t ax t:m)
In the last step we have simply unfolded the recursion in V for the first m cycles.
As m →∞ the term Vπ
µµ
γ
(ax1:m)→ 0. Thus, if we take the limit m →∞ above
we can drop V without affecting the result. It follows then that the action taken
by the optimal policy πµ in the t th cycle is,
aπ
µ
t
:= argmax
at
lim
m→∞
∑
x t
max
at+1
∑
x t+1
· · · max
am
∑
xm

γt rt + · · ·+ γmrm

µ(ax<t ax t:m).
If there is more than one maximising action in cycle t, we simply select one of
these in an arbitrary way.
Intuitively, in the above equation we can see that the optimal agent takes
the distribution µ, and in effect does a brute force search through all possible
futures looking for the action in the current cycle that maximises the expected
future discounted reward. The agent knows that the environment will always re-
spond according to the distribution µ, thus in each cycle it takes the expectation
by summing over all the possible observations x and weighting these by their
probability according to µ. Furthermore, as the agent always follows an optimal
strategy, its own future actions are just a series of value maximising actions.
2.10 Universal AIXI agent
Although the agent πµ performs optimally in environment µ, this does not meet
the requirements for intelligence according to our definition adopted in Chap-
ter 1. What we require is a general agent that works well in many different en-
vironments. Such an agent must learn about its environment by interacting with
it, and then modify its behaviour accordingly in order to optimise performance.
Only then will the agent have the kind of adaptability to different environments
that we require of an intelligent agent.
This problem with the optimal agent πµ is similar to the one we encountered
in Section 2.7. There the optimal sequence predictor was based on the distri-
bution µ that was actually generating the sequence. Of course, for inductive
inference µ is unknown and must be inferred by observing the sequence. Thus,
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basing a predictor on µ might be “optimal” in terms of prediction performance,
but it is in some sense cheating. Moreover, it is certainly not general as the
predictor is designed for just one environment.
Solomonoff’s solution was to replace the unknown µ in the optimal predictor
with a universal prior distribution, such as ξ. This produced an extremely pow-
erful universal predictor that rapidly converged to optimal predictions whenever
the distribution µ was computable (Theorem 2.7.1). In this way Solomonoff
solved, at least in theory, the problem of predicting sequences from unknown
distributions. Hutter’s innovation was to do essentially the same trick for active
agents: he took the optimal active agent πµ, described in the previous section,
and replaced the unknown µ with a generalised universal prior distribution ξ.
This produced πξ, also known as AIXI, which will be described in this section.
In order to construct πξ, the first thing to do is to generalise ξ in Defini-
tion 2.5.4 from sequences to active environments. As we saw earlier, an active
environment µ is an enumerable semi-measure conditioned, in chronological
order, on a sequence of actions from an agent. The presence of these actions
causes no problems, indeed the development of a universal distribution over ac-
tive environments is virtually identical to what we did for sequence prediction
in Section 2.5.
It can be shown that the space of all enumerable chronological semi-measures
can be effectively enumerated. Let E := {µ1,µ2, . . .} be such an enumeration.
Define the Kolmogorov complexity of one of these environments to be the length
of the shortest program that computes the environment’s index: just as we did
for distributions over sequences in Definition 2.5.2. This gives us the universal
prior probability of a chronological environment ν ∈ E,
PE(ν) := 2
−K(ν).
From this prior over environments we can construct a prior over the agent’s
observations in a given interaction history by taking a mixture over the environ-
ments,
ξ(ax
1:n
) :=
∑
ν∈E
2−K(ν) ν(ax
1:n
).
It is easy to see that ξ is enumerable because 2−K(ν) is enumerable, as is each
ν in the sum. Furthermore, this sum of chronological semi-measures is itself
a chronological semi-measure. Thus, we see that ξ ∈ E. As was the case for
sequences, the dominance property for ξ can easily be seen by taking one ele-
ment from the sum corresponding to the semi-measure to be dominated. Note
that we are reusing the symbol ξ. Whether we are talking about ξ defined over
sequences, or over chronological environments, will always be clear from the
context.
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To construct the AIXI agent πξ, simply take πµ and replace µ with ξ,
aπ
ξ
t
:= argmax
at
lim
m→∞
∑
x t
max
at+1
∑
x t+1
· · · max
am
∑
xm

γt rt + · · ·+ γmrm

ξ(ax<t ax t:m).
This gives us an agent that does not depend on the unknown µ. Replacing the
true distribution µ in the optimal agent πµ with the universal prior distribution ξ
is essentially the same as what we did in Section 2.7 when defining Solomonoff’s
universal predictor. Of course now we are working in the more general setting
of chronological environments rather than just sequences.
Given that Solomonoff prediction works so well for sequence prediction, we
might expect the agent πξ defined above to be similarly powerful in chrono-
logical environments. To some extent this is the case, however analysing the
performance of universal agents in chronological environments turns out to be
significantly more complex.
Perhaps the most elementary question concerns whether our generalised ξ
converges to the true environment µ. It turns out that convergence results can be
proven, including a result similar to Solomonoff’s convergence result generalised
to interaction histories. More precisely, it can be proven that the total µ-expected
squared difference between µ and ξ is finite for interaction histories sampled
from πµ interacting with a computable environment µ. Unfortunately, when the
interaction history comes from µ interacting with πξ, rather than πµ, we run into
trouble. This problem is well illustrated by the Heaven and Hell environment
from Section 5.3.2 of [Hutter, 2005]:
2.10.1 Example. (Heaven and Hell) Imagine an environment where in the
first cycle the agent is faced with two unmarked doors, one of which must be
opened. One of these doors leads to “heaven” where the agent receives plentiful
rewards, and the other leads to “hell” where the agent never gets any reward.
Once a door is chosen there is no way to go back, the agent is stuck in either
heaven or hell forever.
This is no problem for πµ as it knows µ and so it knows which door to take to
get to heaven. Thus it always achieves maximal future discounted reward. The
agent πξ, on the other hand, must learn through experience. Of course once it
has the necessary experience to make the right choice, it may already be too late.
All πξ can do is to guess which door to take and hope for the best. Obviously
the expected performance of πξ will be far below that of πµ. 3
This example does not expose a design flaw in πξ, in the sense that no gen-
eral agent is able to consistently behave optimally in such environments. For
example, consider an environment µ′ with the two doors switched. Agent πµ
would always go to hell in this environment. We could define an agent πµ
′
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which would be optimal in µ′, however it would always go to hell in µ. Clearly,
no agent could behave optimally in both environments without being told what
the true environment was in advance. Matching the performance of optimal
agents in each of their respective environments is thus an impossible task for
any one agent. As such, we need to think carefully about what it is that we want
to prove if we are to show that πξ is indeed a very powerful and general agent.
We have already seen in Section 2.7 that the above problem does not occur
in the sequence prediction setting. This is because in sequence prediction an
agent’s predictions do not affect the future observed sequence and thus mistakes
have no consequences beyond the current cycle. This allows Solomonoff’s pre-
diction system to be able to learn to perform optimally across the entire space of
computable sequence prediction problems. Such optimising behaviour is possi-
ble in certain other classes of environments. What this suggests then is that we
should focus on classes of environments, such as sequence prediction, in which
it is at least possible for a general agent to learn to behave optimally.
We begin by generalising the AIXImodel to different classes of environments.
Let E be a non-strict subset of the enumeration E of all enumerable chronological
semi-measures. Define the mixture distribution over E ,
ζ(ax
1:n
) :=
∑
ν∈E
2−K(ν) ν(ax
1:n
).
Now define the agent πζ based on ζ, just as we defined πξ based on ξ. Note that
while πξ is a single agent, the agent πζ depends on which class of environments
E we are considering. If E = E then ζ = ξ and so πζ = πξ. In this sense πζ
generalises πξ.
Perhaps the most elementary property that an optimal general agent must
have is that there should not exist any other agent that is strictly superior. More
precisely:
2.10.2 Definition. An agent π is Pareto optimal if there is no other agent ρ
such that ∀µ ∈ E ,
Vρµ
γ
(ax<t) ≥ V
πµ
γ
(ax<t) ∀ax<t ,
with strict inequality for at least one µ.
Note that Pareto optimality does not rule out the possibility that some other
agent exists which performs better in some environment in E . It simply means
that no other agent exists which is at least as good in all environments in E , and
strictly better in at least one. For the agent πζ the following optimality result
can be proven (Section 5.5 of Hutter, 2005):
2.10.3 Theorem. For any E ⊆ E, the agent πζ is Pareto optimal.
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As this holds for any E , it also holds for E = E. Thus, the AIXI agent πξ is a
Pareto optimal agent over the space of environments E. Note that for any space
of environments E many Pareto optimal agents may exist.
A stronger result can be proven showing that πζ is also balanced Pareto opti-
mal [Hutter, 2005]. Essentially, this means that any increase in performance in
some environment due to switching to another agent, is compensated for by an
equal or greater decrease in performance in some other environment.
While these Pareto optimality results are very general, they only succeed
in showing that πζ is superior, or at least equal, to other general agents over
the same class of environments. The result does not rule out the possibility
that all general agents, including πζ, typically perform poorly. What we need
is to show that πζ does indeed learn to perform well in many environments.
The complication, as we saw in Example 2.10.1 above, is that in some types
of environments it is impossible for general agents to perform well. Thus we
somehow need to characterise those types of environments in which it is at least
possible for a general agent to perform well. Furthermore, even when optimal
performance is possible for a general agent, we cannot expect such an agent to
perform optimally immediately. We need a performance measure that gives the
agent time to learn about the structure of µ though interaction. One way to
formalise the concept of optimal performance after a period of learning is the
following:
2.10.4 Definition. An agent π is said to be self-optimising in an environment µ
if,
1
Γt
Vπµ
γ
(ax<t) →
1
Γt
Vπ
µµ
γ
(a˙x˙<t)
with µ probability 1 as t → ∞. Here ax<t is an interaction history sampled
from π interacting with µ, and a˙x˙<t is an interaction history sampled from π
µ
interacting with µ. The normalisation factor, defined Γt :=
∑
∞
i=t
γi, is the total
discount remaining at time t.
Essentially this says that with high probability the performance of the agent
π converges to the performance of the optimal agent. The normalisation is
necessary because the un-normalised expected future discounted reward always
converges to zero. Thus without it convergence would trivially hold for any
agent.
We say that π is self-optimising for the set of environments E if it is self-
optimising for every environment in E . Furthermore, we say that a set of en-
vironments E admits self-optimising agents if there exists an agent π that is self-
optimising for E . We also extend the result to non-stationary agents by saying
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that a series of agents π1,π2, . . . is self-optimising if the above result holds with
π replaced by πt . That is, in the t
th cycle agent πt is applied.
The following powerful self-optimising result can be proven [Hutter, 2005]:
2.10.5 Theorem. If there exists a sequence of self-optimising agents πm for a class
of environments E , then the agent πζ is also self-optimising for E .
Intuitively, this result says that the performance of πζ will converge to opti-
mal performance in any class of environments where this is possible for a sin-
gle agent, even if the agent is non-stationary. This is the minimal requirement
possible, in the sense that if no self-optimising agent existed for some class of
environments, then trivially πζ cannot be self-optimising in the class either.
Although this is a strong optimality result, it does have two limitations.
Firstly, while the result shows that πξ converges to optimal performance when-
ever this is possible in a class of environments, it does not tell us how fast the
convergence is. In Solomonoff’s convergence theorem we saw that the conver-
gence of the universal predictor was extremely rapid. Ideally we would like a
similar result for active environments. Unfortunately, such a result is impossible
in general:
2.10.6 Example. (Needle in a haystack) Imagine an environment with N
buttons, one of which generates a reward of 1 in every cycle when pressed,
and all the rest produce no reward. The location of the correct button would
take roughly log2 N bits to encode, thus for most values of N we have K(µ) =
O(log2 N). As π
ξ is not informed prior to the start of the game as to which
button generates reward, the best it can do is to press the buttons one at a
time. Thus the expected number of incorrect choices that πζ will make is
O(N) = O
 
2K(µ)

. 3
Compare this to Theorem 2.7.1 for sequence prediction which bounds the
total squared difference in prediction error by O(K(µ)). Here in the active case
the best possible bound for any general agent is exponentially worse at O
 
2K(µ)

.
This is not a design flaw in πξ as the above limit applies to any general agent.
Clearly then, bounds showing rapid convergence are not possible in general.
We can only hope to prove convergence speed bounds for specific classes of
environments. Unfortunately, results in this direction currently exist only in very
simple settings.
This is a significant weakness in the theory of universal agents. Until further
results are proven it is hard to say just how fast, or slow, convergence to optimal
behaviour is in different classes of environments. As it appears that results in
this direction will be difficult, a more elementary result is to establish which
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classes of environments at least admit self-optimising agents, and under what
conditions. Once we have established this, by Theorem 2.10.5 it would then
follow that πζ is also self-optimising in these environments. If we can show this
for many classes of environments, it then follows that πζ is able to perform well
in a wide range of environments, at least in the limit.
Although the required analysis is not particularly difficult for many of the
basic classes of environments, sorting out all the definitions, the relationships
between them and the conditions under which they admit self-optimising agents
is lengthy and requires some care. This is the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter 3
Taxonomy of Environments
In the previous chapter we introduced the AIXI agent πξ, and its generalisation
to arbitrary spaces of environments, πζ. Of particular importance was Theo-
rem 2.10.5 which roughly said: For any class of environments for which there
exists a self-optimising agent, the agent πζ defined over this class is also self-
optimising. Thus, in order to understand the performance of πζ across a wide
range of environments, we need to understand which classes of environments
admit self-optimising agents, and which do not. In this chapter we present a
partial answer to this question by showing that many well known classes of en-
vironments admit self-optimising agents under reasonable conditions.
We begin by formalising some common classes of environments. To do this
we examine the environments’ measures and in particular the way in which
they condition on the interaction history. In this way we characterise and relate
many well known classes of environments, such as Bernoulli schemes, Markov
chains, and Markov decision processes (MDPs). Some interesting new classes of
environments naturally arise from the analysis. We then take some important
classes of problems studied in artificial intelligence, such as sequence prediction
and classification, and express these too in terms of the structure of their mea-
sures. This formalisation in terms of chronological measures reveals that many
classes of environments are special cases of other classes, that is, a hierarchy of
classes of environments exists. Studying this more closely we see that many of
these classes are in fact reducible to the class of ergodic MDPs. Putting all these
relationships together produces a taxonomy of classes of environments.
It is known that certain machine learning algorithms, such as Q-learning,
are self-optimising in the class of ergodic MDPs. As many of the classes in our
taxonomy are reducible to ergodic MDPs, it follows that these classes also admit
self-optimising agents. Thus, from Theorem 2.10.5, we see that πζ converges to
optimal behaviour in these classes of environments. In this way, we clarify our
earlier claim that universal agents can learn to behave optimally in a wide range
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of environments, as required by our definition of intelligence.
3.1 Passive environments
The first class of environments we will consider is the class of passive environ-
ments. Loosely speaking, such environments are not affected by the agent’s ac-
tions. We will be more interested in the active environments to be described in
later sections.
3.1.1 Definition. A Bernoulli scheme is an environment (A ,X ,µ) such that
∀ax1:k,
µ(ax<kax k) = µ(x k).
As the random variables x1, x2, . . . are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.), one may think of a Bernoulli scheme as being an i.i.d. process.
The above definition involves some slight abuse of notation. Essentially, what
we are showing is that an equivalent measure with the same name (on the right
hand side) can be defined over a reduced parameter space by dropping the pa-
rameters that have no effect on the value of the original measure (on the left
hand side). In other words, the equation above indicates that the distribution µ
over xk can be defined in a way that it is completely independent of the history
ax<kak.
Note also that we have written (A ,X ,µ) in order to specify the action and
perception spaces associated with the measure. This will be necessary in this
chapter as we will often need to consider relationships between environments
that differ in their action and perception spaces.
3.1.2 Example. Many simple stochastic processes can be described as Bernoulli
schemes. Imagine a game where a 6 sided die is thrown repetitively. The agent
receives a reward of 1 whenever a 6 is thrown, and 0 otherwise. There are no
actions that the agent can take. Formally, A := {ε}, O := {1,2,3, 4, 5, 6} and
R := B. The measure is defined ∀ax1:k,
µ(x
k
) :=
¨
1
6
for xk = okrk ∈ {(1,0), (2,0), (3,0), (4,0), (5,0), (6,1)},
0 otherwise.
3
Other than perhaps a constant environment, Bernoulli schemes are about the
simplest environments possible. Despite their simplicity, they are important in
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statistics where sets of i.i.d. random variables play an important role. For exam-
ple, sampling from a population should ideally produce individuals that are both
independent of each other, and come from the same underlying distribution.
A natural generalisation of Bernoulli schemes is to allow the next perception
to depend on the previous observation. This gives us a richer class of environ-
ments where the distribution over perceptions can change with time:
3.1.3 Definition. A Markov chain is an environment (A ,X ,µ) that is a
Bernoulli scheme ∀ax1, and ∀ax1:k with k > 1,
µ(ax<kax k) = µ(ok−1x k).
For a Markov chain the last observation completely defines the system’s state
and so these outputs are usually referred to as states. In more general classes
of environments this is not the case, so for consistency we will use our usual
terminology of observations and perceptions. Note that we treat the first cycle
as a special case as there is no previous perception to condition on. By requiring
the system to be a Bernoulli scheme in the first cycle we ensure that the first
action has no effect.
3.1.4 Example. Imagine a game where we have a ring shaped playing board
that has been divided into 20 different cells. There is a pebble that starts in cell
1 and moves around the board as follows: On each turn a standard six sided
die is thrown to decide how many positions the pebble will be moved clockwise
around the board. In cells 5 and 15 the agent receives a reward of 1. Otherwise
the reward is 0.
We can model this system as a Markov chain. LetA := {ε}, O := {0,1,2, . . . , 19},
R := B. For k = 1 the pebble is in cell 1 and thus ∀ax1,
µ(x
1
) :=

1 for o1 = 1 ∧ r1 = 0,
0 otherwise.
Now define ∀ax1:k with k > 1,
µ(ok−1x k) :=



1
6
for ok ∈

(ok−1+ 1)mod 20, . . . , (ok−1+ 6)mod 20
	
∧ rk = δ5,ok +δ15,ok ,
0 otherwise.
In this game there is a 1
6
chance of obtaining reward if the pebble is currently in
one of the six cells before either cell 5 or cell 15. 3
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From the definitions of Bernoulli schemes and Markov chains it is clear that
in both of these classes an agent is “passive”, in the sense that its actions have no
effect on the environment’s behaviour. The difference between the two classes
is the size of the history that is relevant to determining the next perception.
Increasing the length of this history to the full history of observations gives us
the most general class of completely passive environments:
3.1.5 Definition. A Totally Passive Environment is an environment (A ,X ,µ)
such that ∀ax1:k,
µ(ax<kax k) = µ(o<kx k).
By construction, this class of environments is a super set of the classes of en-
vironments defined thus far. We could define a more limited version of this class
where the next perception only depends on the last n observations, rather than
the full history. However, such an environment is mathematically equivalent to
a standard Markov chain where for each history of length n we create a unique
observation in an enlarged observation space. In this new space the environment
can then be represented by a first order Markov chain. This reduction technique
will be used in a more general setting to prove Lemma 3.2.6.
While totally passive environments are useful in modelling some systems, in
terms of artificial intelligence they are relatively uninteresting because the agent
cannot do anything. We can relax this constraint just a little by only requiring
that the agent cannot affect future observations:
3.1.6 Definition. A Passive Environment is an environment (A ,X ,µ) such
that ∀ax<kaok,
µ(ax<kaok) = µ(o<kok).
Note that there are no restrictions on the rewards; the environment is free to
reward or punish the agent in any way. Totally passive environments are clearly
a special case of passive environments. For more on AIXI in passive environments
see Section 5.3.2 of [Hutter, 2005].
Another important special case is the class of problems where the agent is
rewarded for correctly predicting a sequence that it cannot influence:
3.1.7 Definition. A Sequence Prediction Problem is a passive environment
(A ,X ,µ) such that ∀ax1:k,
µ(ax<kaork) = µ(aork).
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That is, the reward in each cycle depends entirely on the action and the
observation that immediately follows it. As sequence prediction environments
are passive the observations do not depend on the agent’s actions, however there
is no limit on how long the relevant observation history can be. The above
definition makes precise what we meant in previous chapters where sequence
prediction problems were referred to as being “passive”. For more on how AIXI
deals with sequence prediction problems see Section 6.2 of [Hutter, 2005].
3.1.8 Example. LetA = O := {0,1, . . . , 9}. Define ∀ax1:k,
µ(o<kok) :=

1 if ok the k
th digit in 3.141592 . . . ,
0 otherwise,
and
µ(aor
k
) :=
¨
1 if rk = 1−
1
9
|ok − ak|,
0 otherwise.
Thus, in order to maximise reward, the agent must generate successive digits
of the mathematical constant π. A correct digit gets a reward of 1, while an
incorrect digit gets a lesser reward proportional to the difference between the
correct digit and the guess. 3
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The simplest active environment is one where the next perception xk depends
on only the last action ak:
3.2.1 Definition. A Bandit is an environment (A ,X ,µ) such that ∀ax1:k,
µ(ax<kax k) = µ(ax k).
This class of environments is named after the bandit machines found in casi-
nos around the world, although the relation to real bandit machines is tenuous.
Bandit environments are weaker than Markov chains as future perceptions do
not depend on past observations. However, they do have the ability to react
to the last action, and so in this respect they are more powerful. Even though
bandit problems are conceptually simple, solving them optimally is surprisingly
involved [Berry and Fristedt, 1985; Gittins, 1989].
3.2.2 Example. Imagine a machine that has n different levers, or arms, that
the agent can pull. Each arm has a different but fixed probability of generating
a reward. For this example, let the reward be either 0 or 1. The agent’s task is
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to figure out which arm to pull so that it maximises its expected reward. One
approach might be to spend time pulling different arms and collecting statistics
in order to estimate which produces the most reward.
We can formally define this bandit as follows: Let O := {ε}, R := B and
let A := {1,2,3, . . . ,n} represent the n different arms that the agent can pull.
Let β1,β2, . . . ,βn be the respective probabilities of obtaining a reward of 1 after
pulling the corresponding arm. Now define ∀ax1:k,
µ(ax
k
) :=

βak for rk = 1,
1− βak for rk = 0.
3
A natural extension to the class of bandits is to allow the next perception to
depend on both the last observation and the last action. This produces a much
more powerful class of environments that has been intensively studied and has
many theoretical and practical applications:
3.2.3 Definition. A (stationary) Markov Decision Process (MDP) is an
environment (A ,X ,µ) that is a Bernoulli scheme ∀ax1, and ∀ax1:k with k > 1,
µ(ax<kax k) = µ(ok−1ax k).
UsuallyMDPs are defined in such a way that the agent does not act before the
first perception. However, in our definition the first cycle is a Bernoulli scheme
and so the first action has no effect anyway. Aside from this detail, our definition
is equivalent to the standard definition [Bellman, 1957]. It is immediately clear
that this class generalises Bernoulli schemes, bandits and Markov chains.
What we have defined above is a stationary MDP. This is because the proba-
bility of a perception given the current action and the last perception does not
change, that is, it is independent of k. In some definitions the measure µ is al-
lowed to vary over time. These non-stationaryMDPs can be modelled as POMDPs,
which will be defined shortly.
3.2.4 Example. Consider again the simple Markov chain in Example 3.1.4.
This can be extended to an MDP by allowing the agent to decide whether to
move clockwise or anticlockwise around the board. Let O := {0,1, . . . , 19} and
R := B as before, but now A := {,} as the agent can select which direction
to move in. For k = 1 the pebble is in cell 1 and thus ∀ax1,
µ(ax
1
) :=

1 for o1 = 1 ∧ r1 = 0,
0 otherwise.
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Now define ∀ax1:k with k > 1,
µ(ok−1ax k) :=

1
6
for ok ∈

(ok−1+ 1)mod 20, . . . , (ok−1+ 6)mod 20
	
∧ rk = δ5,ok +δ15,ok ∧ ak =,
1
6
for ok ∈

(ok−1− 1)mod 20, . . . , (ok−1− 6)mod 20
	
∧ rk = δ5,ok +δ15,ok ∧ ak =,
0 otherwise.
3
A natural way to generalise the class of MDPs is to allow the next perception
to depend on the last n observations and actions:
3.2.5 Definition. A (stationary) nth order Markov Decision Process is an
environment (A ,X ,µ) that is a Bernoulli scheme ∀ax1, and ∀ax1:k with k > 1,
µ(ax<kax k) = µ(ok−maok−m+1:k−1ax k),
where m :=min{n, k}.
Immediately from the definition we can see that a standard MDP is an nth
order MDP where n = 1. The added complication of the variable m is to allow
for the situation where the current history length k is less than n.
It might appear that nth order MDPs are more general than standard MDPs,
however it turns out that any nth order MDP can be converted into an equivalent
MDP. This is done by extending the observation space and appropriately modi-
fying the measure. The proof follows the same pattern as the reduction of nth
order Markov chains to standard Markov chains, except that now we have to
deal with the complication of having actions in the history.
3.2.6 Lemma. nth order MDPs can be reduced to MDPs.
Proof. Let (A ,X = O ×R ,µ) be an nth order MDP. To prove the result we will
define an equivalent first order MDP (A ,Z =Q ×R , µ˜). We begin by defining
the new observation space,
Q :=
n⋃
i=1
O × (A ×O )i−1.
Every interaction history that the nth order MDP conditions on is thus uniquely
represented in Q. Although it complicates things, we need to include histories
of length less than n to accommodate the first n− 1 cycles of the system.
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Next we define a measure µ˜ over the perception space Z , that is equivalent
to the measure µ over the perception space X . We begin by dealing with the
first interaction cycle: ∀az1 ∈A ×Z define,
µ˜(az
1
) :=

µ(az
1
) for z1 ∈ X ,
0 otherwise.
This makes the processes equivalent in the first cycle.
Next, for interaction cycles k > 1, define ∀qk−1azk ∈ Q ×A ×Z ,
µ˜(qk−1azk) :=



µ(ok−maok−m+1:k−1ax k) if qk−1 = ok−maok−m+1:k−1
∧ zk = qkrk
∧ qk = ok−m+1aok−m+2:k−1aok,
0 otherwise.
That is, if the transition qk−1azk is possible when represented in the original
environment, then this transition is given the same probability by µ˜ in the new
environment. Any transition qk−1azk which is impossible in the original envi-
ronment, for example because the two histories represented by qk−1 and qk are
inconsistent, is given a transition probability of zero by µ˜. Thus, the two envi-
ronments have equivalent structure and dynamics. 2
As the proof illustrates, writing down the equation for a higher order MDP
and working with it is cumbersome. Thus, the above result is useful as it means
that we only have to deal with first order MDPs in our analysis. Nevertheless,
conceptually it is often more natural to think of certain problems as being nth
order MDPs.
Rather than increasing the history that the measure conditions on, another
extension is to assume that the agent cannot properly observe theMDP’s outputs:
3.2.7 Definition. A Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP)
is an environment (A ,X = O ×R ,µ) defined as follows: Let (A , X˜ = O˜ ×R , µ˜)
be an MDP called the core MDP. Let φ : X˜ ×X → [0,1] be a conditional proba-
bility measure of the form φ( x˜ x) which expresses the probability of perceiving
x when the core MDP outputs x˜ . Define ∀ax1:k ∈ (A ×X )
k,
µ(ax
1:k
) :=
∑
x˜1:k∈X˜
k
µ˜(ax˜
1
)φ( x˜1x1) µ˜(o˜1ax˜2)φ( x˜2x2) · · · µ˜(o˜k−1ax˜ k)φ( x˜kx k).
The nature of POMDPs is perhaps best illustrated by example.
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3.2.8 Example. Let the core MDP (A , X˜ , µ˜) be the MDP defined in Exam-
ple 3.2.4. Now imagine that the agent cannot reliably observe which cell the peb-
ble is in. To do this, let X := X˜ and define the observation function ∀ x˜ , x ∈ X ,
φ( x˜ x) :=
(
61
100
if x˜ = x ,
1
100
otherwise.
Thus, with probability 0.61 the agent observes the true output of the core MDP.
The rest of the time it observes some other randomly chosen output. The prob-
abilities add up as |X | = |O | × |R| = 20× 2 = 40. Thus, x can take 39 values
other than x˜ . 3
The fact that POMDPs generalise MDPs can be seen by letting X = X˜ and
φ( x˜ x) := δ x˜ ,x , in which case it follows that µ = µ˜. That is, the POMDP reduces
to being its core MDP. Furthermore, as nth order MDPs can be reduced to first
order MDPs, it follows that POMDPs also generalise higher order MDPs.
To see that POMDPs can define non-stationaryMDPs, consider a POMDPwhere
X is a strict subset of X˜ . Now use this extra internal information in the core
MDP to keep a parameter that varies over time and that affects the core MDP’s
behaviour. To the external agent who cannot observe this extra information, it
appears that the environment is non-stationary.
Both theoretically and practically this class of environments is difficult to
work with. However, it does encompass a huge variety of possibilities, including
all of the environments considered in this chapter, and many real world prob-
lems.
3.3 Some ommon problem lasses
Many of the problems considered in artificial intelligence can be expressed as
classes of environments using our measure notation. In this section we will
formalise some of them.
3.3.1 Definition. A Function Maximisation Problem is an environment
(A ,X ,µ) such that O = R and for some objective function f : A → R we
have ∀ax1:k,
µ(ax<kax k) :=

1 if ok = f (ak) ∧ rk =max{o1, . . . , ok},
0 otherwise.
Essentially, the agent’s actions are interpreted as input to some function,
and in each cycle the result of the function is returned as an observation. We
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do not simply return the current value of the function as the reward as this
discourages the agent from exploring once a good value has been found. Rather
we return the reward associated with the best value found so far. Obviously,
maximisation problems with different ranges, or minimisation problems, can be
expressed by applying a simple transformation to the original objective function.
For more on how AIXI deals with various types of function optimisation problems
see Section 6.4 of [Hutter, 2005].
3.3.2 Example. Let f (a) := 1− (a− 1
4
)2. To maximise reward the agent must
generate the action that maximises f , that is, a = 1
4
. 3
Artificial intelligence often considers environments that consist of some kind
of a game that is repetitively played by the agent. Games such as chess, various
card games, tic-tac-toe and others belong to this class, so long as at the end of
each match a new match is started. This can be formalised as follows:
3.3.3 Definition. A Repeated Strategic Game is an environment (A ,X ,µ)
where ∃l ∈ N such that ∀ax1:k,
µ(ax<kax k) = µ(aolm:k−1ax k)
where m := ⌊k/l⌋ is the number of the episode when in cycle k, and l is the
episode length.
Clearly, Bernoulli schemes and bandits are repeated strategic games. If we
want to allow games to finish before the episode finishes we can pad the re-
maining cycles, and perhaps also reward the system for padded cycles following
a victory in order to encourage rapid wins. For more on how AIXI deals with
strategic games see Section 6.3 of [Hutter, 2005].
Another common type of problem considered in artificial intelligence is clas-
sification. A classification problem consists of a domain space W and a set of
classes Z and some function f :W →Z . The agent must try to learn this map-
ping based on examples. When given cases where the class is missing it has to
correctly guess the class in order to obtain reward. More formally:
3.3.4 Definition. A Classification Problem is an environment (A ,X ,µ) set
up as follows. LetW and Z be two sets called the attribute space and the class
space respectively. Z includes a special symbol “?” used to indicate whether the
agent needs to guess the class. Let O ⊂W ×Z and let f :W →Z \{“?”} where
∀ax1:k such that xk−1 = wzrk−1 and xk = wzrk,
µ(ax<kawk) = µ(wk),
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and for α ∈ (0,1),
µ(wz
k
) =



α if zk = f (wk),
1−α if zk = “?”,
0 otherwise,
and
µ(zk−1akrk) =



1 zk−1 = “?”∧ ak = f (wk−1)∧ rk = 1,
1 zk−1 6= “?”∧ rk = 0,
0 otherwise.
The first condition says that the distribution of the points in the attribute
space is independent of the system’s history. In other words, this part of xk is
a Bernoulli scheme. The second condition says that in each cycle the system
must either provide a training instance or ask for the agent to classify based on
the attribute vector. The parameter α controls how often the agent is asked to
guess the class. The third condition says that reward is given when the system
asks for a classification and the agent guesses it correctly. It is easy to see that
classification problems are passive MDPs.
3.3.5 Example. Let each element of W be a vector of medical measurements
for a patient, and Z some list of diseases. When provided with a list of patients’
statistics and their diseases, the agent’s job is to learn a function that determines
which disease is present given a patient’s medical data. 3
For more on how AIXI deals with supervised learning problems see Sec-
tion 6.5 of [Hutter, 2005].
3.4 Ergodi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Intuitively, a Markov chain is ergodic if the current observation cannot impose
any long term constraints on future observations. Given that the reward in a
Markov chain only depends on the last observation, being ergodic also implies
that the current observation does not place any long term constraints on future
rewards either. Although the ergodic property is typically studied in the context
of Markov chains, in this section we will extend the notion to MDPs. To illustrate
the idea, we begin by considering some Markov chains that are not ergodic.
3.4.1 Example. Imagine a Markov chain with O := {A,B,C}. The chain
starts with observation A and then transitions to either B or C . In all subsequent
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cycles the observation remains the same. Thus, once observation B has been
generated, observation C will never occur. This is a long term constraint on
future observations, and thus the Markov chain is not ergodic. 3
It is as if the agent has gone through a one-way door into a part of the
environment that it can never return from. This is similar to the Heaven and Hell
environment in Example 2.10.1, except that in the above example the agent was
unable to choose where to go as the environment was passive. Consider now a
slightly more subtle example of non-ergodic behaviour.
3.4.2 Example. Imagine a Markov chain with O := {A,B}. The environment
starts with observation A and then in the first cycle transitions to B. In the
following cycle it transitions back to state A, and then in the next it returns to B.
In this way the system alternates between the two observations.
This environment might seem ergodic as both possible observations continue
to occur forever and so the agent clearly has not become confined to just one
part of the environment. However, if the current observation is A, it must be the
case that two time steps into the future the observation will again be A. In fact,
for any even number of time steps into the future the observation will always
be A. As this is a long term constraint on future observations the environment is
not ergodic. 3
The above example can be modified so that it is ergodic: after outputting ob-
servation Amake it so that there is a 0.1 probability of generating this again, and
a 0.9 probability of outputting B. Thus, no matter what the current observation
is, after three time steps the environment could output either observation.
We now formalise the proceeding concepts. We say that two observations
communicate if it is possible to go from one observation to the other and return
after some finite number of steps. A communicating class is a set of observa-
tions that all communicate with each other, and do not communicate with any
observations outside this set. If all observations of the Markov chain belong to
the same communicating class, we say that the Markov chain is irreducible. An
observation has period k if any return to the observation must occur in some
multiple of k time steps and k is the largest number with this property. For ex-
ample, if it is only possible to return to an observation in an even number of
steps, then this observation has period 2. If an observation has period 1 then it
is aperiodic, and if all observations are aperiodic we say that the Markov chain
is aperiodic. We can now formally define what it means for a Markov chain to
be ergodic:
3.4.3 Definition. A Markov chain environment (A ,X ,µ) is ergodic if and only
if it is irreducible and aperiodic.
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Consider again the two examples above. The technical reason the Markov
chain in Example 3.4.1 was not ergodic was because the observations A and B
were not communicating and thus the Markov chain was not irreducible. In
Example 3.4.2 the problem was that both observations had period 2 and thus
the Markov chain was not aperiodic.
To extend the concept of being ergodic to cover MDPs consider again the
relationship between Markov chains and MDPs. Let µ be an MDP environment,
and π an agent that is conditioned on only the last observation. That is, ∀ax<kak
with k > 1 we have,
π(ax<kak) = π(ok−1ak).
Now consider the measure π
µ
that describes how the above environment and
agent interact. In each cycle we have,
π
µ
(ax<kax k) :=
∑
ak∈A
π(ok−1ak)µ(ok−1ax k)
= π
µ
(ok−1x k).
Thus, if π has the form above and is fixed, the distribution over the next per-
ception depends on only the last observation. That is, π
µ
defines a Markov chain.
In other words, an MDP can be thought of as a Markov chain with the addition
of actions that allow an agent to influence future observations. We can remove
this by taking an appropriate agent and building it into the MDP. The resulting
system no long has free actions to be chosen, and reverts back to being a Markov
chain.
Using this relationship, we can now define ergodic MDPs in the natural way:
3.4.4 Definition. An MDP environment (A ,X ,µ) is ergodic if and only if there
exists an agent (A ,X ,π) such that π
µ
defines an ergodic Markov chain.
As higher order MDPs are reducible to MDPs, we will say that a higher order
MDP is ergodic if it is reducible to an ergodic MDP.
Consider again the Heaven and Hell environment defined in Example 2.10.1.
After the first interaction cycle the agent is always in either heaven or hell. Fur-
thermore, no matter what the agent does, it cannot switch between being in
heaven or being in hell, it is stuck in its current location for all eternity. Thus,
no matter what agent we select we cannot create a Markov chain such that the
observations of being in heaven communicate with the observations of being in
hell, and so this MDP environment is not ergodic.
The importance of ergodic MDPs for us will be their relationship to learning.
In an MDP environment only the current observation and action have any impact
on future perceptions. When theMDP is ergodic, the current observation also has
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no long term impact on future perceptions that cannot be overcome by taking
the right actions. This means that in an ergodic MDP environment no matter
what mistakes an agent might make, there is always a way to recover from
these. Obviously this is a significant property for learning agents, and indeed
the following important result can be proven:
3.4.5 Theorem. Ergodic MDPs admit self-optimising agents.
For references and other details see Appendix 7.3. As ergodic MDPs admit
self-optimising agents it follows by Theorem 2.10.5 that the universal agent πζ
defined over the class of ergodic MDPs is also self-optimising. What remains
to be shown is that many important classes of environments are in fact special
cases of ergodic MDPs. This is the topic of the next section.
3.5 Environments that admit self-optimising agents
In this section we will prove that some of the environments we have defined are
in fact ergodic MDPs. Thus, by the results in the last section, πζ is self-optimising
in these environments. Before we begin we first need to introduce one extra
property: we need to assume that environments are accessible, meaning that
there are no observations that have zero probability of ever being observed.
3.5.1 Definition. A chronological environment (A ,X ,µ) is accessible if
∀ok,∃ax<kak such that µ(ax<kakok)> 0.
It is reasonable to assume this because if it is impossible to find any finite
interaction history that gives some observation a non-zero probability then we
can simply remove it from the observation space. This produces an equivalent
environment that is accessible. In particular, this does not interfere with the
property that ergodic MDPs admit self-optimising agents. These unused extra
observations play no role.
3.5.2 Lemma. Bernoulli schemes are ergodic MDPs.
Proof. Consider a Bernoulli scheme (A ,X ,µ). From the definition of a
Bernoulli scheme we immediately see that they are a special case of the MDP
definition. As the environment is accessible, ∀ok, ∃ax<kak : µ(ax<kakok) > 0.
Applying the definition of a Bernoulli scheme, this reduces to ∀ok : µ(ok) > 0.
Thus, as the next observation does not depend on observations prior to ok−1, nor
does it depend on the actions or rewards, the agent and environment together
define a Markov chain. As all observations are possible at every point in time
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it follows that all observations belong to the same communicating class and are
aperiodic. That is, the Markov chain is ergodic. 2
Note that the above result holds independent of the agent as the environment
is passive. The same is true for classification problems:
3.5.3 Lemma. Classification problems are ergodic MDPs.
Proof. From Definition 3.3.4 we see that the distribution over the attribute
space W is not dependent on the interaction history, and the distribution over
the class space Z depends only on the attribute in the current cycle and so
it too is independent of anything in prior cycles. More formally, ∀ax<kakok :
µ(ax<kakok) = µ(wk)µ(wkzk) where ok := wkzk. Thus the distribution over
observations is completely independent of prior cycles.
Again from the definition of classification problems we see that the distribu-
tion over rewards depends on only the observation in the previous interaction
cycle and the action in the current cycle. It follows then that in each cycle the
perception (consisting of an attribute, class and reward) depends on only the
action in the current cycle and the observation in the previous cycle. Thus, clas-
sification problems are MDPs.
As the environment is accessible, ∀ok, ∃ax<kak : µ(ax<kakok) > 0. Because
the distribution over observations is independent of previous interaction cycles
this immediately reduces to ∀ok : µ(ok) > 0 and so the environment is er-
godic. 2
As classification problems are passive, in the above proof it was again possi-
ble to construct an ergodic Markov chain without specifying the agent. In active
environments, such as bandits, we must define an appropriate agent:
3.5.4 Lemma. Bandits are ergodic MDPs.
Proof. Consider a bandit (A ,X ,µ). By definition it is trivially an MDP. As the
environment is accessible ∀ok,∃ax<kak : µ(ax<kaok)> 0. Applying the definition
of a Bandit this reduces to,
∀ok,∃ak : µ(aok)> 0. (3.1)
Next we need to show that there exists an agent under which the agent
interacting with the environment defines an ergodic Markov chain. If we define
an agent ∀ak : π(ak) :=
1
|A |
it follows that ∀ax<kaok,
π
µ
(ax<kaok) :=
∑
ak∈A
π(a
k
)µ(ao
k
) =
1
|A |
∑
ak∈A
µ(ao
k
) =: π
µ
(o
k
).
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From Equation 3.1 it then follows that for each ok at least one of the terms in
the above sum is non-zero. Thus, ∀ok :
π
µ
(o
k
)> 0 and so π
µ
is an ergodic Markov
chain and therefore µ is an ergodic MDP. 2
Unfortunately, repeated strategic games are not ergodic MDPs. The problem
is that there may be observations which can only occur at certain points in each
episode, for example at the start or the end. Clearly then one cannot define an
agent such that these observations have period 1, making it impossible to con-
struct an ergodic Markov chain. Nevertheless, through a change of action and
perception spaces a repeated strategic game can be converted into an equivalent
system which is a bandit. Bandits, as we saw above, are ergodic MDPs. For our
purposes such a conversion is sufficient as it allows these environments to admit
self-optimising agents.
3.5.5 Lemma. Repeated strategic games are reducible to ergodic MDPs.
Proof. Let (A ,X ,µ) be a repeated strategic game with episode length l. Now
define a new action space A˜ :=A l . In this new action space every combination
of actions that an agent can take in a single episode of the game is represented
by a single action. Similarly, define a new perception space that represents each
episode, X˜ := X l , and now define a chronological measure µ˜ over the new
spaces such that ∀a˜x˜1:k,
µ˜(a˜x˜<k a˜x˜ k) = µ˜(a˜x˜ k) := µ(ax (k−1)l+1:(k−1)l+l).
By construction the environment (A˜, X˜ , µ˜) is a bandit and thus by Lemma 3.5.4
it is an ergodic MDP. 2
The above results show that Bernoulli schemes, classification problems, ban-
dits and repeated strategic games are either ergodic MDPs or can be reduced to
one. As such, they all admit self-optimising policies and thus an appropriately
defined universal agent πζ is self-optimising in these classes of environments.
As the rewards received in totally passive environments are independent of the
agent’s behaviour, these trivially admit self-optimising agents, indeed all agents
are equally “optimal”. What about function optimisation and sequence predic-
tion problems?
Unfortunately, the above approach does not work for function optimisation
problems as we have defined them. The problem is that they are not MDPs as
the reward signal depends on more than just the current action and the last
observation. They can be modelled as a POMDP by including the last reward in
the core MDP and making this unobservable. In any case, this is not a problem
because any agent that enumerates the action space will eventually hit upon
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the optimal action and thus is self-optimising. What this highlights is that being
self-optimising only tells us something about performance in the limit, it says
nothing about how quickly an agent will learn to perform well.
Sequence prediction problems are more problematic. In general, no agent
can be self-optimising over the class of all sequence prediction problems. To see
this, simply consider that for any prediction agent there exists a sequence where
the next observation is always the observation which the agent predicted would
be the least likely (for a formal statement of this see Lemma 5.2.4). This is true
even for incomputable agents. If we restrict the sequences to have computable
distributions, but still allow the agent to be incomputable, then we have seen
that Solomonoff’s predictor has a bounded total expected prediction error. As
the prediction error converges to zero, the reward converges to optimal and
so Solomonoff’s predictor is self-optimising. Given that the universal agent was
built upon the same foundations as Solomonoff’s predictor, we might then expect
the same result to hold. At present nobody has been able to prove this, though
it is conjectured to be true. Currently the best bound is exponentially worse
and holds only for deterministic computable sequence prediction (Section 6.2.2
of Hutter, 2005). For our purposes an exponentially worse bound is still finite
and thus it follows that a universal agent defined over the space of computable
sequences is self-optimising.
3.6 Conlusion
In this chapter we have defined a range of classes of environments and shown
that many of these are either special cases of other more general classes, or
are at least reducible to more elementary classes through a change of action
and perception spaces. This hierarchy of classes defines a kind of taxonomy of
environments. To the best of our knowledge this analysis has not been done be-
fore. Figure 3.1 summarises these relationships. The most general and powerful
classes of environments are at the top and the most limited and specific classes
at the bottom. As we can see, all of the more concrete classes at the bottom of
the hierarchy admit self-optimising agents. By Theorem 2.10.5 it then follows
that a universal agent defined over one of these classes is also self-optimising.
This supports our earlier claim that universal agents are able to perform well in
a wide range of environments, as required by our informal definition of intelli-
gence.
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Figure 3.1: Taxonomy of environments. Downward arrows indicate that the
class below is a special case of the class above. Dotted horizontal lines indicate
that two classes of environments are reducible to each other. The greyed area
contains the classes of environments that admit self-optimising agents, that is,
the environments in which a universal agent will learn to behave optimally.
Chapter 4
Universal Intelligene Measure
“. . . we need a definition of intelligence that is applicable to ma-
chines as well as humans or even dogs. Further, it would be helpful
to have a relative measure of intelligence, that would enable us to
judge one program more or less intelligent than another, rather than
identify some absolute criterion. Then it will be possible to assess
whether progress is being made . . . ” Johnson [1992]
In Chapter 1 we explored the concept of intelligence and proposed an in-
formal definition of intelligence. In Chapter 2 we introduced universal agents,
and in Chapter 3 we detailed some of the classes of environments in which their
behaviour converges to optimal. This shows that universal agents are highly in-
telligent with respect to the definition of intelligence that we have adopted. One
could argue that the universal agent defined over the space of all enumerable
chronological environments, that is AIXI, is in some sense an optimal machine
intelligence.
In this chapter we turn this idea on its head: Instead of using the theory
of universal artificial intelligence to define powerful agents, we use it instead to
formally define intelligence itself. One approach is to take AIXI and to mathemat-
ically define a performance measure under which AIXI is the maximal agent by
construction. This is the approach taken by the Intelligence Order Relation (see
Section 5.1.4 in Hutter, 2005). Although this produces a very general relation
for comparing the relative performance of agents, in order to justify calling this a
formal definition of “intelligence” one must carefully examine the way in which
intelligence is defined, and then show how this relates to the equation.
In this chapter we bridge this gap by proceeding in the opposite direction.
We begin with our informal definition of intelligence from Chapter 1 that was
based on a range of standard definitions given by psychologists and artificial in-
telligence researchers. We then formalise this definition, borrowing ideas from
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reinforcement learning, Kolmogorov complexity, Solomonoff induction and uni-
versal artificial intelligence theory as necessary. The result is an equation for
intelligence that is strongly related to existing definitions, and with respect to
which highly intelligent agents can be proven to have powerful optimality prop-
erties. We then look at some of this definition’s properties and compare it to
other tests and definitions of machine intelligence.
4.1 A formal denition of mahine intelligene
Consider again our informal definition of intelligence:
Intelligence measures an agent’s ability to achieve goals in a wide range
of environments.
This definition contains three essential components: An agent, environments
and goals. Clearly, the agent and the environment must be able to interact
with each other, specifically, the agent needs to be able to send signals to the
environment and also receive signals being sent from the environment. Similarly,
the environment must be able to send and receive signals. In our terminology
we will adopt the agent’s perspective on these communications and refer to the
signals sent from the agent to the environment as actions, and the signals sent
from the environment to the agent as perceptions.
Our definition of an agent’s intelligence also requires there to be some kind
of goal for the agent to try to achieve. Perhaps an agent could be intelligent, in
an abstract sense, without having any objective to apply its intelligence to. Or
perhaps the agent has no desire to exercise its intelligence in a way that affects
its environment. In either case, the agent’s intelligence would be unobservable
and, more importantly, of no practical consequence. Intelligence then, at least
the concrete kind that interests us, comes into effect when the agent has an
objective or goal that it actively pursues by interacting with its environment.
The existence of a goal raises the problem of how the agent knows what the
goal is. One possibility would be for the goal to be known in advance and for
this knowledge to be built into the agent. The problem with this is that it limits
each agent to just one goal. We need to allow agents that are more flexible,
specifically, we need to be able to inform the agent of what the goal is. For
humans this is easily done using language. In general however, the possession
of a sufficiently high level of language is too strong an assumption to make
about the agent. Indeed, even for something as intelligent as a dog or a cat,
direct explanation is not very effective.
Fortunately there is another possibility which is, in some sense, a blend of the
above two. We define an additional communication channel with the simplest
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possible semantics: a signal that indicates how good the agent’s current situation
is. We will call this signal the reward. The agent simply has to maximise the
amount of reward it receives, which is a function of the goal. In a complex
setting the agent might be rewarded for winning a game or solving a puzzle. If
the agent is to succeed in its environment, that is, receive a lot of reward, it must
learn about the structure of the environment and in particular what it needs to
do in order to get reward.
This system of an agent interacting with an environment and trying to achieve
some goal is the reinforcement learning agent-environment framework from
Section 2.8. That this framework fits well with our informal definition of in-
telligence is not surprising given how simple and general it is. Indeed, it is not
only used in artificial intelligence, in control theory it is known as the plant-
controller framework. For example, the plant could be a nuclear power plant,
and the controller a system designed to keep the reactor within safe operating
guidelines. Even the way in which you might train your dog to perform tricks by
rewarding certain behaviours fits into this very general framework.
As in Section 2.8, we will include the reward signal as a part of the perception
generated by the environment. The perceptions also contain a non-reward part,
which we will refer to as observations. The goal is implicitly defined by the
environment as this is what controls when rewards are generated. Thus, in the
framework as we have defined it, to test an agent in any given way it is sufficient
to fully define the environment.
Unfortunately, maximising reward is not sufficient to define how the agent
should behave over time. We have to define some kind of a temporal preference
that describes how much the agent should value near term rewards verses re-
wards further into the future. As we saw in Section 2.9, a general approach is
to weight, or discount, each reward in a way that depends on which cycle it oc-
curs in. Let γ1,γ2, . . . be the discounts we apply to the reward in each successive
cycle, where ∀i : γi ≥ 0, and
∑
∞
i=1
γi < ∞ in order to avoid infinite weighted
sums. Now define the expected future discounted reward for agent π interacting
with environment µ to be,
Vπµ
γ
:= E
 
∞∑
i=t
γi ri
!
.
It is this value function that incorporates our temporal preferences that the
agent must optimise. Although this is very general, the discounting parame-
ters γ1,γ2, . . . are nevertheless free parameters. In order to make our formal
measure unique we want to remove these parameters, and of course we must do
so in a way that is still completely general.
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If we look at the value function above, we see that discounting plays two
roles. Firstly, it normalises rewards received so that their sum is always finite.
Secondly, it weights the rewards at different points in the future which in effect
defines a temporal preference. A direct way to solve both of these problems,
without needing an external parameter, is to simply require the total reward
returned by the environment to be bounded. Without loss of generality, we set
the bound to be 1. We denote this set of reward-summable environments by E.
For any µ ∈ E, it follows that the expected value of the sum of rewards is also
finite and thus discounting is no longer required,
Vπ
µ
:= E
 
∞∑
i=1
ri
!
≤ 1.
One way of viewing this is that the rewards returned by the environment now
have the temporal preference already factored in. Indeed, because every reward
summable environment is included, in effect every possible temporal preference
is represented in the space of environments. The cost is that this is an additional
condition that we place on the space of environments. Previously we required
that each reward signal was in a subset of [0,1]∩Q, now we have the additional
constraint that the reward sum is always bounded.
Next we need to quantify what we mean by “goals in a wide range of envi-
ronments.” As we have argued previously, intelligence is not simply the ability to
perform well at a narrowly defined task; it is much broader. An intelligent agent
is able to adapt and learn to deal with many different situations, kinds of prob-
lems and types of environments. In our informal definition this was described
as the agent’s general ability to perform well in a “wide range of environments.”
This flexibility is a defining characteristic and one of the most important dif-
ferences between humans and many current AI systems: while Gary Kasparov
would still be a formidable player if we were to change the rules of chess, IBM’s
Deep Blue chess super computer would be rendered useless without significant
human intervention.
As we want our definition to be as broad and encompassing as possible, the
space of environments used should be as large as possible. As the environment
is a probability measure with a certain structure, an obvious possibility would be
to consider the space of all probability measures of this form. Unfortunately, this
extremely broad class of environments causes serious problems. As the space of
all probability measures is uncountably infinite, some environments cannot be
described in a finite way and so are incomputable. This would make it impos-
sible, by definition, to test an agent in such an environment using a computer.
Further, most environments would be infinitely complex and have little structure
for the agent to learn from.
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The solution is to require the environmental probability measures to be com-
putable. Not only is this condition necessary if we are to have an effective mea-
sure of intelligence, it is also not as restrictive as it might first appear. There
are still an infinite number of environments with no upper bound on their maxi-
mal complexity. Also, although the measures that describe the environments are
computable, this does not mean that the environments are deterministic. For ex-
ample, although a typical sequence of 1’s and 0’s generated by flipping a coin is
not computable, the probability measure that describes this distribution is com-
putable and thus it is included in our space of possible environments. Indeed,
there is currently no evidence that the physical universe cannot be simulated
by a Turing machine in the above sense (for further discussion of this point see
Section 4.4). This appears to be the largest reasonable space of environments.
We have now formalised all the elements of our informal definition. The next
problem is how to bring these together in order to define an overall measure of
performance; we need to find a way to combine an agent’s performance in many
different environments into a single overall measure. As there are an infinite
number of environments, we cannot simply take a uniform distribution over
them. Mathematically, we must weight some environments higher than others.
But how?
Consider the agent’s perspective on this situation: there exists a probabil-
ity measure that describes the true environment, however this measure is not
known to the agent. The only information the agent has are some past observa-
tions of the environment. From these, the agent can construct a list of probability
measures that are consistent with the observations. We call these potential ex-
planations of the true environment hypotheses. As the number of observations
increases, the set of hypotheses shrinks and hopefully the remaining hypotheses
become increasingly accurate at modelling the environment.
The problem is that in any given situation there will likely be a large number
of hypotheses that are consistent with the current set of observations. The agent
must keep these in accordance with Epicurus’ principle of multiple explanations,
as we saw in Section 2.1. Because they are all consistent with the current obser-
vations, if the agent is going to estimate which hypotheses are the most likely to
be correct it must resort to something other than this observational information.
This is a frequently occurring problem in inductive inference for which the most
common approach is to invoke the principle of Occam’s razor, which we also met
in Section 2.1:
Given multiple hypotheses that are consistent with the data, the sim-
plest should be preferred.
This is generally considered the rational and intelligent thing to do [Wallace,
2005]. Indeed, as noted in Section 1.5, standard IQ tests implicitly test an in-
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dividual’s ability to use Occam’s razor. In some cases we may even consider the
correct use of Occam’s razor to be a more important demonstration of intelli-
gence than achieving a successful outcome. Consider, for example, the following
game:
4.1.1 Example. (Dumb luck game) A questioner lays twenty $10 notes out
on a table before you and then points to the first one and asks “Yes or No?”.
If you answer “Yes” he hands you the money. If you answer “No” he takes it
from the table and puts it in his pocket. He then points to the next $10 note
on the table and asks the same question. Although you, as an intelligent agent,
might experiment with answering both “Yes” and “No” a few times, by the 13th
round you would have decided that the best choice seems to be “Yes” each time.
However what you do not know is that if you answer “Yes” in the 13th round
then the questioner will pull out a gun and shoot you! Thus, although answering
“Yes” in the 13th round is the most intelligent choice, given what you know, it
is not the most successful one. An exceptionally dim individual may have failed
to notice the obvious relationship between answers and getting the money, and
thus might answer “No” in the 13th round, thereby saving his life due to what
could truly be called “dumb luck”. 3
What is important then, is not that an intelligent agent succeeds in any given
situation, but rather that it takes actions that we would expect to be the most
likely ones to lead to success. Given adequate experience this might be clear,
however experience is often not sufficient and one must fall back on good prior
assumptions about the world, such as Occam’s razor. It is important then that
we test the agents in such a way that they are, at least on average, rewarded for
correctly applying Occam’s razor, even if in some cases this leads to failure.
Note that this does not necessarily mean always following the simplest hy-
pothesis that is consistent with the observations. It is just that simpler hypothe-
ses are considered to be more likely to be correct. Thus, if there is a simple
hypothesis suggesting one thing, and a large number of slightly more complex
hypotheses suggesting something else, the latter may be considered the most
likely.
There is another subtlety that needs to be pointed out. Often intelligence is
thought of as the ability to deal with complexity. Or in the words of one psy-
chologist, “. . . [intelligence] is the ability to deal with cognitive complexity —
in particular, with complex information processing.”[Gottfredson, 1997a] It is
tempting then to equate the difficultly of an environment with its complexity.
Unfortunately, things are not so straightforward. Consider the following envi-
ronment:
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4.1.2 Example. Imagine a very complex environment with a rich set of rela-
tionships between the agent’s actions and observations. The measure that de-
scribes this will have a high complexity. However, also imagine that the reward
signal is always maximal no matter what the agent does. Thus, although this is
a very complex environment in which the agent is unlikely to be able to predict
what it will observe next, it is also an easy environment in the sense that all
agents are optimal, even very simple ones that do nothing at all. The environ-
ment contains a lot of structure that is irrelevant to the goal that the agent is
trying to achieve. 3
From this perspective, a problem is thought of as being difficult if the simplest
good solution to the problem is complex. Easy problems on the other hand are
those that have simple solutions. This is a very natural way to think about the
difficulty of problems, or in our terminology, environments.
Fortunately, this distinction does not affect our use of Occam’s razor. This is
because Occam’s razor assigns to each hypothesis a prior probability of it being
the correct model according to its complexity. It says nothing about how relevant
or useful that hypothesis might be to the agent’s goals. For example, according
to Occam’s razor a simple environment that always gives the agent maximal
reward would be more likely than a complex environment that also always gives
the agent maximal reward, even though the two environments are equally easy
to succeed in. Of course from an agent’s perspective, an incorrect hypothesis
that fails to model much of the environment may be a good one if the parts of
the environment that the hypothesis fails to model are not relevant to receiving
reward. Nevertheless, if we want to reward agents on average for correctly using
Occam’s razor, we must weight the environments according to their complexity,
not their difficulty.
Although we have chosen to follow a fairly strict interpretation of Occam’s
razor, the idea of weighting according to the complexity of the simplest good
solution may have some merit. For example, if we weight the different “experts”
in a prediction with expert advice algorithm according to their complexity, we are
in effect applying this alternate principle. In practice, this can work well.
Our remaining problem now is to measure the complexity of environments.
This is a problem that we have already solved for sequences in Section 2.5, and
then generalised to active environments in Section 2.10: for any environment
µ ∈ E we define its complexity to be K(µ), that is, its Kolmogorov complexity
which is essentially just the length of the shortest program that describes µ.
Bringing all these pieces together, we can now define our formal measure of
intelligence:
4.1.3 Definition. The universal intelligence of an agent π is its expected per-
formance with respect to the universal distribution 2−K(µ) over the space of all
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computable reward-summable environments E, that is,
Υ(π) :=
∑
µ∈E
2−K(µ) Vπ
µ
= Vπ
ξ
.
The final equality above follows from the linearity of V and the definition of ξ
as a weighted mixture of environments. It shows that the universal intelligence
of an agent is simply its expected performance with respect to the universal
distribution.
Consider how this equation corresponds to our informal definition. We need
to measure an agent’s ability to achieve goals in a wide range of environments.
Clearly present in the equation is the agent π, the environment µ and, implicit
in the environment, a goal. The agent’s “ability to achieve” is represented by
the value function Vπ
µ
. By a “wide range of environments” we have taken the
space of all computable reward-summable environments, where these environ-
ments have been characterised as computable chronological measures in the set
E. Occam’s razor is given by the term 2−K(µ) which weights the agent’s perfor-
mance in each environment in a way that decreases according to its complexity.
The definition is very general in terms of which sensors or actuators the agent
might have, as all information exchanged between the agent and the environ-
ment takes place over very general communication channels. Finally, the formal
definition places no limits on the internal workings of the agent. Thus, we can
apply the definition to any system that is able to receive and generate informa-
tion with a view to achieving goals.
The main drawback is that the Kolmogorov complexity function K is not
computable and can only be approximated. This is acceptable as our aim has
simply been to define the concept of intelligence in the most general, powerful
and elegant way. In future research we will explore ways to approximate this
ideal with a practical test. Naturally, the process of estimation will introduce
weaknesses and flaws that the current definition does not have. For example,
while the definition considers the general performance of an agent over all com-
putable environments with bounded reward sum, in practice a test could only
ever estimate this by testing the agent on a finite sample of environments.
This situation is similar to the definition of randomness for sequences: In-
formally, an infinite sequence is said to be Martin-Löf random when it has no
significant regularity [Martin-Löf, 1966]. This lack of regularity is equivalent
to saying that the sequence cannot be compressed in any significant way, and
thus we can characterise randomness using Kolmogorov complexity. Naturally,
we cannot test a sequence for every possible regularity, which is equivalent to
saying that we cannot compute its Kolmogorov complexity. We can however test
sequences for randomness by checking them for a large number of statistical
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regularities; indeed, this is what is done in practice. Of course, just because a
sequence passes all our tests does not mean that it must be random. There could
always be some deeper structure to the sequence that our tests were not able to
detect. All we can say is that the sequence seems random with respect to our
ability to detect patterns.
Some might argue that the definition of something should not just capture
the concept, it should also be practical. For example, the definition of intelli-
gence should be such that intelligence can be easily measured. The above ex-
ample, however, illustrates why this approach is sometimes flawed: if we were
to define randomness with respect to a particular set of tests, then one could
specifically construct a sequence that followed a regular pattern in such a way
that it passed all of our randomness tests. This would completely undermine
our definition of randomness. A better approach is to define the concept in the
strongest and cleanest way possible, and then to accept that our ability to test
for this ideal has limitations. In other words, our task is to find better and more
effective tests, not to redefine what it is that we are testing for. This is the atti-
tude we have taken here, though in this thesis our focus is on the first part, that
is, establishing a strong theoretical definition of machine intelligence.
4.2 Universal intelligene of various agents
In order to gain some intuition for our definition of intelligence, in this section
we will consider a range of different agents and their relative degrees of univer-
sal intelligence.
A random agent. The agent with the lowest intelligence, at least among those
that are not actively trying to perform badly, would be one that makes uniformly
random actions. We will call this πrand. Although this is clearly a weak agent,
we cannot simply conclude that the value of Vπ
r a n d
µ
will always be low as some
environments will generate high reward no matter what the agent does. Nev-
ertheless, in general such an agent will not be very successful as it will fail to
exploit any regularities in the environment, even trivial ones. It follows then
that the values of Vπ
r a n d
µ
will typically be low compared to other agents, and thus
Υ(πrand) will be low. Conversely, if Υ(πrand) is very low, then the equation for
Υ implies that for simple environments, and many complex environments, the
value of Vπ
r a n d
µ
must also be relatively low. This kind of poor performance in
general is what we would expect of an unintelligent agent.
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A very speialised agent. From the equation for Υ, we see that an agent could
have very low universal intelligence but still perform extremely well at a few
very specific and complex tasks. Consider, for example, IBM’s Deep Blue chess
supercomputer, which we will represent by πdblue. When µhess describes the
game of chess, Vπ
d b l u e
µ h e s s
is very high. However 2−K(µ
 h e s s ) is small, and for µ 6=
µhess the value function will be low as πdblue only plays chess. Therefore, the
value of Υ(πdblue) will be very low. Intuitively, this is because Deep Blue is too
inflexible and narrow to have general intelligence. Current artificial intelligence
systems fall into this category: powerful in some domain, but not general and
adaptable enough to be truly intelligent.
Interestingly, universal intelligence becomes somewhat counter intuitive when
we use it to compare very specialised agents. Consider an agent πsimple which
is only able to learn to predict sequences of the form 0000 . . . and 1111 . . ..
Obviously this agent will fail in most environments and thus will have a low uni-
versal intelligence, as we would expect. However, environments of this form will
have short programs and thus are much more likely than environments which
describe, for example, chess. As πdblue can only play chess, it cannot learn to
predict these simple sequences, it follows then that Υ(πdblue) < Υ(πsimple).
Intuitively we would expect the reverse to be true.
What this shows is that the universal intelligence measure strongly empha-
sises the ability to solve simple problems. If any system cannot do this, even if
it can do something relatively complex like play chess, then it is considered to
have very little intelligence. Of course extreme cases such the one above only
occur with artificial constructions such as chess playing machines. Any human
able to play chess would easily be able to learn to predict trivial patterns such as
0000 . . ..
With the above in mind, it is interesting to consider the progress of artificial
intelligence as a field from the perspective of universal intelligence. In the early
days of artificial intelligence there was a lot of emphasis on developing machines
that were able to do simple reasoning and pattern matching etc. Extending the
power of these general systems was difficult and over time the field become
increasingly concerned with very narrow systems that were able to solve quite
specific problems. This has lead some people to complain that while we now
have impressive systems for some specific things, we have not progressed much
towards true intelligence, meaning artificial general intelligence. Indeed, from
the perspective of universal intelligence, by focusing on increasingly specialised
systems we have in fact have gone backwards.
A general but simple agent. Imagine an agent that performs very basic learning
by building up a table of observation and action pairs and keeping statistics
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on the rewards that follow. Each time an observation that it has seen before
occurs, the agent takes the action with highest estimated expected reward in
the next cycle with 0.9 probability, or a random action with 0.1 probability. We
will call this agent πbasi. It is clear that many environments, both complex
and very simple, will have at least some structure that such an agent would
take advantage of. Thus, for almost all µ we will have Vπ
b a s i 
µ
> Vπ
r a n d
µ
and so
Υ(πbasi)> Υ(πrand). Intuitively, this is what we would expect as πbasi, while
very simplistic, is surely more intelligent than πrand.
Similarly, as πdblue will fail to take advantage of even trivial regularities in
some of the most basic environments, Υ(πbasi)> Υ(πdblue). This is reasonable
as our aim is to measure a machine’s level of general intelligence. Thus an agent
that can take advantage of basic regularities in a wide range of environments
should rate more highly than a specialised machine that fails outside of a very
limited domain.
A simple agent with more history. The first order structure of πbasi, while
very general, will miss many simple exploitable regularities. Consider the fol-
lowing environment µalt. Let A = {up,down} and O = {ǫ}. In cycle k the
environment generates a reward of 2−k each time the agent’s action is different
to its previous action. Otherwise the reward is 0. We can define this environment
formally,
µalt(ax<kax k) :=



1 if ak 6= ak−1 ∧ rk = 2
−k,
1 if ak = ak−1 ∧ rk = 0,
0 otherwise.
Clearly the optimal strategy for an agent is simply to alternate between the ac-
tions up and down. Even though this is very simple, this strategy requires the
agent to correlate its current action with its previous action, something that
πbasi cannot do. Note that we set the reward in cycle k to be 2k in order to
satisfy our bounded reward sum condition.
A natural extension of πbasi is to use a longer history of actions, observa-
tions and rewards in its internal table. Let π2bak be the agent that builds a table
of statistics for the expected reward conditioned on the last two actions, rewards
and observations. It is immediately clear that π2bak will exploit the structure of
the µalt environment. Furthermore, by definition π2bak is a generalisation of
πbasi and thus it will adapt to any regularity that πbasi can adapt to. It fol-
lows then that in general Vπ
2 b a  k
µ
> Vπ
b a s i 
µ
and so Υ(π2bak) > Υ(πbasi), as we
would expect. In the same way we can extend the history that the agent utilises
back further and produce even more powerful agents that are able to adapt to
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bottom
top
a = rest
r = 2
a = climb
r = 0.0
a = rest or climb
r = 2 -k
-k-4
Figure 4.1: A simple game in which the agent climbs a playground slide and
slides back down again. A shortsighted agent will always just rest at the bottom
of the slide.
more lengthy temporal structures and which will have still higher universal in-
telligence.
A simple forward looking agent. In some environments simply trying to max-
imise the next reward is not sufficient, the agent must also take into account the
rewards that are likely to follow further into the future, that is, the agent must
plan ahead. Consider the following environment µslide. LetA = {rest,limb}
and O = {ǫ}. Imagine there is a slide such as you would see in a playground.
The agent can rest at the bottom of the slide, for which it receives a reward of
2−k−4. The alternative is to climb the slide, which gives a reward of 0. Once at
the top of the slide the agent always slides back down no matter what action is
taken; this gives a reward of 2−k. This deterministic environment is illustrated
in Figure 4.1.
Because climbing receives a reward of 0, while resting receives a reward
of 2−k−4, a very shortsighted agent that only tries to maximise the reward in
the next cycle will choose to stay at the bottom of the slide. Both πbasi and
π2bak have this problem, even though they also take random actions with 0.1
probability and so will occasionally climb the slide by chance. Clearly this is not
optimal in terms of total reward over time.
We can extend the π2bak agent again by defining a new agent π2forward that
with 0.9 probability chooses its next action to maximise not just the next reward,
but rˆk+ rˆk+1, where rˆk and rˆk+1 are the agent’s estimates of the next two rewards.
As the estimate of rˆk+1 will potentially depend not only on ak, but also on ak+1,
the agent assumes that ak+1 is chosen to simply maximise the estimated reward
rˆk+1.
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The π2bak agent can see that by missing out on the resting reward of 2−k−4
for one cycle and climbing, a greater reward of 2−k will be had when sliding
back down the slide in the following cycle. Note that the value of the time index
k will have increased by the time the agent gets to slide down, however this is
not enough to change the optimal course of action.
By definition π2forward generalises π2bak in a way that more closely reflects
the value function V and thus in general Vπ
2 f o r w a r d
µ
> Vπ
2 b a  k
µ
. It then follows that
Υ(π2forward) > Υ(π2bak) as we would intuitively expect for this more powerful
agent.
In a similar way agents of increasing complexity and adaptability can be de-
fined which will have still greater intelligence. However, with more complex
agents it is usually difficult to see whether one agent has more universal intelli-
gence than another. Nevertheless, the simple examples above illustrate how the
more flexible and powerful an agent is, the higher V typically is and thus the
higher its universal intelligence.
A very intelligent agent. A very intelligent agent would perform well in sim-
ple environments, and reasonably well compared to most other agents in more
complex environments. From the equation for universal intelligence this would
clearly produce a high value for Υ. Conversely, if Υ was high then the equation
for Υ implies that the agent must perform well in most simple environments and
reasonably well in many complex ones also. Thus, the agent is able to achieve
goals in a wide range of environments, as required by our informal definition of
intelligence.
A super intelligent agent. Consider what would be required to maximise the
value of Υ. By definition, a “perfect” agent would always pick the action which
had greatest expected future reward. To do this, for every environment µ ∈
E the agent must take into account how likely it is that it is facing µ, given
the interaction history so far and the prior probability of µ, that is, 2−K(µ). It
would then consider all possible future interactions that might occur, how likely
they are, and from this select the action in the current cycle that maximises the
expected future reward.
Essentially, this is the AIXI agent described in Section 2.10. The only dif-
ference is that AIXI was defined using discount parameters, while universal in-
telligence avoided these by requiring the total reward from environments to be
bounded. If we remove discounting for AIXI and define it to work over reward
bounded environments, then the universal intelligence measure is in some sense
the dual of the universal agent AIXI. It follows that agents with very high univer-
88 4.3 Properties of universal intelligene
sal intelligence have powerful performance characteristics.
With our modified AIXI being the most intelligent agent by construction, we
can define the upper bound on universal intelligence to be,
Υ¯ := max
π
Υ(π) = Υ
 
πξ

.
This upper bounds the intelligence of all future machines, no matter how pow-
erful their hardware and algorithms might be.
A human. For simple environments, a human should be able to identify their
structure and exploit this to maximise reward. However, for more complex en-
vironments it is hard to know how well a human would perform. Much of the
human brain is set up to process certain kinds of structured information from
the human sense organs, and thus is quite specialised, at least compared to the
extremely general setting considered here. Perhaps the amount of universal ma-
chine intelligence that a human has is not that high compared to some machine
learning algorithms? It is difficult to know without experimental results.
4.3 Properties of universal intelligene
What we have presented is a definition of machine intelligence. It is not a prac-
tical test of machine intelligence, indeed the value of Υ is not computable due
to the use of Kolmogorov complexity. Although some of the criteria by which we
judge practical tests of intelligence are not relevant to a pure definition of intel-
ligence, many of the desirable properties are similar. Thus, to understand the
strengths and weaknesses of our definition, consider again the desirable proper-
ties for a test of intelligence from Section 1.4.
Valid. The most important property of any proposed formal definition of intel-
ligence is that it does indeed describe something that can reasonably be called
intelligence. Essentially, this is the core argument of this chapter so far: we have
taken a mainstream informal definition and step by step formalised it. Thus, so
long as our informal definition is acceptable, and our formalisation argument
holds, the result can reasonably be described as a formal definition of intelli-
gence.
As we saw in the previous section, universal intelligence orders the power
and adaptability of simple agents in a natural way. Furthermore, a high value of
Υ implies that the agent performs well on most simple and moderately complex
environments. Such an agent would be an impressively powerful and flexible
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piece of technology, with many potential uses. Clearly then, universal intelli-
gence is inherently meaningful, independent of whether or not one considers it
to be a measure of intelligence.
Informative. Υ(π) assigns to agent π a real value that is independent of the
performance of other possible agents. Thus we can make direct comparisons
between many different agents on a single scale. This property is useful if we
want to use this measure to study new algorithms or modifications to existing
algorithms. In comparison, some other tests return only comparative results, i.e.
that one algorithm is better than another, or even just a binary pass or fail.
Wide range. As we saw in the previous section, universal intelligence is able to
order the intelligence of even the most basic agents such as πrand, πbasi, π2bak
and π2forward. At the other extreme we have the theoretical super intelligent
agent AIXI which has maximal Υ value. Thus, universal intelligence spans triv-
ial learning algorithms right up to incomputable super intelligent agents. This
seems to be the widest range possible for a measure of machine intelligence.
General. As the agent’s performance on all well defined environments is fac-
tored into its Υ value, a broader performance metric is difficult to imagine.
Indeed, a well defined measure of intelligence that is broader than universal in-
telligence would seem to contradict the Church-Turing thesis as it would imply
that we could effectively measure an agent’s performance for some well defined
problem that was outside of the space of computable measures.
Dynami. Universal intelligence includes environments in which the agent has
to learn and adapt its behaviour over time in order to maximise reward. As such,
it is a so called “dynamic intelligence test” that allows rich interaction between
the agent being tested and its environment (see Section 1.4). In comparison,
most other intelligence tests are “static”, in the sense that they only require the
agent to solve isolated one-off problems. Such tests cannot directly measure an
agent’s ability to learn and adapt over time.
Unbiased. In a standard intelligence test, an individual’s performance is judged
on specific kinds of problems, and then these scores are combined to produce an
overall result. Thus the outcome of the test depends on which types of problems
it uses, and how each score is weighted to produce the end result. Unfortunately,
how we do this is a product of many things, including our culture, values and
the theoretical perspective on intelligence that we have taken. For example,
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while one intelligence test might contain many logical puzzle problems, another
might be more linguistic in emphasis, while another stresses visual reasoning.
Modern intelligence tests like the Stanford-Binet try to minimise this problem
by covering the most important areas of human reasoning both verbally and
non-verbally. This helps but it is still very anthropocentric as we are only testing
those abilities that we think are important for human intelligence.
For an intelligence measure for machines we have to base the test on some-
thing more general and principled: universal Turing computation. As all pro-
posed models of computation have thus far been equivalent in their expressive
power, the concept of computation appears to be a fundamental theoretical prop-
erty rather than the product of any specific culture. Thus, by weighting different
environments depending on their Kolmogorov complexity, and considering the
space of all computable environments, we have avoided having to define intelli-
gence with respect to any particular culture, species etc.
Unfortunately, we have not entirely removed the problem. The environmen-
tal distribution 2−K(µ) that we have used is invariant, up to a multiplicative con-
stant, to changes in the reference machine U . Although this affords us some
protection, the relative intelligence of agents can change if we change our refer-
ence machine. One approach to this problem is to limit the complexity of the ref-
erence machine, for example by limiting its state-symbol complexity. We expect
that for highly intelligent machines that can deal with a wide range of environ-
ments of varying complexity, the effect of changing from one simple reference
machine to another will be minor. For simple agents, such as those considered in
Section 4.2, the ordering of their machine intelligence was also not particularly
sensitive to natural choices of reference machine. Recently attempts have been
made to make algorithmic probability completely unique by identifying which
universal Turing machines are, in some sense, the most simple [Müller, 2006].
Unfortunately however, an elegant solution to this problem has not yet been
found.
An alternate solution, suggested by Peter Dayan (personal communication),
would be to allow the agent to maintain state between different test environ-
ments. This would mitigate any bias introduced as intelligent agents would then
be able to adapt to the test’s reference machine.
Fundamental. Universal intelligence is based on Turing computation, informa-
tion and complexity. These are fundamental universal concepts that are unlikely
to change in the future with changes in technology. It also means that universal
intelligence is in no way anthropocentric.
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Formal and objetive. As universal intelligence is expressed as a mathematical
equation, there is little space for ambiguity in the definition. In particular, it in
no way depends on any subjective criteria, unlike some other intelligence tests
and definitions.
Fully dened. For a fixed reference machine, the universal intelligence mea-
sure is fully defined. In comparison, some tests of machine intelligence have
aspects which are currently unspecified and in need of further research.
Impratial. In its current form the definition cannot be directly turned into
a test of intelligence as the Kolmogorov complexity function is not computable.
Thus, in its pure form, we can only use it to analyse the nature of intelligence
and to theoretically examine the intelligence of mathematically defined learning
algorithms.
In order to use universal intelligence more generally we will need to con-
struct a workable test that approximates an agent’s Υ value. The equation for Υ
suggests how we might approach this problem. Essentially, an agent’s universal
intelligence is a weighted sum of its performance over the space of all environ-
ments. Thus, we could randomly generate programs that describe environmen-
tal probability measures and then test the agent’s performance against each of
these environments. After sampling sufficiently many environments, the agent’s
approximate universal intelligence could be estimated by weighting its score in
each environment according to the complexity of the environment as given by
the length of its program. Another possibility might be to try to approximate the
sum by enumerating environmental programs from short to long, as the short
ones will make by far the greatest contribution to the sum. However, in this case
we will need to be able to reset the state of the agent so that it cannot cheat by
learning our environmental enumeration method. In any case, various practical
challenges will need to be addressed before universal intelligence can be used
to construct an effective intelligence test. As this would be a significant project
in its own right, here we focus on the theoretical issues surrounding universal
intelligence.
Denition rather than a test. As it is not practical in its current form, universal
intelligence is more of a formal definition of intelligence than a test of intelli-
gence. Some proposals we have reviewed aim to be just tests of intelligence,
others aim to be definitions, and in some cases they are intended to be both.
Often the exact classification of a proposal as a test or definition, or both, is
somewhat subjective.
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Turing Test • · · · • · · · • • T
Total Turing Test • · · · • · · · • · T
Inverted Turing Test • • · · • · · · • • T
Toddler Turing Test • · · · • · · · · • T
Linguistic Complexity •  • · · · · • · • T
Text Compression Test •   • · • •    T
Turing Ratio •    ? ? ? ? · ? T/D
Psychometric AI   •  ? • · • • • T/D
Smith’s Test •   • · ?   · • T/D
C-Test •   • ·      T/D
Universal Intelligence          · D
Table 4.1: In the table  means “yes”, • means “debatable”, · means “no”, and ?
means unknown. When something is rated as unknown it is because the test in
question is not sufficiently specified.
Having covered the key properties of the universal intelligence measure, we
now compare these properties with the properties of the other proposed tests
and definitions of machine intelligence surveyed in Section 1.7. Although we
have attempted to be as fair as possible, some of our judgements will of course
be debatable. Nevertheless, we hope that it provides a rough overview of the
relative strengths and weaknesses of the proposals. The summary comparison
appears in Table 4.1.
4.4 Response to ommon ritiisms
Attempting to mathematically define intelligence is very ambitious and so, not
surprisingly, the reactions we get can be interesting. Having presented the
essence of this work as posters at several conferences, and also as a 30 minute
talk, we now have some idea of what the typical responses are. Most people
start out sceptical but end up generally enthusiastic, even if they still have a
few reservations. This positive feedback has helped motivate us to continue this
direction of research. In this section, however, we will attempt to cover some of
the more common criticisms.
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It's obviously false, there's nothing in your denition, just a few equations.
Perhaps the most common criticism is also the most vacuous one: It’s obviously
wrong! These people seem to believe that defining intelligence with an equation
is clearly impossible, and thus there must be very large and obvious flaws in our
work. Not surprisingly, these people are also the least likely to want to spend
10 minutes having the material explained to them. Unfortunately, none of these
people have been able to communicate why the work is so obviously flawed in
any concrete way — despite in one instance chasing the poor fellow out of the
conference centre and down the street begging for an explanation. If anyone
would like to properly explain their position to us in the future, we promise not
to chase you down the street!
It's obviously orret, indeed everybody already knows this. Curiously, the
second most common criticism is the exact opposite: The work is obviously
right, and indeed it is already well known. Digging deeper, the heart of this
criticism comes from the perception that we have not done much more than just
describe reinforcement learning. If you already accept that the reinforcement
learning framework is the most general and flexible way to describe artificial
intelligence, and not everybody does, then by mixing in Occam’s razor and a
dash of complexity theory the equation for universal intelligence follows in a
fairly straightforward way. While this is true, the way in which these things
have been brought together is new. Furthermore, simply coming up with an
equation is not enough, one must argue that what the equation describes is in
fact intelligence in a sense that is reasonable for machines.
We have addressed this question in three main ways: Firstly, in Chapter 1 we
explored many expert definitions of intelligence. Based on these, we adopted
our own informal definition of intelligence in Section 1.2. In the present chapter
this informal definition was piece by piece formalised leading to the equation
for Υ. This chain of argument ties our equation for intelligence to existing infor-
mal definitions and ideas on the nature of intelligence. Secondly, in Sections 4.2
and 4.3 we showed that the equation has properties that are consistent with
a definition of intelligence. Finally, in Section 4.2 it was shown that universal
intelligence is strongly connected to the theory of universally optimal learning
agents, in particular AIXI. From this it follows that machines with very high uni-
versal intelligence have a wide range of powerful optimality properties. Clearly
then, what we have done goes far beyond merely restating reinforcement learn-
ing theory.
Assuming that the environment is omputable is too strong. It is certainly
possible that the physical universe is not computable, in the sense that the prob-
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ability distribution over future events cannot, even in theory, be simulated to
an arbitrary precision by a computable process. Some people take this position
on various philosophical grounds, such as the need for freewill. However, in
standard physics there is no law of the universe that is not computable in the
above sense. Nor is there any evidence showing that such a physical law must
exist. This includes quantum theory and chaotic systems, both of which can
be extremely difficult to compute for some physical systems, but are not funda-
mentally incomputable theories. In the case of quantum computers, they can
compute with lower time complexity than classical Turing machines, however
they are unable to compute anything that a classical Turing machine cannot,
when given enough time. Thus, as there is no hard evidence of incomputable
processes in the universe, our assumption that the agent’s environment has a
computable distribution is certainly not unreasonable.
If a physical process was ever discovered that was not Turing computable,
then this would likely result in a new extended model of computation. Just as
we have based universal intelligence on the Turing model of computation, it
might be possible to construct a new definition of universal intelligence based
on this new model in a natural way.
Finally, even if the universe is not computable, and we do not update our for-
mal definition of intelligence to take this into account, the fact that everything in
physics so far is computable means that a computable approximation to our uni-
verse would still be extremely accurate over a huge range of situations. In which
case, an agent that could deal with a wide range of computable environments
would most likely still function well within such a universe.
Assuming that environments return bounded sum rewards is unrealisti. If an
environment µ is an artificial game, like chess, then it seems fairly natural for
µ to meet any requirements in its definition, such as having a bounded reward
sum. However, if we think of the environment µ as being the universe in which
the agent lives, then it seems unreasonable to expect that it should be required
to respect such a bound.
Strictly speaking, reward is an interpretation of the state of the environment.
In this case the environment is the universe, and clearly the universe does not
have any notion of reward for particular agents. In humans this interpretation
is internal, for example, the pain that is experienced when you touch something
hot. In this case, should it be a part of the agent rather than the environment?
If we gave the agent complete control over rewards then our framework would
become meaningless: the perfect agent could simply give itself constant maxi-
mum reward. Perhaps the analogous situation for humans would be taking the
“perfect” drug.
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A more accurate framework would consist of an agent, an environment and a
separate goal system that interpreted the state of the environment and rewarded
the agent appropriately. In such a set up the bounded rewards restriction would
be a part of the goal system and thus the above problem would not occur. How-
ever, for our current purposes, it is sufficient just to fold this goal mechanism
into the environment and add an easily implemented constraint to how the en-
vironment may generate rewards. One simple way to bound an environment’s
total rewards would be to use geometric discounting as discussed in Section 2.9.
How do you respond to Blok's Blokhead argument? The approach we have
taken is unabashedly functional. Theoretically, we desired to have a formal,
simple and very general definition. This is easier to do if we abstract over the
internal workings of the agent and define intelligence only in terms of external
communications. Practically, what matters is how well something works. By
definition, if an agent has a high value of Υ, then it must work well over a wide
range of environments.
Block attacks this perspective by describing a machine that appears to be in-
telligent as it is able to pass the Turing test, but is in fact no more than just a big
look-up table of questions and answers (Block, 1981, for a related argument see
Gunderson, 1971). Although such a look-up table would be unfeasibly large, the
fact that a finite machine could in theory consistently pass the Turing test, seem-
ingly without any real intelligence, intuitively seems odd. Our formal measure
of machine intelligence could be challenged in the same way, as could any test
of intelligence that relies only on an agent’s external behaviour.
Our response to this is very simple: if an agent has a very high value ofΥ then
it is, by definition, able to successfully operate in a wide range of environments.
We simply do not care whether the agent is efficient, due to some very clever
algorithm, or absurdly inefficient, for example by using an unfeasibly gigantic
look-up table of precomputed answers. The important point for us is that the
machine has an amazing ability to solve a huge range of problems in a wide
variety of environments.
How do you respond to Searle's Chinese room argument? Searle’s Chinese
room argument attacks our functional position in a similar way by arguing that
a system may appear to be intelligent without really understanding anything
[Searle, 1980]. From our perspective, whether or not an agent understands
what it is doing is only important to the extent that it affects the measurable
performance of the agent. If the performance is identical, as Searle seems to
suggest, then whether or not the room with Searle inside understands the mean-
ing of what is going on is of no practical concern; indeed, it is not even clear
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to us how to define understanding if its presence has no measurable effects. So
long as the system as a whole has the powerful properties required for universal
machine intelligence, then we have the kind of extremely general and powerful
machine that we desire. On the other hand, if understanding does have a mea-
surable impact on an agent’s performance in some situations, then it is of interest
to us. In which case, because Υ measures performance in all well defined sit-
uations, it follows that Υ is in part a measure of how much understanding an
agent has.
But you don't deal with onsiousness (or reativity, imagination, freewill,
emotion, love, soul, et.) We apply the same argument to consciousness, emo-
tions, freewill, creativity, the soul and other such things. Our goal is to build
powerful and flexible machines and thus these somewhat vague properties are
only relevant to our goal to the extent to which they have some measurable ef-
fect on performance in some well defined environment. If no such measurable
effect exists, then they are not relevant to our objective. Of course this is not
the same as saying that these things do not exist. The question is whether they
are relevant or not. We would consider understanding, imagination and creativ-
ity, appropriately defined, to have a significant impact on an agent’s ability to
adapt to challenging environments. Perhaps the same is also true of emotions,
freewill and other qualities. If one accepts that these properties affect an agent’s
performance, then universal intelligence is in part a test for these properties.
Intelligene is fundamentally an anthropoentri onept. As artificial intelli-
gence researchers our goal is not to create an “artificial human”. We are inter-
ested in making machines that are able to process information in powerful ways
in order to achieve many kinds of goals and solve many kinds of problems. As
such, a limited anthropocentric concept of intelligence is not interesting to us.
Or at least, if such a definition were to be adopted, it would simply mean that we
are interested in something more general and powerful than this human focused
concept of “intelligence”.
Perhaps this is similar to the development of heavier than air flight. One of
the most outspoken sceptics of this was the American astronomer Simon New-
comb. Interestingly, even after planes were regularly “flying” he refused to ac-
cept defeat. He accepted that planes existed and moved around at great speed
up in the air, however he did not accept that what they were doing was “flying”.
To his mind, what birds did was quite different. Of course, the rest of the popu-
lation simply generalised and adapted their concept of flying to reflect the new
technology.
We believe that with more progress in artificial intelligence the same thing
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will eventually happen to the everyday concept of intelligence. At present, most
people think of intelligence in human terms simply because this is the only kind
of powerful intelligence they have ever encountered. Indeed, from the perspec-
tive of evolutionary psychology, it appears that we may have evolved to expect
other intelligent agents to think and act like ourselves.
Universal intelligene does not agree with some everyday intuitions about the
nature of intelligene. Everyday intuitions are not a good guide. People in-
formally use the word “intelligence” to mean a variety of different things, and
even a single person will use the word in multiple ways that are not consistent
with each other. Thus, although our definition should clearly be related to the
everyday concept, it is not necessarily desirable, or even possible, for a precise
and self-consistent definition to always agree with everyday usage.
Consider a word that has both an everyday meaning and a precise technical
meaning. When someone says “It’s a beautiful spring day, I am full of energy
and could run up a mountain”, what they mean by the word ‘energy’ is related
to the concept of energy in physics, i.e. they need energy in the technical sense
to get up the mountain. However, the definition of energy from physics does not
entirely capture what they mean. This does not imply that there is something
wrong with the concept of energy in physics. We expect the same in artificial
intelligence: people will continue to use the word “intelligence” in an informal
way, however in order to do research we will need to adopt a more precise
definition that may be slightly different.
An agent may be intelligent even if it doesn't ahieve anything in any envi-
ronments. Consider, for example, that you are quietly sitting in a dark room
thinking about a problem you are trying to solve. Even though you are not
achieving anything in your environment, some would argue that you are still
intelligent due to your internal process of thought. Or imagine perhaps the fa-
mous physicist Stephen Hawking disconnected from his motorised wheelchair
and talking computer. Although his ability to achieve goals in the environment
would be limited, he is still no doubt highly intelligent. A related problem is that
an agent may simply lack the motivation to exhibit intelligent behaviour, such as
a child who wants to get an IQ test out of the way as soon as possibly in order
to go outside and play. In both of these cases the agent’s intelligence seems to
be divorced from the intelligence observable in its behaviour.
The above highlights the fact that when informally considering the measure-
ment of intelligence we need to be careful about exactly how the measurement
is done. Obviously, it only makes sense to measure an individual’s intelligence if
certain essential requirements are met: a purely written test for a blind person
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is senseless, as are the results of a test where the test subject has no interest in
performing well. Informally, we just assume that the test has been conducted in
an appropriate way. When we say that an agent is intelligent, what we actually
mean is that there exists some reasonable setup such that the agent exhibits a
high level of intelligence: a blind person may require an oral test, and a disinter-
ested child some kind of a bribe. Clearly then, if we want to be precise about the
measured intelligence of an agent we must specify these details about exactly
how the test was conducted.
When we say that an agent has low intelligence, what we mean is that there
does not exist any reasonable test setup such that the agent exhibits intelligent
behaviour. Some take the position that an entity could be intelligent even if it
has no measurable intelligence under any test setup. However, such an agent’s
“intelligence” would be rather meaningless as it would be a property that has
no measurable effects or consequences. Even the philosophical “brain in a vat”
could in theory be interfaced to in order to measure its universal intelligence.
Suh an agent is not intelligent beause it annot hoose its goals. In the setup
we have defined the agent cannot decide what its primary goal is. It simply tries
to maximise the reward signal defined by the environment. In the context of
machines this is probably a good idea: we want to be the ones defining what
the machine’s primary objective is. However, this does not address the question
as to whether such a machine should really be called intelligent, or whether it
is just a very powerful and general optimiser. Intelligent humans, after all, can
choose their own goals in life. But is this really true?
Obviously we can decide that we want to become a successful scientist, a
teacher, or maybe a rock star. So we certainly have some choice in our goals.
But are these things our primary motivations? If we want to be a successful
scientist or a rock star, perhaps this is due to a deeper biological drive to attain
high status because this increases our chances of reproductive success. Perhaps
the desire to become a teacher stems from a biological drive to care for children,
again because having this drive tends to increase our probability of passing on
our genes and memes to future generations. Our interest in mating with an
attractive member of the opposite sex, avoiding intense physical pain or the
pleasure of eating energy rich foods, all of these things have clear biological mo-
tivations. Even a suicide bomber who kills himself and thus destroys his future
reproductive potential may be driven by an out-of-control biological motivation
that tries to increase his societal status in an effort to improve his chances of
reproductive success.
These ideas appear in areas such as evolutionary psychology and, it must
be said, attract a fair amount of controversy. Here we will not attempt to de-
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fend them. We simply note that they offer one explanation as to how we are
able to choose our goals in life, while at the same time having relatively fixed
fundamental motivations.
Universal intelligene is impossible due to the No-Free-Lunh theorem. Some,
such as Edmonds [2006], argue that universal definitions of intelligence are
impossible due to Wolpert’s so called “No Free Lunch” theorem [Wolpert and
Macready, 1997]. However this theorem, or any of the standard variants on it,
cannot be applied to universal intelligence for the simple reason that we have
not taken a uniform distribution over the space of environments. Instead we
have used a highly non-uniform distribution based on Occam’s razor.
It is conceivable that there might exist some more general kind of “No Free
Lunch” theorem for agents that limits their maximal intelligence according to
our definition. Clearly any such result would have to apply only to computable
agents given that the incomputable AIXI agent faces no such limit. If such a
result were true, it would suggest that our definition of intelligence is perhaps
too broad in its scope. Currently we know of no such result (c.f. Chapter 5).
4.5 Conlusion
Given the obvious significance of formal definitions of intelligence for research,
and calls for more direct measures of machine intelligence to replace the prob-
lematic Turing test and other imitation based tests [Johnson, 1992], little work
has been done in this area. In this chapter we have attempted to tackle this
problem by taking an informal definition of intelligence modelled on expert def-
initions of human intelligence, and then formalising it. We believe that the
resulting mathematical definition captures the concept of machine intelligence
in a very powerful and elegant way. Furthermore, we have seen that agents
which are extremely intelligent with respect to this definition, such as AIXI, can
be proven to have powerful optimality properties.
The central challenge for future work on universal intelligence is to convert
this theoretical definition of machine intelligence into a workable test. The ba-
sic structure of such a test is already apparent from the equation for Υ: the
test would work by evaluating the performance of an agent on a large sample
of simulated environments, and then combine the agent’s performance in each
environment into an overall intelligence value. This would be done by weight-
ing the agent’s performance in each environment according the environment’s
complexity.
A theoretical challenge that will need to be dealt with is to find a suitable
replacement for the incomputable Kolmogorov complexity function. One solu-
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tion could be to use K t complexity [Levin, 1973], another might be to use the
Speed prior [Schmidhuber, 2002]. Both of these consider the complexity of an
algorithm to be determined by both its minimal description length and running
time, thus forcing the complexity measures to be computable. Taking computa-
tion time into account also makes reasonable intuitive sense because we would
not usually consider a very short algorithm that takes an enormous amount of
time to run to be a particularly simple one. The fact that such an approach can
be made to work is evidenced by the C-Test (see Section 1.7).
Chapter 5
Limits of Computational Agents
One of the reasons for studying mathematical models such as AIXI is to gain
insights that may be useful for designing practical artificial intelligence agents.
The question then arises as to how useful all this incomputable theory really is.
In this chapter we will explore this question by looking at the theoretical limita-
tions faced by computable sequence predictors that attempt to approximate the
power and generality of Solomonoff induction. As sequence prediction lies at
the heart of reinforcement learning, any limitations found here will carry over
to general computable agents.
As we saw in Chapter 2, sequence prediction and compression are intimately
related. Indeed, they are two different ways of looking at the same problem.
Intuitively, if you can accurately predict what is coming next you do not need to
use much information to encode what the data actually is, and vice versa. For
sequence predictors based on the Minimum Description Length (MDL) principle
[Rissanen, 1996] or the Minimum Message Length (MML) principle [Wallace and
Boulton, 1968], this connection is especially evident as they predict by attempt-
ing to find the shortest possible description, or model, of the data. Not surpris-
ingly then, they can be viewed as computable approximations of Solomonoff in-
duction (Section 5.5 of Li and Vitányi, 1997). Furthermore, in order to produce
a working sequence predictor these methods can easily be combined with gen-
eral purpose data compressors, such as the Lempel-Ziv algorithm [Feder et al.,
1992] or Context Tree Weighting [Willems et al., 1995]. Unfortunately, while
useful in practice, these real world compressors have their limitations: they are
able to find some kinds of computable regularities in sequences, but not oth-
ers. As such, predictors based on them fall short of the power and generality
of Solomonoff induction. Furthermore, even with ideal compression MDL and
MML based predictors can take exponentially longer than Solomonoff induction
to learn as they use only the shortest description of the data, rather than the set
of all possible descriptions [Poland and Hutter, 2004].
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Can we do better than this? Do universal and computable predictors for
computable sequences exist? Unfortunately, it is easy to see that they do not:
simply consider a sequence where the next bit is always the opposite of what the
predictor predicts. This is essentially the same as what Dawid noted when he
found that for any statistical forecasting system there exist sequences for which
the predictor is not calibrated, and thus cannot be learnt [Dawid, 1985]. How-
ever, he does not deal with the complexity of the sequences themselves, nor does
he make a precise statement in terms of a specific measure of complexity. The
impossibility of forecasting has since been developed in considerably more depth
by V’yugin [1998], in particular he proves that there is an efficient randomised
procedure producing sequences that cannot be predicted, with high probability,
by computable forecasting systems.
In this chapter we study the prediction of computable sequences from the
perspective of Kolmogorov complexity. The central question we look at is the
prediction of sequences which have bounded Kolmogorov complexity. This leads
us to a new notion of complexity: Rather than the length of the shortest program
able to generate a given sequence, in other words standard Kolmogorov com-
plexity, we take the length of the shortest program able to learn to predict the
sequence. This new complexity measure has the same fundamental invariance
property as Kolmogorov complexity, and certain strong relationships between
the two measures are proven. Nevertheless, in some cases the two can diverge
significantly. For example, although a long random string that indefinitely re-
peats has a very high Kolmogorov complexity, this sequence also has a relatively
simple structure that even a simple predictor can learn to predict.
We then prove that some sequences can only be predicted by very complex
predictors. This implies that very general prediction algorithms, in particular
those that can learn to predict all sequences up to a given Kolmogorov complex-
ity, must themselves be complex. This puts an end to our hope of there being
an extremely general and yet relatively simple prediction algorithm. We then
use this fact to prove that although very powerful prediction algorithms exist,
they cannot be mathematically discovered due to Gödel incompleteness. This
significantly constrains our ability to design and analyse powerful prediction al-
gorithms, and indeed powerful artificial intelligence algorithms in general.
5.1 Preliminaries
For the basic notation for strings and sequences see Appendix 7.3. In this chapter
we will sometimes need to encode a natural number as a string. Using simple
encoding techniques it can be shown that there exists a computable injective
function f : N → B∗ where no string in the range of f is a prefix of any other,
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and ∀n ∈ N : ℓ( f (n))≤ log2 n+ 2 log2 log2 n+ 1= O(logn).
Of particular interest to us will be the class of sequences which can be gen-
erated by an algorithm executed on the following type of machine:
5.1.1 Definition. A monotone universal Turing machine U is defined as a
universal Turing machine with one unidirectional input tape, one unidirectional
output tape, and some bidirectional work tapes. Input tapes are read only, out-
put tapes are write only, unidirectional tapes are those where the head can only
move from left to right. All tapes are binary (no blank symbol) and the work
tapes are initially filled with zeros. We say thatU outputs/computes a sequence
ω on input p, and write U (p) =ω, if U reads all of p but no more as it contin-
ues to write ω to the output tape.
We fixU and defineU (p, x) by simply using a standard coding technique to
encode a program p along with a string x ∈ B∗ as a single input string forU . For
simplicity of notation we will often write p(x) to mean the function computed
by the program p when executed on U along with the input string x , that is,
p(x) is short hand for U (p, x).
5.1.2 Definition. A sequence ω ∈ B∞ is a computable binary sequence if
there exists a program q ∈ B∗ that writes ω to a one-way output tape when run
on a monotone universal Turing machine U , that is, ∃q ∈ B∗ : U (q) = ω. We
denote the set of all computable sequences by C .
A similar definition for strings is not necessary as all strings have finite length
and are therefore trivially computable: all an algorithm has to do is to copy the
desired string to the output tape and then halt.
5.1.3 Definition. A computable binary predictor is a program p ∈ B∗ that on
a universal Turing machine U computes a total function B∗→ B.
Having x1:n as input, the objective of a predictor is for its output, called its
prediction, to match the next symbol in the sequence. Formally we express this
by writing p(x1:n) = xn+1.
Note that this is different to earlier chapters where a predictor generated a
distribution over the possible symbols that might occur next, rather than out-
putting the predicted symbol. What we consider here is a special case of proba-
bilistic prediction as it is equivalent to a probabilistic predictor that in each cycle
always assigns probability 1 to some symbol.
As the algorithmic prediction of incomputable sequences, such as the halting
sequence, is impossible by definition, we only consider the problem of predicting
computable sequences. To simplify things we will assume that the predictor
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has an unlimited supply of computation time and storage. We will also make
the assumption that the predictor has unlimited data to learn from, that is, we
are only concerned with whether or not a predictor can learn to predict in the
following sense:
5.1.4 Definition. We say that a predictor p can learn to predict a sequence
ω := x1x2 . . . ∈ B
∞ if there exists m ∈ N such that ∀n≥ m : p(x1:n) = xn+1.
The existence of m in the above definition need not be constructive, that is,
we might not know when the predictor will stop making prediction errors for
a given sequence, just that this will occur eventually. This is essentially “next
value” prediction as characterised by Barzdin [1972], which follows the notion
of identifiability in the limit for languages from Gold [1967].
5.1.5 Definition. Let P (ω) be the set of all predictors able to learn to predict
ω. Similarly for sets of sequences S ⊂ B∞, define P (S) :=
⋂
ω∈SP (ω).
A standard measure of complexity for sequences is the length of the shortest
program which generates the sequence:
5.1.6 Definition. For any sequence ω ∈ B∞ the Kolmogorov complexity of
the sequence is,
K(ω) := min
q∈B∗
{ℓ(q) :U (q) =ω },
whereU is a monotone universal Turing machine. If no such q exists, we define
K(ω) :=∞.
In essentially the same way we can define the Kolmogorov complexity of a
string x ∈ Bn, written K(x), by requiring that U (q) halts after generating x on
the output tape.
It can be shown that Kolmogorov complexity depends on our choice of uni-
versal Turing machineU , but only up to an additive constant that is independent
of ω. This is due to the fact that a universal Turing machine can simulate any
other universal Turing machine with a fixed length program. For more expla-
nation see Section 2.4, or for an extensive treatment of Kolmogorov complexity
and some of its applications see [Li and Vitányi, 1997] or [Calude, 2002].
5.2 Predition of omputable sequenes
The most elementary result is that every computable sequence can be predicted
by at least one predictor, and that this predictor need not be significantly more
complex than the sequence to be predicted.
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5.2.1 Lemma. ∀ω ∈ C ,∃p ∈ P (ω) : K(p)<
+
K(ω).
Proof. As the sequenceω is computable, there must exist at least one algorithm
that generates ω. Let q be the shortest such algorithm and construct an algo-
rithm p that “predicts”ω as follows: Firstly the algorithm p reads x1:n to find the
value of n, then it runs q to generate x1:n+1 and returns xn+1 as its prediction.
Clearly p perfectly predictsω and ℓ(p)< ℓ(q)+ c, for some small constant c that
is independent of ω and q. 2
Not only can any computable sequence be predicted, there also exist very
simple predictors able to predict arbitrarily complex sequences:
5.2.2 Lemma. There exists a predictor p such that ∀n ∈ N,∃ω ∈ C : p ∈ P (ω)
and K(ω)> n.
Proof. Take a string x such that K(x) = ℓ(x) ≥ 2n, and from this define a
sequence ω := x0000 . . .. Clearly K(ω) > n and yet a simple predictor p that
always predicts 0 can learn to predict ω. 2
The predictor used in the above proof is very simple and can only “learn”
sequences that end with all 0’s, albeit where the initial string can have arbitrarily
high Kolmogorov complexity. It may seem that this is due to sequences that are
initially complex but where the “tail complexity”, defined lim infi→∞ K(ωi:∞), is
zero. This is not the case:
5.2.3 Lemma. There exists a predictor p such that ∀n ∈ N,∃ω ∈ C : p ∈ P (ω)
and lim infi→∞ K(ωi:∞)> n.
Proof. A predictor p for eventually periodic sequences can be defined as fol-
lows: On input ω1:k the predictor goes through the ordered pairs (1,1), (1,2),
(2,1), (1,3), (2,2), (3,1), (1,4), . . . checking for each pair (a, b) whether the
string ω1:k consists of an initial string of length a followed by a repeating string
of length b. On the first match that is found p predicts that the repeating string
continues, and then p halts. If a+ b > k before a match is found, then p outputs
a fixed symbol and halts. Clearly K(p) is a small constant and p will learn to
predict any sequence that is eventually periodic.
For any (m,n) ∈ N2, let ω := x(y∗) where x ∈ Bm, and y ∈ Bn is a random
string, that is, K(y) = n. As ω is eventually periodic p ∈ P (ω) and also we see
that lim infi→∞ K(ωi:∞) =min{K(ωm+1:∞),K(ωm+2:∞), . . . ,K(ωm+n:∞)}.
For any k ∈ {1, . . . ,n} let q∗
k
be the shortest program that can generate
ωm+k:∞. We can define a halting program q
′
k
that outputs y where this program
consists of q∗
k
, n and k. Thus, ℓ(q′
k
) = ℓ(q∗
k
) +O(logn) = K(ωk:∞) +O(logn). As
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n = K(y) ≤ ℓ(q′
k
), we see that K(ωk:∞) > n−O(logn). As n and k are arbitrary
the result follows. 2
Using a more sophisticated version of this proof it can be shown that there
exist predictors that can learn to predict arbitrary regular or primitive recursive
sequences. Thus we might wonder whether there exists a computable predictor
able to learn to predict all computable sequences. Unfortunately, no universal
predictor exists, indeed for every predictor there exists a sequence which it can-
not predict at all:
5.2.4 Lemma. For any predictor p there constructively exists a sequence ω :=
x1x2 . . . ∈ C such that ∀n ∈ N : p(x1:n) 6= xn+1 and K(ω)<
+
K(p).
Proof. For any computable predictor p there constructively exists a computable
sequence ω = x1x2x3 . . . computed by an algorithm q defined as follows: Set
x1 = 1− p(λ), then x2 = 1− p(x1), then x3 = 1− p(x1:2) and so on. Clearly
ω ∈ C and ∀n ∈ N : p(x1:n) = 1− xn+1.
Let p∗ be the shortest program that computes the same function as p and de-
fine a sequence generation algorithm q∗ based on p∗ using the procedure above.
By construction, ℓ(q∗) = ℓ(p∗)+ c for some constant c that is independent of p∗.
Because q∗ generatesω, it follows that K(ω)≤ ℓ(q∗). By definition K(p) = ℓ(p∗)
and so K(ω)<
+
K(p). 2
Allowing the predictor to be probabilistic, as we did in previous chapters,
does not fundamentally avoid the problem of Lemma 5.2.4. In each step, rather
than generating the opposite to what will be predicted by p, instead q attempts to
generate the symbol that p is least likely to predict given x1:n. To do this q must
simulate p in order to estimate the probability that p(x1:n) = 1. With sufficient
simulation effort, q can estimate this probability to any desired accuracy for any
x1:n. This produces a computable sequence ω such that ∀n ∈ N the probability
that p(x1:n) = xn+1 is not significantly greater than
1
2
, that is, the performance
of p is no better than a predictor that makes completely random predictions. As
probabilistic prediction complicates things without avoiding this problem, in this
chapter we will consider only deterministic predictors. This will also allow us to
see the root of this problem as clearly as possible.
With the preliminaries covered, we now move on to the central problem:
predicting sequences of limited Kolmogorov complexity.
5.3 Predition of simple omputable sequenes
As the computable prediction of any computable sequence is impossible, a weaker
goal is to be able to predict all “simple” computable sequences.
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5.3.1 Definition. For n ∈ N, let Cn := {ω ∈ C : K(ω) ≤ n}. Further, let
Pn := P (Cn) be the set of predictors able to learn to predict all sequences in
Cn.
Firstly, we establish that prediction algorithms exist that can learn to predict
all sequences up to a given complexity, and that these predictors need not be
significantly more complex than the sequences they can predict:
5.3.2 Lemma. ∀n ∈ N,∃p ∈ Pn : K(p)<
+
n+O(logn).
Proof. Let h ∈ N be the number of programs of length n or less which generate
infinite sequences. Build the value of h into a prediction algorithm p constructed
as follows:
In the kth prediction cycle run in parallel all programs of length n or less until
h of these programs have each produced k+ 1 symbols of output. Next predict
according to the k + 1th symbol of the generated string whose first k symbols
is consistent with the observed string. If more than one generated string is
consistent with the observed sequence, pick the one which was generated by the
program that occurs first in a lexicographical ordering of the programs. If no
generated output is consistent, give up and output a fixed symbol.
For sufficiently large k, only the h programs which produce infinite sequences
will produce output strings of length k+1. As this set of sequences is finite, they
can be uniquely identified by finite initial strings. Thus, for sufficiently large
k, the predictor p will correctly predict any computable sequence ω for which
K(ω)≤ n, that is, p ∈ Pn.
As there are 2n+1 − 1 possible strings of length n or less, h < 2n+1 and thus
we can encode h with log2 h+ 2 log2 log2 h = n+ 1+ 2 log2(n+ 1) bits. Thus,
K(p)< n+1+2 log2(n+1)+ c for some constant c that is independent of n. 2
Can we do better than this? Lemmas 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 show us that there
exist predictors able to predict at least some sequences vastly more complex
than themselves. This suggests that there might exist simple predictors able to
predict arbitrary sequences up to a high complexity. Formally, could there exist
p ∈ Pn where n ≫ K(p)? Unfortunately, these simple but powerful predictors
are not possible:
5.3.3 Theorem. ∀n ∈ N : p ∈ Pn ⇒ K(p)>
+
n.
Proof. For any n ∈ N let p ∈ Pn, that is, ∀ω ∈ Cn : p ∈ P (ω). By Lemma 5.2.4
we know that ∃ω′ ∈ C : p /∈ P (ω′) . As p /∈ P (ω′) it must be the case that
ω′ /∈ Cn, that is, K(ω
′)≥ n. From Lemma 5.2.4 we also know that K(p)>
+
K(ω′)
and so the result follows. 2
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Intuitively the reason for this is as follows: Lemma 5.2.4 guarantees that
every simple predictor fails for at least one simple sequence. Thus, if we want
a predictor that can learn to predict all sequences up to a moderate level of
complexity, then clearly the predictor cannot be simple. Likewise, if we want a
predictor that can predict all sequences up to a high level of complexity, then the
predictor itself must be very complex. Even though we have made the generous
assumption of unlimited computational resources and data to learn from, only
very complex algorithms can be truly powerful predictors.
These results easily generalise to notions of complexity that take computation
time into consideration. As sequences are infinite, the appropriate measure of
time is the time needed to generate or predict the next symbol in the sequence.
Under any reasonable measure of time complexity, the operation of inverting a
single output from a binary valued function can be performed with little cost. If
C is any complexity measure with this property, it is trivial to see that the proof
of Lemma 5.2.4 still holds for C . From this, an analogue of Theorem 5.3.3 for C
easily follows.
With similar arguments these results also generalise, in a straightforward
way, to complexity measures that take space or other computational resources
into account. Thus, the fact that extremely powerful predictors must be very
complex, holds under any measure of complexity for which inverting a single bit
is inexpensive.
5.4 Complexity of predition
Another way of viewing these results is in terms of an alternate notion of se-
quence complexity defined as the size of the smallest predictor able to learn
to predict the sequence. This allows us to express the results of the previous
sections more concisely. Formally, for any sequence ω define the complexity
measure,
K˙(ω) := min
p∈B∗
{ℓ(p) : p ∈ P (ω) },
and K˙(ω) := ∞ if P (ω) = ∅. Thus, if K˙(ω) is high then the sequence ω is
complex in the sense that only complex prediction algorithms are able to learn
to predict it. It can easily be seen that this notion of complexity has the same
invariance to the choice of reference universal Turing machine as the standard
Kolmogorov complexity measure.
It may be tempting to conjecture that this definition simply describes what
might be called the “tail complexity” of a sequence, that is, K˙(ω) is equal to
lim infi→∞ K(ωi:∞). This is not the case. In the proof of Lemma 5.2.3 we saw
that there exists a single predictor capable of learning to predict any sequence
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that consists of a repeating string, and thus for these sequences K˙ is bounded. It
was further shown that there exist sequences of this form with arbitrarily high
tail complexity. Clearly then tail complexity and K˙ cannot be equal in general.
Using K˙ we can now rewrite a number of our previous results much more
succinctly. From Lemma 5.2.1 it immediately follows that,
∀ω : 0 ≤ K˙(ω) <
+
K(ω).
From Lemma 5.2.2 we know that ∃c ∈ N,∀n ∈ N,∃ω ∈ C such that K˙(ω) < c
and K(ω) > n, that is, K˙ can attain the lower bound above within a small
constant, no matter how large the value of K is. The sequences for which the
upper bound on K˙ is tight are interesting as they are the ones which demand
complex predictors. We prove the existence of these sequences and look at some
of their properties in the next section.
The complexity measure K˙ can also be generalised to sets of sequences, for
S ⊂ B∞ define K˙(S) := minp {ℓ(p) : p ∈ P (S) }. This allows us to rewrite
Lemma 5.3.2 and Theorem 5.3.3 as simply,
∀n ∈ N : n <
+
K˙(Cn) <
+
n+O(logn).
This is just a restatement of the fact that the simplest predictor capable of
predicting all sequences up to a Kolmogorov complexity of n, has itself a Kol-
mogorov complexity of roughly n.
Perhaps the most surprising thing about K˙ complexity is that this very natural
definition of the complexity of a sequence, as viewed from the perspective of
prediction, does not appear to have been studied before.
5.5 Hard to predit sequenes
We have already seen that some individual sequences, such as the repeating
string used in the proof of Lemma 5.2.3, can have arbitrarily high Kolmogorov
complexity but nevertheless can be predicted by trivial algorithms. Thus, al-
though these sequences contain a lot of information in the Kolmogorov sense, in
a deeper sense their structure is very simple and easily learnt.
What interests us in this section is the other extreme: individual sequences
that can only be predicted by complex predictors. As we are concerned with
prediction in the limit, this extra complexity in the predictor must be some kind
of special information which cannot be learnt through observing the sequence.
Our first task is to show that these hard to predict sequences exist.
5.5.1 Theorem. ∀n ∈ N,∃ω ∈ C : n <
+
K˙(ω) <
+
K(ω) <
+
n+O(logn).
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Proof. For any n ∈ N, let Qn ⊂ B
<n be the set of programs shorter than n that
are predictors, and let x1:k ∈ B
k be the observed initial string from the sequence
ω that is to be predicted. Now construct a meta-predictor pˆ:
By dovetailing the computations, run in parallel every program of length
less than n on every string in B≤k. Each time a program is found to halt on
all of these input strings, add the program to a set of “candidate prediction
algorithms”, called Q˜k
n
. As each element of Qn is a valid predictor, and thus halts
for all input strings in B∗ by definition, for every n and k it eventually will be the
case that |Q˜k
n
|= |Qn|. At this point the simulation to approximate Qn terminates.
It is clear that for sufficiently large values of k all of the valid predictors, and
only the valid predictors, will halt with a single symbol of output on all tested
input strings. That is, ∃r ∈ N,∀k > r : Q˜k
n
=Qn.
The second part of the pˆ algorithm uses these candidate prediction algo-
rithms to make a prediction. For p ∈ Q˜k
n
define dk(p) :=
∑k−1
i=1
|p(x1:i)− x i+1|.
Informally, dk(p) is the number of prediction errors made by p so far. Compute
this for all p ∈ Q˜k
n
and then let p∗
k
∈ Q˜k
n
be the program with minimal dk(p).
If there is more than one such program, break the tie by letting p∗
k
be the lexi-
cographically first of these. Finally, pˆ computes the value of p∗
k
(x1:k) and then
returns this as its prediction and halts.
By Lemma 5.2.4, there exists ω′ ∈ C such that pˆ makes a prediction error
for every k when trying to predict ω′. Thus, in each cycle at least one of the
finitely many predictors with minimal dk makes a prediction error and so ∀p ∈
Qn : d
k(p) → ∞ as k → ∞. Therefore, ∄p ∈ Qn : p ∈ P (ω
′), that is, no
program of length less than n can learn to predict ω′ and so n≤ K˙(ω′). Further,
from Lemma 5.2.1 we know that K˙(ω′) <
+
K(ω′), and from Lemma 5.2.4 again,
K(ω′)<
+
K(pˆ).
Examining the algorithm for pˆ, we see that it contains some fixed length
program code and an encoding of |Qn|, where |Qn| < 2
n
− 1. Thus, using a
standard encoding method for integers, K(pˆ) <
+
n+ O(logn). Chaining these,
n<
+
K˙(ω′)<
+
K(ω′)<
+
K(pˆ)<
+
n+O(logn), which proves the theorem. 2
This establishes the existence of sequences with arbitrarily high K˙ complexity
which also have a similar level of Kolmogorov complexity. Next we establish
a fundamental property of high K˙ complexity sequences: they are extremely
difficult to compute.
For an algorithm q that generates ω ∈ C , define tq(n) to be the number of
computation steps performed by q before the nth symbol of ω is written to the
output tape. For example, if q is a simple algorithm that outputs the sequence
010101 . . ., then clearly tq(n) = O(n) and so ω can be computed quickly. The
following theorem proves that if a sequence can be computed in a reasonable
amount of time, then the sequence must have a low K˙ complexity:
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5.5.2 Lemma. ∀ω ∈ C , if ∃q :U (q) =ω and ∃r ∈ N,∀n > r : tq(n) < 2
n, then
K˙(ω)
+
= 0.
Proof. Construct a prediction algorithm p˜ as follows:
On input x1:n, run all programs of length n or less, each for 2
n+1 steps. In
a set Wn collect together all generated strings which are at least n+ 1 symbols
long and where the first n symbols match the observed string x1:n. Now order
the strings in Wn according to a lexicographical ordering of their generating
programs. IfWn = ∅, then just return a prediction of 1 and halt. If |Wn|> 1 then
return the n+ 1th symbol from the first sequence in the above ordering.
Assume that ∃q :U (q) =ω such that ∃r ∈ N,∀n > r : tq(n) < 2
n. If q is not
unique, take q to be the lexicographically first of these. Clearly ∀n> r the initial
string from ω generated by q will be in the set Wn. As there is no lexicographi-
cally lower program which can generate ω within the time constraint tq(n)< 2
n
for all n > r, for sufficiently large n the predictor p˜ must converge on using q
for each prediction and thus p˜ ∈ P (ω). As ℓ(p˜) is clearly a fixed constant that
is independent of ω, it follows then that K˙(ω)< ℓ(p˜)
+
= 0. 2
We could replace the 2n bound in the above result with any monotonically
growing computable function, for example, 22
n
. In any case, this does not
change the fundamental result that sequences which have a high K˙ complexity
are practically impossible to compute. However, from our theoretical perspec-
tive, these sequences present no problem as they can be predicted, albeit with
immense difficulty.
5.6 The limits of mathematial analysis
One way to interpret the results of the previous sections is in terms of con-
structive theories of prediction. Essentially, a constructive theory of prediction
expressed in some sufficiently rich formal system F, is in effect a description of
a prediction algorithm with respect to a universal Turing machine which imple-
ments the required parts of F. Thus, from Theorems 5.3.3 and 5.5.1, it follows
that if we want to have a predictor that can learn to predict all sequences up to
a high level of Kolmogorov complexity, or even just predict individual sequences
which have high K˙ complexity, the constructive theory of prediction that we base
our predictor on must be very complex. Elegant and highly general constructive
theories of prediction simply do not exist, even if we assume unlimited compu-
tational resources. This is in marked contrast to Solomonoff’s highly elegant but
non-constructive theory of prediction.
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Naturally, highly complex theories of prediction will be very difficult to math-
ematically analyse, if not practically impossible. Thus, at some point the devel-
opment of very general prediction algorithms must become mainly an exper-
imental endeavour due to the difficulty of working with the required theory.
Interestingly, an even stronger result can be proven showing that beyond some
point the mathematical analysis is in fact impossible, even in theory:
5.6.1 Theorem. In any consistent formal axiomatic system F that is sufficiently
rich to express statements of the form “p ∈ Pn”, there exists m ∈ N such that for all
n > m and for all predictors p ∈ Pn the true statement “p ∈ Pn” cannot be proven
in F.
In other words, even though we have proven that very powerful sequence
prediction algorithms exist, beyond a certain complexity it is impossible to find
any of these algorithms using mathematics. The proof has a similar structure to
Chaitin’s information theoretic proof [Chaitin, 1982] of Gödel’s incompleteness
theorem for formal axiomatic systems [Gödel, 1931].
Proof. For each n ∈ N let Tn be the set of statements expressed in the formal
system F of the form “p ∈ Pn”, where p is filled in with the complete description
of some algorithm in each case. As the set of programs is denumerable, Tn is
also denumerable and each element of Tn has finite length. From Lemma 5.3.2
and Theorem 5.3.3 it follows that each Tn contains infinitely many statements
of the form “p ∈ Pn” which are true.
Fix n and create a search algorithm s that enumerates all proofs in the formal
system F searching for a proof of a statement in the set Tn. As the set Tn is
recursive, s can always recognise a proof of a statement in Tn. If s finds any such
proof, it outputs the corresponding program p and then halts.
By way of contradiction, assume that s halts, that is, a proof of a theorem
in Tn is found and p such that p ∈ Pn is generated as output. The size of
the algorithm s is a constant (a description of the formal system F and some
proof enumeration code) as well as an O(logn) term needed to describe n. It
follows then that K(p)<
+
O(logn). However, from Theorem 5.3.3 we know that
K(p) >
+
n. Thus, for sufficiently large n, we have a contradiction and so our
assumption of the existence of a proof must be false. That is, for sufficiently
large n and for all p ∈ Pn, the true statement “p ∈ Pn” cannot be proven within
the formal system F. 2
The exact value of m depends on our choice of formal system F and which
reference machine U we measure complexity with respect to. However, for
reasonable choices of F and U the value of m would be in the order of 1000.
That is, the bound m is certainly not so large as to be vacuous.
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We have shown that there does not exist an elegant constructive theory of pre-
diction for computable sequences, even if we assume unbounded computational
resources, unbounded data and learning time, and place moderate bounds on
the Kolmogorov complexity of the sequences to be predicted. Very powerful com-
putable predictors are therefore necessarily complex. We have further shown
that the source of this problem is the existence of computable sequences which
are extremely expensive to compute. While we have proven that very power-
ful prediction algorithms which can learn to predict these sequences exist, we
have also proven that, unfortunately, mathematical analysis cannot be used to
discover these algorithms due to Gödel incompleteness.
These results can be extended to more general settings, specifically to those
problems which are equivalent to, or depend on, sequence prediction. Consider,
for example, a reinforcement learning agent interacting with an environment, as
described in Chapters 2 and 3. In each interaction cycle the agent must choose
its actions so as to maximise the future rewards that it receives from the envi-
ronment. Of course the agent cannot know for certain if some action will lead to
rewards in the future. Whether explicitly or implicitly, it must somehow predict
these. Thus, at the heart of reinforcement learning lies a prediction problem,
and so the results for computable predictors presented in this paper also apply
to computable reinforcement learners. More specifically, from Theorem 5.3.3
it follows that very powerful computable reinforcement learners are necessarily
complex, and from Theorem 5.6.1 it follows that it is impossible to discover any
of these extremely powerful reinforcement learning algorithms mathematically.
These relationships are illustrated in Figure 5.1.
It is reasonable to ask whether the assumptions we have made in our model
need to be changed. If we increase the power of the predictors further, for exam-
ple by providing them with some kind of an oracle, this would make the predic-
tors even more unrealistic than they currently are. This goes against our goal of
finding an elegant, powerful and general prediction theory that is more realistic
in its assumptions than Solomonoff’s incomputable model. On the other hand, if
we weaken our assumptions about the predictors’ resources to make them more
realistic, we are in effect taking a subset of our current class of predictors. As
such, all the same limitations and problems will still apply, as well as some new
ones.
It seems then that the way forward is to further restrict the problem space.
One possibility would be to bound the amount of computation time needed to
generate the next symbol in the sequence. However, if we do this without re-
stricting the predictors’ resources then the simple predictor from Lemma 5.5.2
easily learns to predict any such sequence and thus the problem of prediction in
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the limit has become trivial. Another possibility might be to bound the memory
of the machine used to generate the sequence, however this makes the generator
a finite state machine and thus bounds its computation time, again making the
problem trivial.
Perhaps the only reasonable solution would be to add additional restrictions
to both the algorithms which generate the sequences to be predicted, and to the
predictors. We may also want to consider not just learnability in the limit, but
also how quickly the predictor is able to learn. Of course we are then facing a
much more difficult analysis problem.
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Figure 5.1: Theorem 5.3.3 rules out simple but powerful artificial intelligence al-
gorithms, as indicated by the greyed out region in the upper left. Theorem 5.6.1
upper bounds how powerful an algorithm can be before it can no longer be
proven to be a powerful algorithm. This is indicated by the horizontal line sep-
arating the region of provable algorithms from the region of Gödel incomplete-
ness.
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Chapter 6
Temporal Dierene Updating without
a Learning Rate
In Chapters 2 and 3 we saw how universal agents are able to learn to behave
optimally across a wide range of environments. Unfortunately, these agents are
incomputable as they are based on incomputable universal prior distributions.
Thus, in order to use the theory of universal artificial intelligence to design and
build practical algorithms, we must first find a way to scale the theory down. In
Chapter 5 we investigated some of the constraints faced when attempting this.
What we uncovered was a number of fundamental negative results. In short,
computable predictors capable of predicting all sequences up to a moderate Kol-
mogorov complexity are both highly complex and mathematically impossible to
find due to Gödel incompleteness. The only way out of this bind, it seems, is to
move to a more sophisticated measure of complexity that takes not only informa-
tion content into account, but also time and space. Unfortunately, the theory of
resource bounded complexity is notoriously difficult to work with and has many
unsolved fundamental questions. Furthermore, even if the universal prior dis-
tribution could be replaced by a suitable computable prior, perhaps something
like the Speed prior [Schmidhuber, 2002], there still remains the fact that AIXI’s
search through possible futures requires computation time that is exponential in
the depth of the look ahead (see the equation for AIXI in Section 2.10).
Despite these difficulties, several attempts at scaling AIXI down have been
made. The most theoretically founded of these is AIXIt l (Chapter 7 of Hutter,
2005). In this model, proof search is used to limit the size and computation
time of the algorithm. Unfortunately, although technically computable, the re-
sulting agent still requires impossibly vast computational resources. Another
more drastic scaling down of AIXI did produce a usable algorithm [Poland and
Hutter, 2006]. Here the problem domain was limited to games that could be
described by 2× 2 matrices, and the look ahead was bounded to 8 interaction
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cycles. The resulting algorithm was able to learn simple game theoretic inter-
action strategies. While this proves that some kind of scaling down of AIXI is
possible, the problem space of 2 × 2 matrix games falls well short of what is
needed for a useful artificial intelligence algorithm.
In this chapter we present what started out as another attempt to scale AIXI
down. As we have seen in previous chapters, at the core of the reinforcement
learning problem lies the problem of estimating the expected future discounted
reward. We begin by expressing this estimation problem as a loss function, more
specifically, as the squared difference between the empirical future discounted
reward and our estimate. We then derive an equation for this estimator by min-
imising the loss function. Although the resulting learning equations no longer
bear much resemblance to AIXI, they do strongly resemble the standard equation
for temporal difference learning with eligibility traces, also known as the TD(λ)
algorithm. Interestingly, while the standard algorithm has a free learning rate
parameter, in our new equation there is none. In its place there is an equation
that automatically sets the learning rate in a way that is specific to each state
transition. We have experimentally tested this new learning rule against TD(λ)
and found that it offers superior performance in various settings. We have also
extended the algorithm to reinforcement learning and again found encouraging
results. This chapter covers the derivation of this algorithm and our experimen-
tal results.
Note that while the notation used in this chapter is fairly standard for the
temporal difference learning literature, it is a little different to what we used
to define AIXI. For example, we now talk of states rather than observations, and
index the value function in a new way.
6.1 Temporal dierene learning
In the field of reinforcement learning, perhaps the most popular way to esti-
mate the future discounted reward of states is the method of temporal difference
learning. It is unclear who exactly introduced this first, however the first explicit
version of temporal difference as a learning rule appears to be Witten [1977].
The idea is as follows: The expected future discounted reward of a state s is,
V s := E
¦
rk + γrk+1+ γ
2rk+2+ · · · |sk = s
©
,
where the rewards rk, rk+1, . . . are geometrically discounted into the future by
γ < 1. From this definition it follows that,
V s = E
¦
rk + γV sk+1 |sk = s
©
. (6.1)
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Our task, at time t, is to compute an estimate V t
s
of V s for each state s.
The only information we have to base this estimate on is the current history
of state transitions, s1, s2, . . . , st , and the current history of observed rewards,
r1, r2, . . . , rt . Equation (6.1) suggests that at time t + 1 the value of rt + γVst+1
provides us with information on what V t
s
should be: if it is higher than V t
st
then
perhaps this estimate should be increased, and vice versa. This intuition gives
us the following estimation heuristic for state st ,
V t+1
st
:= V t
st
+α

rt + γV
t
st+1
− V t
st

,
where α is a parameter that controls the rate of learning. This type of temporal
difference learning is known as TD(0).
One shortcoming of this method is that at each time step the value of only the
last state st is updated. States before the last state are also affected by changes in
the last state’s value and thus these could be updated too. This is what happens
with so called temporal difference learning with eligibility traces, where a history,
or trace, is kept of which states have been recently visited. Under this method,
when we update the value of a state we also go back through the trace updating
the earlier states as well. Formally, for any state s its eligibility trace is computed
by,
E t
s
:=

γλE t−1
s
if s 6= st ,
γλE t−1
s
+ 1 if s = st ,
where λ is used to control the rate at which the eligibility trace is discounted.
The temporal difference update is then, for all states s,
V t+1
s
:= V t
s
+αE t
s

r + γV t
st+1
− V t
st

. (6.2)
This more powerful version of temporal different learning is known as TD(λ)
[Sutton, 1988]. The complete algorithm appears in Algorithm 1.
Although it has been successfully applied to many simple problems, plain
TD(λ) has a number of drawbacks. One of these is that the learning rate param-
eter α has to be experimentally tuned by hand. Indeed, even this is not always
enough, for optimal performance some monotonically decreasing function has
to be experimentally found that decreases the learning rate over time at the right
rate. If the learning rate decreases too quickly, the system may become stuck at
a level of sub-optimal performance, if it decreases too slowly then convergence
will be unnecessarily late. The main contribution of this chapter is to solve this
problem by deriving a temporal difference rule from statistical principles that
automatically sets its learning rate.
Perhaps the closest work to ours is the LSTD(λ) algorithm [Bradtke and
Barto, 1996; Boyan, 1999; Lagoudakis and Parr, 2003]. LSTD(λ) is concerned
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Algorithm 1 TD(λ)
Initialise V (s) arbitrarily and E(s) = 0 for all s
Initialise s
repeat
Make state transition and observe r, s′
∆← r + γV (s′)− V (s)
E(s)← E(s) + 1
for all s do
V (s)← V (s) +αE(s)∆
E(s)← γλE(s)
end for
s ← s′
until end of run
with finding a least-squares linear function approximation to the true value func-
tion. The unknown expected rewards and transition probabilities are replaced
by empirical averages up to current time t. In contrast, we consider finite state
spaces and no function approximation. We derive a least-squares estimate of the
empirical values including future rewards by bootstrapping. The computation
time for our update is linear in the number of states, like TD(λ), while LSTD is
quadratic (even in the case of state-indicator features and no function approxi-
mation). Indeed our algorithm exactly coincides with TD/Q/Sarsa(λ) but with a
novel learning rate derived from statistical principles. LSTD has not yet been de-
veloped for general λ and γ. Our algorithm and LSTD both get rid of the learning
rate and the necessity to initialise V . Since LSTD has primarily been developed
for linear function approximation and has a much more expensive update rule,
we focused our experimental comparison to the algorithms for which we deter-
mined the learning rate (finite state space, linear time TD/Q/Sarsa algorithms).
It remains to be seen how our approach generalises to (linear) function approx-
imation.
6.2 Derivation
The empirical future discounted reward of a state sk is the sum of actual rewards
following from state sk in time steps k, k + 1, . . ., where the rewards are dis-
counted as they go into the future. Formally, the empirical value of state sk at
time k for k = 1, ..., t is,
vk :=
∞∑
u=k
γu−kru, (6.3)
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where the future rewards ru are geometrically discounted by γ < 1. In practice
the exact value of vk is always unknown to us as it depends not only on rewards
that have been already observed, but also on unknown future rewards. Note
that if sm = sn for m 6= n, that is, we have visited the same state twice at dif-
ferent times m and n, this does not imply that vn = vm as the observed rewards
following the state visit may be different each time.
Our goal is that for each state s the estimate V t
s
should be as close as pos-
sible to the true expected future discounted reward V s. Thus, for each state s
we would like Vs to be close to vk for all k such that s = sk. Furthermore, in
non-stationary environments we would like to discount old evidence by some
parameter λ ∈ (0,1]. Formally, we want to minimise the loss function,
L :=
1
2
t∑
k=1
λt−k
 
vk − V
t
sk
2
. (6.4)
For stationary environments we may simply set λ = 1 a priori.
As we wish to minimise this loss, we take the partial derivative with respect
to the value estimate of each state and set to zero,
∂ L
∂ V t
s
= −
t∑
k=1
λt−k
 
vk − V
t
sk

δsks = V
t
s
t∑
k=1
λt−kδsks −
t∑
k=1
λt−kδsksvk = 0,
where we could change V t
sk
into V t
s
due to the presence of the Kronecker δsks,
defined δx y := 1 if x = y , and 0 otherwise. By defining a discounted state visit
counter N t
s
:=
∑t
k=1
λt−kδsks we get
V t
s
N t
s
=
t∑
k=1
λt−kδsksvk. (6.5)
Since vk depends on future rewards rk, Equation (6.5) can not be used in its
current form. Next we note that vk has a self-consistency property with respect
to the rewards. Specifically, the tail of the future discounted reward sum for
each state depends on the empirical value at time t in the following way,
vk =
t−1∑
u=k
γu−kru + γ
t−kvt .
Substituting this into Equation (6.5) and exchanging the order of the double
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sum,
V t
s
N t
s
=
t−1∑
u=1
u∑
k=1
λt−kδsksγ
u−kru +
t∑
k=1
λt−kδsksγ
t−kvt
=
t−1∑
u=1
λt−u
u∑
k=1
(λγ)u−kδsksru +
t∑
k=1
(λγ)t−kδsksvt
= Rt
s
+ E t
s
vt ,
where E t
s
:=
∑t
k=1
(λγ)t−kδsks is the eligibility trace of state s, and R
t
s
:=
∑t−1
u=1
λt−uEu
s
ru
is the discounted reward with eligibility.
E t
s
and Rt
s
depend only on quantities known at time t. The only unknown
quantity is vt , which we have to replace with our current estimate of this value
at time t, which is V t
st
. In other words, we bootstrap our estimates. This gives
us,
V t
s
N t
s
= Rt
s
+ E t
s
V t
st
. (6.6)
For state s = st , this simplifies to
V t
st
=
Rt
st
N t
st
− E t
st
.
Substituting this back into Equation (6.6) we obtain,
V t
s
N t
s
= Rt
s
+ E t
s
Rt
st
N t
st
− E t
st
. (6.7)
This gives us an explicit expression for our V estimates. However, from an al-
gorithmic perspective an incremental update rule is more convenient. To derive
this we make use of the relations,
N t+1
s
= λN t
s
+δst+1s, N
0
s
= 0,
E t+1
s
= λγE t
s
+δst+1s, E
0
s
= 0,
Rt+1
s
= λRt
s
+λE t
s
rt , R
0
s
= 0,
Inserting these into Equation (6.7) with t replaced by t + 1,
V t+1
s
N t+1
s
= Rt+1
s
+ E t+1
s
Rt+1
st+1
N t+1
st+1
− E t+1
st+1
= λRt
s
+λE t
s
rt + E
t+1
s
Rt
st+1
+ E t
st+1
rt
N t
st+1
− γE t
st+1
.
123 6.2 Derivation
By solving Equation (6.6) for Rt
s
and substituting back in,
V t+1
s
N t+1
s
= λ
 
V t
s
N t
s
− E t
s
V t
st

+λE t
s
rt + E
t+1
s
N t
st+1
V t
st+1
− E t
st+1
V t
st
+ E t
st+1
rt
N t
st+1
− γE t
st+1
=
 
λN t
s
+δst+1s

V t
s
−δst+1sV
t
s
−λE t
s
V t
st
+λE t
s
rt
+ E t+1
s
N t
st+1
V t
st+1
− E t
st+1
V t
st
+ E t
st+1
rt
N t
st+1
− γE t
st+1
.
Dividing through by N t+1
s
(= λN t
s
+δst+1s),
V t+1
s
= V t
s
+
−δst+1sV
t
s
−λE t
s
V t
st
+λE t
s
rt
λN t
s
+δst+1s
+
(λγE t
s
+δst+1s)(N
t
st+1
V t
st+1
− E t
st+1
V t
st
+ E t
st+1
rt)
(N t
st+1
− γE t
st+1
)(λN t
s
+δst+1s)
.
Making the first denominator the same as the second, then expanding the
numerator,
V t+1
s
= V t
s
+
λE t
s
rt N
t
st+1
−λE t
s
V t
st
N t
st+1
−δst+1sV
t
s
N t
st+1
−λγE t
st+1
E t
s
rt
(N t
st+1
− γE t
st+1
)(λN t
s
+δst+1s)
+
λγE t
st+1
E t
s
V t
st
+ γE t
st+1
V t
s
δst+1s +λγE
t
s
N t
st+1
V t
st+1
−λγE t
s
E t
st+1
V t
st
(N t
st+1
− γE t
st+1
)(λN t
s
+δst+1s)
+
λγE t
s
E t
st+1
rt +δst+1sN
t
st+1
V t
st+1
−δst+1sE
t
st+1
V t
st
+δst+1sE
t
st+1
rt
(N t
st+1
− γE t
st+1
)(λN t
s
+δst+1s)
.
After cancelling equal terms (keeping in mind that in every term with a Kro-
necker δx y factor we may assume that x = y as the term is always zero other-
wise), and factoring out E t
s
the right hand side becomes,
V t
s
+
E t
s
 
λrt N
t
st+1
−λV t
st
N t
st+1
+ γV t
s
δst+1s+λγN
t
st+1
V t
st+1
−δst+1sV
t
st
+δst+1srt

(N t
st+1
− γE t
st+1
)(λN t
s
+δst+1s)
Finally, by factoring out λN t
st+1
+δst+1s we obtain our update rule,
V t+1
s
= V t
s
+ E t
s
βt(s, st+1)
 
rt + γV
t
st+1
− V t
st

, (6.8)
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where the learning rate is given by,
βt(s, st+1) :=
1
N t
st+1
− γE t
st+1
N t
st+1
N t
s
. (6.9)
Examining Equation (6.8), we find the usual update equation for tempo-
ral difference learning with eligibility traces (see Equation (6.2)), however the
learning rate α has now been replaced by βt(s, st+1). This learning rate was
derived by minimising the squared loss between the estimated and true state
value. In the derivation we have exploited the fact that the latter must be
self-consistent and then bootstrapped to get Equation (6.6). This gives us an
equation for the learning rate for each state transition at time t, as opposed to
the standard temporal difference learning where the learning rate α is either a
fixed free parameter for all transitions, or is decreased over time by some mono-
tonically decreasing function. In either case, the learning rate is not automatic
and must be experimentally tuned for good performance. The above derivation
appears to theoretically solve this problem.
The first term in βt seems to provide some type of normalisation to the learn-
ing rate, though the intuition behind this is not clear to us. The meaning of
second term however can be understood as follows: N t
s
measures how often we
have visited state s in the recent past. Therefore, if N t
s
≪ N t
st+1
then state s has
a value estimate based on relatively few samples, while state st+1 has a value
estimate based on relatively many samples. In such a situation, the second term
in βt boosts the learning rate so that V
t+1
s
moves more aggressively towards the
presumably more accurate rt + γV
t
st+1
. In the opposite situation when st+1 is a
less visited state, we see that the reverse occurs and the learning rate is reduced
in order to maintain the existing value of Vs.
6.3 Estimating a small Markov proess
For our first test we consider a small Markov process with 21 states. In each
step the state number is either incremented or decremented by one with equal
probability, unless the system is in state 0 or 20 in which case it always transi-
tions to state 10 in the following step. When the state transitions from 0 to 10
a reward of 1.0 is generated, and for a transition from 20 to 10 a reward of -1.0
is generated. All other transitions have a reward of 0. We set the discount value
γ= 0.9 and then computed the true discounted value of each state by running a
brute force Monte Carlo simulation.
For our first test we ran our algorithm 10 times on the above Markov chain
and computed the root mean squared error in the value estimate across the
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states at each time step averaged across each run. The optimal value of λ for
our algorithm, which we will call HL(λ), was 1.0. This was to be expected
given that the environment is stationary and thus discounting old experience is
not helpful. Setting this parameter correctly was important, for example if we
reduced the value of λ to 0.98 performance became poor.
For TD(λ) the optimal value of λ was about 0.7. This algorithm was much
less sensitive to the setting of λ. The other important parameter for TD(λ) was
the learning rate α. We tested a variety of values, the effect of which is illustrated
by the two values α= 0.07 and α= 0.13 on Figure 6.1.
When α was high, TD(λ) learnt more quickly, as we would expect, but then
became unstable as the learning rate was too high for fine tuning the value es-
timates. With the lower learning rate of 0.07, TD(λ) learnt more slowly, but
eventually achieved a more accurate value estimate before becoming stuck. In
fact rather than just becoming stuck, what we see is that the error reaches a
minimum at around t = 4,000 and then actually becomes worse for the remain-
der of the run. This is a well known undesirable characteristic of TD(λ) (see for
example Section 6.2 of Sutton and Barto, 1998). With a fixed learning rate we
also see that the variability in the error estimate does not improve towards the
end of the run.
In comparison, HL(λ) had very fast learning initially, combined with a more
accurate final estimate of the discounted state values, and the mean squared
error in the second half of the experiment was very stable. This is significant
given that TD(λ) required two parameters to be tuned for good performance,
while HL(λ) had just λ which could be set a priori to 1.0.
Figure 6.1 shows the same experiment averaged over 100 runs. This obscures
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the better stability of HL(λ), but more clearly illustrates its faster learning and
better convergence.
6.4 A larger Markov proess
In order to understand how well HL(λ) scales as the number of states increases,
we ran the previous experiment again but with 51 states. As the movement
through the states is almost entirely a random walk with reward on just two
transitions, estimating the value function on this Markov chain is significantly
more difficult than before, even though the total number of states has not grown
all that much. In the new experiment the return state was still in the middle of
the chain, i.e. state 25. As most of the state space was a long way from the
rewards, we increased the γ value to 0.99 so that states in the middle of the
chain would not have values too close to 0. The true discounted value of each
state was again computed by running a brute force Monte Carlo simulation.
We ran our algorithm 10 times on the above Markov chain and computed the
root mean squared error in the value estimate across the states at each time step
averaged across each run. The optimal value of λ for HL(λ) was 1.0, which was
to be expected given that the environment is stationary and thus discounting old
experience is not helpful.
For TD(λ) we tried various different learning rates and values of λ. We could
find no settings where TD(λ) was competitive with HL(λ). If the learning rate α
was set too high the system would learn as fast as HL(λ) briefly before becoming
stuck. With a lower learning rate the final performance was improved, however
the initial performance was now much worse than HL(λ). The results of these
tests appear in Figure 6.2.
Similar tests were performed with larger and smaller Markov chains, and
with different values of γ. HL(λ) was consistently superior to TD(λ) across these
tests. One wonders whether this may be due to the fact that the implicit learning
rate that HL(λ) uses is not fixed. To test this we explored the performance
of a number of different learning rate functions on the 51 state Markov chain
described above. We found that functions of the form κ
t
always performed poorly,
however good performance was possible by setting κ correctly for functions of
the form κp
t
and κ3pt . As the results were much closer, we averaged over 300
runs. These results appear in Figure 6.2.
With a variable learning rate TD(λ) is performing much better, however we
were still unable to find an equation that reduced the learning rate in such a way
that TD(λ) would outperform HL(λ). This is evidence that HL(λ) is adapting the
learning rate optimally without the need for manual equation tuning.
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6.5 Random Markov proess
To test on a Markov process with a more complex transition structure, we cre-
ated a random 50 state Markov process. We did this by creating a 50 by 50
transition matrix where each element was set to 0 with probability 0.9, and a
uniformly random number in the interval [0,1] otherwise. We then scaled each
row to sum to 1. Then to transition between states we interpret the i th row as
a probability distribution over which state follows state i. To compute the re-
ward associated with each transition we created a random matrix as above, but
without normalising. We set γ = 0.9 and then ran a brute force Monte Carlo
simulation to compute the true discounted value of each state.
The λ parameter for HL(λ) was simply set to 1.0 as the environment is sta-
tionary. For TD we experimented with a range of parameter settings and learning
rate decrease functions. We found that a fixed learning rate of α= 0.2, and a de-
creasing rate of 1.53pt performed reasonable well, but never as well as HL(λ). The
results were generated by averaging over 10 runs, and are shown in Figure 6.3.
Although the structure of this Markov process is quite different to that used in
the previous experiment, the results are again similar: HL(λ) preforms as well
or better than TD(λ) from the beginning to the end of the run. Furthermore,
stability in the error towards the end of the run is better with HL(λ) and no
manual learning tuning was required for these performance gains.
128 6.6 Non-stationary Markov proess
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Time
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
R
M
S
E
HL(1.0)
TD(0.9) a = 0.2
TD(0.9) a = 1.5/cbrt(t)
Figure 6.3: Random 50 state Markov
process. The parameter a is the learn-
ing rate α.
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
Time x1e+4
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
R
M
S
E
HL(0.9995)
TD(0.8) a = 0.05
TD(0.9) a = 0.05
Figure 6.3: 21 state non-stationary
Markov process.
6.6 Non-stationary Markov proess
The λ parameter in HL(λ), introduced in Equation (6.4), reduces the impor-
tance of old observations when computing the state value estimates. When the
environment is stationary this is not useful and so we can set λ = 1.0, however
in a non-stationary environment we need to reduce this value so that the state
values adapt properly to changes in the environment. The more rapidly the en-
vironment is changing, the lower we need to make λ in order to more rapidly
forget old observations.
To test HL(λ) in such a setting we reverted back to the 21 state Markov
chain from Section 6.3 in order to speed up convergence. We used this Markov
chain for the first 5,000 time steps. At that point, we changed the reward when
transitioning from the last state to the middle state from -1.0 to be 0.5. At
time 10,000 we then switched back to the original Markov chain, and so on
alternating between the models of the environment every 5,000 steps. At each
switch, we also changed the target state values that the algorithm was trying
to estimate to match the current configuration of the environment. For this
experiment we set γ= 0.9.
As expected, the optimal value of λ for HL(λ) fell from 1 down to about
0.9995. This is about what we would expect given that each phase is 5,000
steps long. For TD(λ) the optimal value of λ was around 0.8 and the optimum
learning rate was around 0.05. As we would expect, for both algorithms when
we pushed λ above its optimal value this caused poor performance in the periods
following each switch in the environment (these bad parameter settings are not
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Algorithm 2 HLS(λ)
Initialise Q(s, a) = 0, N(s, a) = 1 and E(s, a) = 0 for all s, a
Initialise s and a
repeat
Take action a, observed r, s′
Choose a′ by using ε-greedy selection on Q(s′, ·)
∆← r + γQ(s′, a′)−Q(s, a)
E(s, a)← E(s, a) + 1
N(s, a)← N(s, a) + 1
for all s, a do
β((s, a), (s′, a′))← 1
N(s′,a′)−γE(s′,a′)
N(s′,a′)
N(s,a)
end for
for all s, a do
Q(s, a)←Q(s, a) + β
 
(s, a), (s′, a′)

E(s, a)∆
E(s, a)← γλE(s, a)
N(s, a)← λN(s, a)
end for
s ← s′; a ← a′
until end of run
shown in the results). On the other hand, setting λ too low produced initially
fast adaption to each environment switch, but poor performance after that until
the next environment change. To get accurate statistics we averaged over 200
runs. The results of these tests appear in Figure 6.3.
For some reason HL(0.9995) learns faster than TD(0.8) in the first half of the
first cycle, but only equally fast at the start of each following cycle. Furthermore,
its performance in the second half of the first cycle is poor. We are not sure why
this is happening. We could improve the initial speed at which HL(λ) learnt in
the last three cycles by reducing λ, however that comes at a performance cost in
terms of the lowest mean squared error attained at the end of each cycle. In any
case, in this non-stationary situation HL(λ) again performed well in general.
6.7 Windy Gridworld
Reinforcement learning algorithms such as Watkins’ version of Q(λ) [Watkins,
1989] and Sarsa(λ) [Rummery and Niranjan, 1994; Rummery, 1995] are based
on temporal difference updates. This suggests that new reinforcement learning
algorithms based on HL(λ) should be possible.
For our first experiment we took the standard Sarsa(λ) algorithm and mod-
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ified it in the obvious way to use an HL temporal difference update. In the
presentation of this algorithm we have changed notation slightly to make things
more consistent with that typical in reinforcement learning. Specifically, we have
dropped the t super script as this is implicit in the algorithm specification, and
have defined Q(s, a) := V(s,a), E(s, a) := E(s,a) and N(s, a) := N(s,a). Our new re-
inforcement learning algorithm, which we call HLS(λ) is given in Algorithm 2.
Essentially the only changes to the standard Sarsa(λ) algorithm have been to
add code to compute the visit counter N(s, a), add a loop to compute the β
values, and replace α with β in the temporal difference update.
To test HLS(λ) against standard Sarsa(λ) we used the Windy Gridworld en-
vironment described on page 146 of [Sutton and Barto, 1998]. This world is
a grid of 7 by 10 squares that the agent can move through by going either up,
down, left or right. If the agent attempts to move off the grid it simply stays
where it is. The agent starts in the 4th row of the 1st column and receives a
reward of 1 when it finds its way to the 4th row of the 8th column. To make
things more difficult, there is a “wind” blowing the agent up 1 row in columns 4,
5, 6, and 9, and a strong wind of 2 rows in columns 7 and 8. This is illustrated
in Figure 6.4. Unlike in the original version, we have set up this problem to be a
continuing discounted task with an automatic transition from the goal state back
to the start state. This is because we have not yet derived an episodic version of
our learning rule.
We set γ = 0.99 and in each run computed the empirical future discounted
reward at each point in time. As this value oscillated we also ran a moving
average through these values with a window length of 50. Each run lasted for
50,000 time steps as this allowed us to see at what level each learning algorithm
topped out. These results appear on the left of Figure 6.5 and were averaged
over 500 runs to get accurate statistics.
Despite putting considerable effort into tuning the parameters of Sarsa(λ),
we were unable to achieve a final future discounted reward above 5.0. The
settings shown on the graph represent the best final value we could achieve.
In comparison HLS(λ) easily beat this result at the end of the run, while being
slightly slower than Sarsa(λ) at the start. By setting λ = 0.99 we were able to
achieve the same performance as Sarsa(λ) at the start of the run, however the
performance at the end of the run was then only slightly better than Sarsa(λ).
This combination of superior performance and fewer parameters to tune suggest
that the benefits of HL(λ) carry over into the reinforcement learning setting. In
terms of computational cost, HL(λ) was about 1.7 times slower than Sarsa(λ)
per time step due to the cost of computing the β values.
Another popular reinforcement learning algorithm is Watkins’ Q(λ). Similar
to Sarsa(λ) above, we simply inserted the HL(λ) temporal difference update
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Figure 6.4: [Windy Gridworld] S marks the start state and G the goal state, at
which the agent jumps back to S with a reward of 1. Small arrows indicate an
upward wind of one row per time step. The large arrows indicate a wind of two
rows per time step.
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Figure 6.5: Windy Gridworld performance tests. The left graph shows HLS(λ)
vs. Sarsa(λ), while the right graph shows HLQ(λ) vs. Q(λ). In both tests the
algorithm based on HL learning performed best. e represents the exploration
parameter ε, and a represents the learning rate α. For both tests the perfor-
mance was averaged over 500 runs.
into the usual Q(λ) algorithm in the obvious way. We call this new algorithm
HLQ(λ) and it is given in Algorithm 3. The test environment was exactly the
same as we used with Sarsa(λ) above.
The results this time were more competitive and appear on the right hand
side of Figure 6.5. Nevertheless, despite spending a considerable amount of
time fine tuning the parameters of Q(λ), we were unable to beat HLQ(λ). As
the performance advantage was relatively modest, the main benefit of HLQ(λ)
was that it achieved this level of performance without having to manually tune
a learning rate.
6.8 Conlusion
We have derived a new equation for setting the learning rate in temporal dif-
ference learning with eligibility traces. The equation replaces the free learning
rate parameter α, which is normally experimentally tuned by hand. In every
setting tested, be it stationary Markov chains, non-stationary Markov chains or
reinforcement learning, our new method produced superior results.
To further our theoretical understanding, the next step would be to try to
prove that the method converges to correct estimates. This can be done for
TD(λ) under certain assumptions on how the learning rate decreases over time [Dayan,
1992; Peng, 1993]. Hopefully, something similar can be proven for our new
method. In terms of experimental results, it would be interesting to try different
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Algorithm 3 HLQ(λ)
Initialise Q(s, a) = 0, N(s, a) = 1 and E(s, a) = 0 for all s, a
Initialise s and a
repeat
Take action a, observed r, s′
Choose a′ by using ε-greedy selection on Q(s′, ·)
a∗← argmaxb Q(s
′, b)
∆← r + γQ(s′, a∗)−Q(s, a)
E(s, a)← E(s, a) + 1
N(s, a)← N(s, a) + 1
for all s, a do
β((s, a), (s′, a′))← 1
N(s′,a′)−γE(s′,a′)
N(s′,a′)
N(s,a)
end for
for all s, a do
Q(s, a)←Q(s, a) + β
 
(s, a), (s′, a′)

E(s, a)∆
N(s, a)← λN(s, a)
if a′ = a∗ then
E(s, a)← γλE(s, a)
else
E(s, a)← 0
end if
end for
s ← s′; a ← a′
until end of run
types of reinforcement learning problems and to more clearly identify where the
ability to set the learning rate differently for different state transition pairs helps
performance.
Many extensions to the algorithm should also be possible. One would be to
generalise the learning rule to episodic tasks, another would be to merge our
update rule with Peng’s version of Q(λ) [Peng and Williams, 1996], as we have
done with Sarsa(λ) and Watkins’ version of Q(λ). Finally, it would be useful to
extend the algorithm to work with function approximation methods so that it
could deal with larger state spaces.
134 6.8 Conlusion
Chapter 7
Disussion
The title of this thesis is deliberately provocative. It asks the reader to consider
not just intelligent machines, but the possibility of machines that are super in-
telligent. Many find this idea difficult to take seriously. Among researchers the
topic is almost taboo: it belongs in science fiction. The most intelligent computer
in the world, they assure the public, is perhaps as smart as an ant, and that’s on
a good day. True machine intelligence, if it is ever developed, lies in the distant
future.
This was not always the case. In the 1960’s pioneering artificial intelligence
researchers had initial successes in a range of areas. Emboldened, they predicted
that more powerful systems were not far off, and that truly intelligent machines
might follow. As the researcher Herbert Simon wrote in 1965, “machines will
be capable, within twenty years, of doing any work a man can do.” (quoted
in Crevier, 1993) The field was alight with ambition and, not surprisingly, at-
tracted plenty of attention.
Over the decade that followed a series of high profile failures brought this
dream crashing back to earth. Although progress was being made, it was far
slower than many had expected. Naturally the public, and more importantly the
funding agencies, wanted to know where the intelligent machines were. The
cuts that ensued marked the beginning of the so called ‘AI winter’, although us-
age of this label varies considerably [Crevier, 1993; Russell and Norvig, 1995].
During the early 80’s there was a brief reprieve as expert systems became popu-
lar, however by the late 80’s these too had failed to live up to expectations. Over
time some areas distanced themselves from the label ‘artificial intelligence’, em-
phasising that their work was more practical and limited in scope. Any talk of
building machines with human level intelligence was frowned upon.
Since the early 90’s steady progress has slowly begun to reinvigorate the
field, particularly since the late 90’s. More powerful algorithms coupled with
dramatically improved hardware has produced countless advances in robotics,
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speech recognition, natural language processing, image processing, clustering,
classification, prediction, various types of optimisation, and many other areas.
As a result the reputation of artificial intelligence has started to recover and
funding has improved, leading some to believe that the ‘AI spring’ may have
finally arrived [Havenstein, 2005].
With the mood becoming more positive, the grand dream of artificial in-
telligence is starting to make a come back. A number of books predicting the
arrival of advanced artificial intelligence have been published and major confer-
ences have held workshops on ‘Human level AI’. Small conferences on ‘Artificial
General Intelligence’ and on the safety issues surrounding powerful machine
intelligence have also appeared. Perhaps over the next few years these ideas
will become more mainstream, however for now they are at the fringe. Most
researchers remain very sceptical about the idea of truly intelligent machines
within their lifetime.
One goal of this thesis is to promote the idea that intelligent machines, even
super intelligent machines, is a topic that is both important and one that can
be scientifically studied, even if just theoretically for now. In Chapters 2 and 3
we described Hutter’s model of an intelligent machine and examined some of
its remarkable properties. In Chapter 4 we saw how this model can be used to
construct a general measure of machine intelligence that formalises many of the
standard perspectives on the nature of intelligence outlined in Chapter 1. In
Chapter 5 we then examined some of the theoretical limitations faced by power-
ful artificial intelligence algorithms. Thus, although highly intelligent machines
do not exist yet, theoretical tools are starting to emerge to allow us to study
their properties. While this thesis makes some contributions to this effort, many
fundamental questions remain open (see for example the open problems listed
in Hutter, 2005).
None of this theoretical work would be of much importance if intelligent
machines were impossible in practice, or exceedingly unlikely in any reasonable
time frame. In this last chapter we will argue that this is not the case. Our goal
is not to conclusively argue that this will happen, or exactly when it will happen,
but simply to argue that the possibility cannot be completely discounted. This is
important because if a super intelligent machine ever did exist the implications
for humanity would be immense. Thus, if there is even a small probability that
intelligent machines could be developed in the foreseeable future, it is important
that we start to think seriously about the nature of these machines and what the
implications might be.
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7.1 Are super intelligent mahines possible?
Many people outside of the field are deeply sceptical about the idea that ma-
chines, mere physical objects of our construction, could ever have anything re-
sembling real intelligence: machines can only ever be strictly logical; they can-
not do anything they were not programed to do; and they certainly could not be
superior to their own creator — that would be a paradox! However, as anybody
working in the field knows, these common beliefs are baseless myths. Artificial
intelligence algorithms regularly find solutions to problems using heuristics and
forms of reasoning that are not strictly logical. They discover powerful new de-
signs for problems that the system’s programmers had never thought of [Koza
et al., 2003]. They also learn to play games such as chess [Hsu et al., 1995]
and backgammon [Tesauro, 1995] at levels superior to that of any human, let
alone the researchers who designed and created the system. Indeed, in the case
of checkers, computers are now literally unbeatable as they can play a provably
perfect game [Schaeffer et al., 2007].
The persistence of these beliefs seems to be due to a number of things. One
is that algorithms from artificial intelligence are not consumer products: they
are hidden in the magic of sophisticated technology. For example, when hand
writing the address on a card most people do not know that it will likely be read
by a computer rather than a human at the sorting office. People do not think
about the learning algorithms that are monitoring their credit card transactions
looking for fraud, filtering spam to their email address, automatically trading
their retirement savings on international markets, monitoring their behaviour
on the internet in order to decide which ads should appear on web pages they
view, or even just the vision processing algorithms that graded the apples at
the supermarket. The steady progress that artificial intelligence algorithms are
making is out of sight, and thus generally out of mind.
Another common objection is that we humans have something mysterious
and special that makes us tick, something that machines, by definition, do not
have. Perhaps some type of non-physical consciousness or feelings, qualia, or
‘quantum field’ etc. Of course it is impossible to rule out mysterious possibili-
ties until an intelligent machine has been constructed without needing anything
particularly mysterious. Nonetheless, we should view such objections for what
they are: a form of vitalism. Throughout history, whenever science could not
explain some unusual phenomenon, many people readily assumed that God or
magic was at work. Even distinguished scientists have fallen into this, only to
be embarrassed once more sceptical and curious scientists worked out what was
actually going on. Things ranging from the motion of whole galaxies to the
behaviour of sub-atomic particles are now known to follow extremely precise
physical laws. To conjecture that our brains are somehow special and different
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in some strange way is to speculate based on nothing but our own feelings of
specialness.
If the human brain is merely a ‘meat machine’, as some have put it, it is
certainly not the most powerful intelligence possible. To start with, there is the
issue of scale: a typical adult human brain weights about 1.4 kg and consumes
just 25 watts of power [Kandel et al., 2000]. This is ideal for a mobile intelli-
gence, however an artificial intelligence need not be mobile and thus could be
orders of magnitude larger and more energy intensive. At present a large su-
percomputer can fill a room twice the size of a basketball court and consume
10 megawatts of power. With a few billion dollars much larger machines could
be built. Google, for example, is currently constructing a data centre next to
a power station in Oregon that will cover two football fields and have cooling
towers four stories high [Markoff and Hansell, 2005]. Biology never had the
option of building brains on such an enormous scale.
Another point is that brains use fairly large and slow components. Consider
one of the simpler of these, axons: essentially the wiring of the nervous system.
These are typically around 1 micrometre wide, carry spike signals at up to 75
metres per second at a frequency of at most a few hundred hertz [Kandel et al.,
2000]. Compare these characteristics with those of a wire that carries signals
on a microchip. Currently these are 45 nanometres wide, propagate signals at
300 million metres per second and can easily operate at 4 billion hertz. Some
might debate whether an electrochemical spike travelling down an axon is so
directly comparable to an electrical pulse travelling down a wire, however it is
well established that at least the primary role of an axon is simply to carry this
information. Given that present day technology produces wires which are 20
times thinner, propagate signals 4 million times faster and operate at 20 million
times the frequency, it is hard to believe that the performance of axons could not
be improved by at least a few orders of magnitude.
Of course, the above assumes that the brain’s design is what we should repli-
cate. Perhaps the brain’s algorithm is close to optimal for some things, but it
certainly is not optimal for all problems. Even the most outstanding savants
cannot store information anywhere near as quickly, accurately and in the quan-
tities that are possible for a computer. Also savants’ impressive ability to perform
fast mental calculations is insignificant next to even a basic calculator. Brains are
poorly designed for such feats. A machine, however, would have no such limi-
tations: it could employ a range of specialised algorithms for different types of
problems. Concepts like education become obsolete when knowledge and un-
derstanding can simply be copied from one intelligent machine to another. It is
easy to think up many more advantages.
Most likely improvements over brains are possible in algorithms, hardware
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and scale. This is not to take away from the amazing system that the brain is,
something that we are still unable to match in many ways. All we wish to point
out is that if the brain is essentially just a machine, which appears to be the case,
then it certainly is not the most intelligent machine that could exist. This idea is
reasonable once you think about it: machines can easily carry more, fly higher,
move faster and see further than even the most able animals in each of these
categories. Why would human intelligence be any different? Of course, just
because systems with greater than human intelligence are possible in principle,
this does not mean that we will be able to build one. Designing and constructing
such an advanced machine could be beyond our capabilities.
7.2 How ould intelligent mahines be developed?
There are many ways in which machine intelligence might be developed. Un-
fortunately, it is difficult to estimate how likely any of these approaches are to
succeed. In this section we speculate on a few of them.
Theoretial approahes
The approach most closely related to this thesis would be to take the AIXI model
and find a way to usefully scale it down. A number of attempts to do this have
been made: the HL(λ) algorithm presented in Chapter 6, the AIXIt l algorithm
(Chapter 7 of Hutter, 2005), the AIXI based algorithm for repeated matrix games
[Poland and Hutter, 2006] and Fitness Uniform Optimisation [Hutter and Legg,
2006] all originate in efforts to scale down AIXI. Although not deriving from AIXI,
the Shortest and Fastest algorithm in [Hutter, 2002a], the Speed prior [Schmid-
huber, 2002], the Optimal Ordered Problem Solver [Schmidhuber, 2004], and
the Gödel Machine [Schmidhuber, 2005] come from a related background in al-
gorithmic probability and Kolmogorov complexity theory. While each of these
has their strengths, as yet none come close to bringing the power of theoretical
models such as AIXI into reality.
The key question is how to make a general and powerful artificial intelli-
gence like AIXI work efficiently. The results of Chapter 5 offer some hints on the
direction that such a project might take. For certain, the prediction of general
computable sequences is out of the question (Lemma 5.2.4), as is the prediction
of all computable sequences whose Kolmogorov complexity is below some mod-
erate bound. Otherwise serious problems arise with the necessary complexity of
the prediction algorithms (Theorem 5.3.3), and even worse Gödel incomplete-
ness (Theorem 5.6.1). Nevertheless, we know that certain types of complex
sequences can be predicted by relatively simple algorithms (Lemma 5.2.3), and
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that many theoretical problems go away when even weak bounds are placed
on the computation time of the sequences to be predicted (Lemma 5.5.2). Thus,
what we need to aim for is the ability to efficiently predict computable sequences
that have certain computational resource bounds. How best to characterise such
sequences is an open problem, let alone how to efficiently learn to predict them.
Perhaps any breakthrough is more likely to come from the opposite direction:
somebody discovers a theoretically elegant and very powerful algorithm that is
able to efficiently predict many kinds of sequences. The structure of this algo-
rithm and how easily it can model different sequences will then implicitly define
a natural measure of resource bounded sequence complexity.
When a breakthrough in this area might occur is impossible to predict, and
the same is true of other theoretical approaches. Perhaps with the right theo-
retical insight Bayesian networks, prediction with expert advice, artificial neural
networks, reasoning engines, or any one of a dozen other techniques will sud-
denly advance in a dramatic way. Although some progress in all of these areas
is a near certainty, true breakthroughs by their very nature are rare and highly
unpredictable. Furthermore, even if a huge breakthrough did occur, whether ex-
isting computer hardware would be sufficient to support the creation of highly
intelligent machines would depend on the nature of this new algorithm. In sum-
mary, although we cannot rule out the possibility of a large breakthrough leading
to intelligent machines, there is little we can do to estimate how likely this is.
Brain simulation
Rather than taking abstract theories like AIXI and trying to scale them down to
make them practical, another approach is to proceed in the opposite direction:
start by studying the details of how real biological brains work and then try to
abstract from this a design for an artificial intelligence. Although this idea is
simple in principle, studying and understanding the brain is very challenging.
One of the most basic problems is that it is currently impossible to observe a
brain in action with sufficient spatial and temporal resolution to really see how
it works. Methods to study the brain include: PET scans, fMRI scans, arrays of
probes, marking neurons with chemicals which cause them to fluoresce when
they fire, placing extracted neural tissue on microchips that can sense when
neurons fire, and the use of staining and microscopy to study the anatomical
structure of the brain. The problem is that none of these methods allows a
researcher to take a sizable area of a brain and simultaneously observe exactly
which neurons are firing, precisely when they fire, what type of neurons they
are, which other neurons they are connected to, the types of these connections,
how these connections change over short intervals of time, and so on. Instead,
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researchers have at their disposal a range of methods, each of which provides
only a limited view of what is going on. Indeed, what is known about the brain
is largely dictated by the strengths and weaknesses of the different methods of
study.
Another major problem is the sheer complexity of the system. A human brain
consists of hundreds of billions of neurons, and hundreds of trillions of synapses.
There are over a hundred different types of neurons, different synapses employ
different combinations of neurotransmitters, connection patterns vary from one
part of the brain to another, and so on (see any standard text book, for exam-
ple Kandel et al., 2000). When looking at slices of brain tissue where a small
percentage of neurons and their dendritic trees have been stained, the brain’s
wiring starts to look about as comprehensible as an ocean of tangled spaghetti.
Even worse, all these elements interact with each other in highly dynamic ways.
Via some kind of a miracle, from this monstrous cacophony emerges the human
mind. With so much complexity, even if the perfect brain scanning technology
existed it might still be very difficult to understand how the brain actually works.
Given the scale of these difficulties, is building a brain simulation feasible?
Perhaps the first point to note is that building a working simulation of something
does not require understanding everything about how the system works. What
is required is that the basic units which comprise the system can be faithfully re-
produced and connected together. If this is done properly, the resulting dynamics
will be the same as the dynamics in the real system — even if we do not fully
understand what these higher level dynamics are, or why they are important to
the system’s overall functioning. Indeed, simulations are often constructed for
the very purpose of better understanding a system’s emergent dynamics once its
low level dynamics are understood. Thus, rather than needing to understand all
the mysteries of how the brain works, in order to build a functional simulation it
is sufficient to understand the nature and organisation of the brain’s elementary
units: neurons, dendrites, axons, synapses etc. There is already a large body of
knowledge about how these basic units work and how they are wired together in
various parts of the brain. Literally thousands of researchers around the world
are refining and developing this knowledge.
Another important point, at least for people interested in developing artificial
intelligence, is that much of the brain’s complexity is not relevant. A significant
part of the human brain is a jumble of different subsystems that take care of
basic instinctive things like breathing, heart beat, blood pressure, reproduction,
hunger, thirst, rhythms such as sleeping and body temperature, fight or flight
response and so on. Even one of the largest parts of the brain, the cerebellum
which is involved in movement and precision timing, is not needed for an artifi-
cial intelligence: individuals without one are still intellectually and emotionally
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able. The key, it seems, lies in understanding the neocortex, and its interaction
with two smaller structures, namely, the thalamus and the hippocampus. It is
known that the neocortex is the part of the brain that is primarily responsible for
processing vision, sound, touch, proprioception, understanding and generating
language, planning, spatial reasoning, coordinating and executing movement,
and logical thought [Fuster, 2003]. Clearly then, the key to artificial intelligence
via brain simulation lies in understanding the neocortex and related structures.
As different regions of the neocortex perform different functions, one might
expect that they would have significantly different anatomical structures. Amaz-
ingly, this is not the case. Essentially the whole neocortex has the same six layer
structure, or up to 12 layers depending on how you count them. Each layer is
characterised by the types of neurons present, where axons from neurons in the
layer project to, and where axons come from that form synapses on the den-
dritic trees of these neurons. Besides some thickening and thinning of the layers
in different regions, and the fact that primary visual cortex actually has an extra
layer, this six layer structure is consistent across the whole neocortex [Fuster,
2003; Abeles, 1991]. What this suggests is that the same information process-
ing mechanism is being applied across the neocortex, and that the variations
in function across different regions are actually adaptations to the information
passing through each region [Creutzfeldt, 1977; Mountcastle, 1978].
A number of results back up this hypothesis. One is that with increased use
the region of cortex responsible for performing some action tends to expand, in
the sense that neighbouring cortex is recruited. In extreme cases, such as the
congenitally blind, the unused areas of visual cortex start to perform other roles,
such as helping touch processing for reading braille. In a more dramatic exam-
ple, the brain of a ferret was physically altered at birth so that visual neocortex
received auditory input and vice versa. Each region of neocortex then learnt to
process the input it was receiving [Melchner et al., 2000]. Similar experiments
with rats have produced consistent results.
If the hypothesis of a single underlying learning and adaptation dynamic
across the neocortex is correct, then the key to understanding much of the in-
tellectual capacity of the brain lies in understanding how these six layers work,
and the way in which they interact with the thalamus and hippocampus. In
recent years this approach to artificial intelligence has been popularised by Jeff
Hawkins 2004, though most of these ideas have been known in neuroscience
for some time. The main vehicle for Hawkins’ artificial intelligence work is his
company Numenta, with related neuroscience research being carried out at the
Redwood Center for Theoretical Neuroscience, also founded by Hawkins. They
are certainly not alone in trying to understand the cortex, indeed it is one of
the largest areas of neuroscience research with whole journals dedicated to the
143 7.2 How ould intelligent mahines be developed?
topic.
One group of researchers whose work may be useful to brain modelling is
currently cutting a cortical column into 30 nanometre slices and then scanning
these using both electron and light based microscopes. As this produces enor-
mous quantities of data, machine learning algorithms are being developed to
automatically identify the structures in these images. Over the next few years
this process should produce an extremely detailed three dimensional anatomical
model of the cortex [Singer, 2007].
A group with more of a simulation emphasis is the BlueBrain project based
at EPFL. Using information on the structure and behaviour of cortical columns
collected from a wide range of sources, they have built a computer model of
a column that they run on an IBM BlueGene supercomputer. To calibrate their
model they use segments of rat cortex which they stimulate in different ways
and then compare the resulting dynamics with what their model predicts. They
now claim to have succeeded in accurately modelling the dynamics of a cortical
column, and are working on ways to expand this model to be able to simulate
groups of columns working together [Graham-Rowe, 2007]. Their goal is to
eventually be able to simulate an entire human neocortex.
Another group working at the IBM Almaden Research Lab recently announced
that they had simulated a mouse scale neocortex, also on an IBM BlueGene su-
percomputer. Their model consisted of 8 million neurons and 50 billion synapses
and ran at one seventh real time speed. They claim that this simulation produced
dynamical properties consistent with what is observed in a real mouse brain, in-
cluding EEG like waves [Ananthanarayanan and Modha, 2007]. Their aim is
also to scale up to a human sized neocortex as more powerful supercomput-
ers become available in the coming years. Unlike the BlueBrain project, their
core goals are less neuroscience orientated: as their model starts to do more
interesting things, their aim is to extract from this useful algorithms for artificial
intelligence.
Obviously these simulations are pushing the limits of what is known about
the cortex, and also what is possible with current computer technology. Never-
theless, the fact that these simulations are being attempted at all illustrates how
the gap between the power of supercomputers and brains is perhaps not as large
as some people think. At present the world’s fastest machine is the IBM Road-
runner supercomputer at the US department of defence which has an official
LAPACK benchmark performance of 1015 floating point operations per second
(FLOPS). Machines capable of 1016 FLOPS are being designed and should ap-
pear in a few years. No doubt these will be superseded by even more powerful
machines.
To put these numbers in perspective, a human cortex has on the order of 1010
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neurons and 1014 synapses [Koch, 1999]. Given that neurons can fire on the
order of 100 Hz, this gives a crude estimate of the computational capacity of the
brain: 1016 operations per second [Moravec, 1998; Kurzweil, 2000]. Of course,
until a simulation succeeds in producing intelligence, nobody knows for sure
how much computer power will be needed. Researchers working in molecular
neuroscience tend to think it is much more, while some working in theoretical
neuroscience think it could be less. If the estimate of 1016 FLOPS is in fact 100
times too low, then we will have to wait 10 years before a sufficiently powerful
computer exists.
Evolution
Another approach that is becoming more attractive with increasing computer
power is artificial evolution. After all, natural evolution produced the human
brain so we know that the approach does work — at least as a planet wide phe-
nomenon over billions of years! No computer in the foreseeable future could
hope to simulate evolution on such a scale. Fortunately, evolving an artificial
intelligence via an evolutionary algorithm is a much smaller problem. To begin
with, it is not necessary to start from scratch the way nature did. Of the approxi-
mately 4 billion years since simple cellular life first came into existence, about 3
billion years of this time was required just to get to the level of multicellular life.
Only then could more complex organisms start to evolve. We can short circuit
this by building a virtual body for the agent. Of course, evolving an intelligence
for a complex body might be too difficult, thus we may want to begin with trying
to evolve a simple intelligence for a simple body in a simple environment, and
then scale up. In any case, all the evolutionary algorithm has to do is to work on
the design of the agent’s intelligence: much of the remaining complexity can be
taken care of by us.
Another important point is that natural evolution does not seek to maximise
intelligence: its effect is to optimise agents’ ability to spread their genes. Intelli-
gence is a secondary feature that is more useful in some ecological niches than
others. In artificial evolution this does not need to be the case. So long as we
can define and measure intelligence in a sufficiently general way, we can use this
to evaluate the fitness of individuals. With evolution explicitly directed towards
maximising intelligence, progress towards more intelligent agents should be far
more rapid.
The universal intelligence measure described in Chapter 4 lays the founda-
tion for such a measure. Essentially, what the universal intelligence measure
says is that we should test agents initially over extremely trivial pattern recogni-
tion and interaction problems as these are the most important. As agents learn
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to solve these, we should slowly include more complex problems, always en-
suring that agents are still able to solve the simple problems that came before.
This ensures that the agents’ abilities remain very general as they develop. As
the universal intelligence measure is still a theoretical definition, some further
work would be needed to figure out how best to convert it into a practical test
for evolving agents.
The importance of having a good fitness function cannot be stressed enough:
with a fitness function that is reliable, smooth and has a gradient that gener-
ally points in the right direction, even high dimensional optimisation problems
can become relatively easy. With an unreliable or deceptive fitness function
seemingly simple problems can become practically unsolvable. It is currently
unknown how well universal intelligence would work as a fitness function for
evolving agents with general intelligence.
Another major issue concerns the model that we use for the agents’ intel-
ligence: should the agents be neural networks, programs in some language,
or some other kind of object? In theory any Turing equivalent representation
should do, however in practice the choice of representation is important as it
has the effect of biasing the space of possibilities towards certain types of agents.
Often choosing the right representation is critical to making artificial evolution
work. For an intelligent agent there are many possible systems of representa-
tion, each with their respective proponents. Unfortunately, nobody really knows
which of these is the best. About the only thing we know for sure is that nature
was able to evolve intelligence working with networks of spiking neurons. On
the other hand, with a computer system perhaps something closer to a tradi-
tional programing language would be more efficient.
One important problem faced in large scale artificial evolution is diversity
control. Essentially, if you apply too much selection pressure the population
tends to collapse around a small group of individuals that are all related to the
fittest individual. At this point evolution becomes stuck due to a lack of genetic
diversity. If you reduce the selection pressure this helps, however now the speed
at which the population fitness rises is reduced. Even with no selection pressure
at all population diversity tends to collapse over time due to the phenomenon
of genetic drift. For problems where the evolving individuals are fairly simple
this can easily be dealt with by creating a distance metric to evaluate how sim-
ilar individuals are to each other. This can then be used to ensure that similar
individuals tend not to mate with each other, or have reduced fitness (see for
example Goldberg and Richardson, 1987; Jong, 1975). In more complex prob-
lems, however, it can become very difficult to judge how similar two individuals
really are. For example, two neural networks may compute the same function,
but have completely different weights and topologies. Indeed, due to Rice’s the-
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orem it is impossible in general to decide whether two algorithms compute the
same function.
One solution is to use diversity control methods that do not rely on compar-
ing the genotypes of the individuals, but rather by comparing properties of their
phenotypes. A simple example of this is Fitness Uniform Optimisation where
the evolutionary algorithm tries to increase the diversity in the population by
increasing the diversity of fitness [Hutter and Legg, 2006]. In the case of the
Fitness Uniform Selection Scheme (FUSS) this is achieved through selection pres-
sure [Hutter, 2002b; Legg et al., 2004], while for the Fitness Uniform Deletion
Scheme it is achieved by deletion [Legg and Hutter, 2005a]. Although these
methods have not yet been applied to the evolution of programs or neural net-
works, they have proven to be effective on a number of deceptive optimisation
problems.
Another possibility might be to mix biologically and theoretically derived
designs with evolution. For example, as a starting point take a model of the
neocortex based on biological studies, such as those in the previous section,
and then apply artificial evolution to modify and tune the model. Although we
might not get the initial design right due to limitations in our understanding of
the cortex, it is reasonable to suppose that in the space of all neural networks
this initial design is relatively close to the correct design, or a related design
that also works. Starting with individuals that are reasonably close to the target
makes the optimisation problem that evolution has to solve orders of magnitude
easier.
Even if each of the above suggestions succeeded in reducing the difficulty of
evolving intelligence by several orders of magnitude, perhaps the biggest prob-
lem is still computer power. Advancing technology over the coming decades
will help, but this could still be too little. Perhaps the closest we could come
to nature’s planet scale evolution would be to construct a world wide network
of machines donating computation time. After all, more than 2 million years of
computer time have so far been donated to the Search for Extraterrestrial Intel-
ligence (SETI), why not something similar to search for artificial intelligence?
7.3 Is building intelligent mahines a good idea?
It is impossible to know whether any of the approaches discussed in the pre-
vious section, or other approaches, will succeed in producing truly intelligent
machines. But this is not the point we want to make: the point is that it is not
obvious that they will all fail. This is important, because the impact of this event
would be huge. Following the first credible demonstration of true general intel-
ligence in a machine, for sure a much larger and more powerful machine will
147 7.3 Is building intelligent mahines a good idea?
be constructed shortly thereafter. This leads to what I. J. Good referred to as an
intelligence explosion:
“Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can
far surpass all the intellectual activities of any man however clever.
Since the design of machines is one of these intellectual activities, an
ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there
would then unquestionably be an ‘intelligence explosion,’ and the
intelligence of man would be left far behind. Thus the first ultrain-
telligent machine is the last invention that man need ever make.”
[Good, 1965]
The defining characteristic of our species is intelligence. It is not by superior
size, strength or speed that we dominate life on earth, but by our intelligence. If
our intelligence were to be significantly surpassed, it is difficult to imagine what
the consequences of this might be. It would certainly be a source of enormous
power, and with enormous power comes enormous responsibility.
Machine intelligence could bring unprecedented wealth and opportunity if
used constructively and safely. Alternatively, it could bring about some kind of
a nightmare scenario. The latter possibility is certainly well known, being a
staple of science fiction. Positive fictional depictions are rare, probably because
casting the machines as villains is a convenient plot device. Outside of works
of fiction, however, the implications of powerful machine intelligence are rarely
encountered. Indeed, the whole subject of truly intelligent machines is generally
avoided by academics, as noted at the start of this chapter.
If one accepts that the impact of truly intelligent machines is likely to be
profound, and that there is at least a small probability of this happening in the
foreseeable future, it is only prudent to try to prepare for this in advance. If
we wait until it seems very likely that intelligent machines will soon appear, it
will be too late to thoroughly discuss and contemplate the issues involved. His-
torically technology has advanced in leaps and bounds, while social and ethical
considerations have developed more slowly, often only as a reaction to the prob-
lems created by a technology after it arrived. Even what now seem to be obvious
moral principles, such as gender and racial equality, were debated for centuries
and are still not accepted in many parts of the world. Given that the implications
of powerful machine intelligence are likely to be complex, we cannot expect to
find good answers quickly. We need to be seriously working on these things now.
A small but growing number of forward thinking individuals and organisa-
tions are thinking about these issues. Perhaps the premier organisation dedi-
cated to the safe and beneficial development of powerful artificial intelligence is
the Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence (SIAI). In 2007 SIAI organised a
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conference that attracted well known speakers including Rodney Brooks (direc-
tor of the computer science and AI laboratory at MIT), Barney Pell (AI researcher
and CEO of Powerset), Wendell Wallach (bioethics lecturer at Yale), Sam Adams
(IBM distinguished engineer), Paul Saffo (lecturer at Sanford), Peter Norvig (di-
rector of research at Google), Peter Thiel (founder of Clarium Capital and co-
founder of Paypal) and Ray Kurzweil (futurologist, inventor and entrepreneur).
Although this event was one of the first of its kind, the calibre of these speakers
makes it clear that issues surrounding the development of advanced artificial
intelligence are starting to be taken seriously. Other notable people who have
spoken and written about the potential dangers of advanced artificial intelli-
gence in recent years include Bill Joy (co-founder of Sun Microsystems), Nick
Bostrom (director of the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford), and Sir Mar-
tin Rees (professor at Cambridge and president of the Royal Society). Hopefully
this trend will continue.
At the SIAI itself the principle research fellow is Eliezer Yudkowsky. He has
written a number of documents that deal mostly with safety and ethical issues
surrounding the development of powerful artificial intelligence, as well as ideas
on how he thinks so called ‘Friendly AI’ should be developed. Although these can
be accessed through the SIAI website, none of his writings have yet appeared in
mainstream peer reviewed journals. As AIXI is currently the only comprehensive
mathematical theory of machine super intelligence, SIAI follows this work with
interest and lists [Hutter, 2007a] among their core readings. PhD candidate Nick
Hay, who is associated with SIAI, is examining whether AIXI theory can be used
to study the safety of intelligent machines. Hopefully the gentle introduction to
AIXI in Chapter 2 will encourage more people to explore some of these research
directions.
In 1887 Lord Acton famously wrote, “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute
power corrupts absolutely.” It is not that power itself is inherently good or evil,
rather it grants the ability to be so: power amplifies intention. Although Acton’s
quote has a ring of truth to it, perhaps it is excessively pessimistic about human
nature. In any case, if there is ever to be something approaching absolute power,
a super intelligent machine would come close. By definition, it would be capable
of achieving a vast range of goals in a wide range of environments. If we care-
fully prepare for this possibility in advance, not only might we overt disaster, we
might bring about an age of prosperity unlike anything seen before.
Notation and Conventions
When defining a symbol or equation we use := to stress that the item on the left
is newly defined. When we just need to assert that two things are equal we use
the plain = symbol. Not equal is 6=, and approximately equal ≈. By x ≫ y we
mean that x is much greater than y , and similarly for≪.
The cardinality of a set S is written |S|. The empty set is written ∅, subset
with the possbility of equality ⊆, and proper subset ⊂. The natural numbers
are denoted N := {1,2, . . .}, naturals with 0 included N0 := {0,1,2, 3, . . .}, the
integers Z := {. . .− 2,−1,0,1, 2, . . .}, the rational numbers Q := { n
m
: n,m ∈ Z},
and the real numbers R. We use standard notation for intervals on the real line.
Specifically, we define [x , y] := {z ∈ R : x ≤ z ≤ y}, and (x , y) := {z ∈ R : x <
z < y}. Intervals such as (0,1] have the obvious meaning.
loga x is the logarithm of x base a. ln x := loge x where e = 2.71828 . . ..
When the specific base used makes no difference we simply write log x . The
factorial of n, written n!, is defined 0!= 1 and n! := n(n−1)(n−2) · · ·1 for n ∈ N.
The binomial is written
 n
r

:= n!
(n−r)!r!
. Although 00 is technically indeterminate,
in derivations we follow the standard convention and take its value to be 1. The
Kronecker delta symbol δab is defined to be 1 if a = b, and 0 otherwise.
An alphabet is a finite set of elements which are called symbols. For example,
{a, b, c, . . . , z} is an alphabet, as is {up,down,left,right}. Mostly we use the
binary alphabet B := {0,1}, in which context the symbols are known as bits. A
binary string is a finite ordered n-tuple of bits. This is denoted x := x1x2 . . . xn
where ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} : x i ∈ B, or more succinctly, x ∈ B
n. The 0-tuple is
denoted ε and is called the null string. The expression B≤n represents the set
of binary strings of length n or less, and B∗ :=
⋃
n∈NB
n is the set of all binary
strings. A substring of a string x is itself a string defined x j:k := x j x j+1 . . . xk
where 1 ≤ j ≤ k ≤ n. Concatenation is indicated by juxtaposition, for example,
if x = x1x2 ∈ B
2 and y = y1 y2 y3 ∈ B
3, then x y = x1x2 y1 y2 y3. In some
cases we will also concatenate constants, for example if x ∈ B∗ then x101 is the
string x with 101 added on the end. By ℓ(x) we mean the length of the string
x , for example, if x ∈ Bn then ℓ(x x) = 2ℓ(x) = 2n, and for k < n we have
ℓ(x j:k) = k− j + 1.
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Unlike strings which always have finite length, a binary sequence ω is an
infinite list of bits, for example ω := x1x2x3 . . . ∈ B
∞. For a sequence ω ∈ B∞
we might be interested in the prediction of the (t+1)th bit, denoted ωt+1, given
that we have so far observed only the finite initial string ω1:t ∈ B
t . Obviously a
string cannot be concatenated onto the end of a sequence as a sequence has no
end, however a sequence can be concateded onto the end of a string.
Our notation and usage of measure theory in this thesis is non-standard as
it makes working with strings and sequences easier. Although the usage is ex-
plained in the text, for the mathematically inclined the relationship to standard
measure theory is as follows: For a given sample space Ω, a probability measure
ν is a type of [0,1] valued function defined over a set of subsets of Ω, known
as a σ-algebra. For prediction we need to measure the probability of sets of
sequences that begin with a given string, thus we need a σ-algebra that con-
tains these sets, the so called cylinder sets defined, Γx := {xω : ω ∈ B
∞
} for
x ∈ B∗. Such a σ-algebra can easily be constructed by considering the smallest
σ-algebra that contains the cylinder sets. In this thesis we do not need to be
able to measure arbitrary sets within this σ-algebra and thus we adopt a simpli-
fied notation for measures by defining ν(x) to be shorthand for ν(Γx). In other
words, ν(x) is the probability that a binary sequence sampled according to the
distribution ν begins with the string x ∈ B∗. This shorthand does not get us
into trouble as it can be proven that measures defined on the set B∗ correspond
uniquely to measures defined on the full σ-algebra [Calude, 2002]. As we are
often interested in the probability that a string x ∈ B∗ follows a string y ∈ B∗
in a sequence sampled according to some distribution µ, we further define the
shorthand notation µ(y x) := µ(y x)/µ(y).
Probability distributions, measures and semi-measures are usually denoted
by a lowercase greek letter, for example, µ,ν ,̺. For an unnamed probabilty
distribution over a random variable X , we write P(X ). Eµ(X ) is the expected
value of X with respect to µ. When µ is the true distribution we can omit this
from the notation for expectations.
Throughout the thesis we refer to an agent, usually denoted by the condi-
tional measure π, that is interacting with some kind of an environment, usually
denoted by the conditional measure µ. This interaction occurs by having ac-
tion symbols from the alphabet A being sent by the agent to the environment,
and perception symbols from the alphabet X being sent back in the other di-
rection. Each perception consists of an observation from the alphabet O and a
reward from the alphabet R . When referring to the full measure defined by π
interacting with µ we use the symbol π
µ
.
To denote symbols being sent we use the lower case variable names a, o, r
and x for actions, observations, rewards and perceptions respectively. We index
151
these in the order in which they occur, thus a1 is the agent’s first action, a2 is the
second action and so on. The agent and the environment take turns at sending
symbols, starting with the agent. This produces a history of actions, observa-
tions and rewards which can be written, a1o1r1a2o2r2a3o3r3 . . .. As we refer to
interaction histories a lot, we need to be able to represent these compactly. One
trick that we use is to squeeze symbols together and then index them as blocks
of symbols. Thus for the complete interaction history up to and including cycle
t, we can write ax1:t := a1x1a2x2a3 . . . at x t . For the history before cycle t we
use ax<t := ax1:t−1. Note that x t := ot rt .
Some of our results will have the property of holding within an additive
constant that is independent of the variables in the expression. We indicate this
by placing a small plus above the equality or inequality symbol. For example,
f <
+
g means that ∃c ∈ R,∀x : f (x) < g(x) + c. If f <
+
g <
+
f , we write
f
+
= g. When using standard “big O” notation this is superfluous as expressions
are already understood to hold within an independent constant, however we
will sometimes still use it for consistency of notation. Similarly, we define f ≤
×
g
to mean that ∃c ∈ R,∀x : f (x)≤ c · g(x), and if f ≤
×
g ≤
×
f we write f
×
= g.
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Ergodi MDPs admit self-optimising
agents
A number of results similar to Theorem 3.4.5 exist, such as the proof that with
probability 1 the Q-learning algorithm converges to optimal in an ergodic MDP
environment [Watkins and Dayan, 1992]. Unfortunately, in order to establish
the necessary chain of results we need something a little different: we require
the convergence to hold for any history and with an effective horizon that goes
to infinity. For a precise statement of the theorem, necessary technical condi-
tions and proof, see Theorem 5.38 in [Hutter, 2005]. Although Hutter’s proof
is straight forward, it assumes a certain continuity condition on value functions
based on estimated transition probabilities for ergodic MDPs. This is left as a
(large!) exercise for the reader (Problem 5.12 in Hutter, 2005). In this ap-
pendix we follow the plan of attack suggested in Problem 5.12 to prove the
missing continuity result, namely, Theorem .4.3 that appears at the end of this
section.
.1 Basi denitions
For definitions of agents, environments, ergodic and many other things used,
see Chapters 2 and 3. Rather than just talking about agents, as we do in the
rest of this thesis, here we will use the slightly more refined notion of a policy.
Essentially, a policy is some rule or mode of operation that an agent has. For
example, when navigating a maze an agent’s policy might be to always turn left
at each intersection. The distinction is useful when we wish to consider agents
which have multiple different modes of operation. That is, an agent which fol-
lows some policy for a while and then, perhaps due to certain conditions such
as a lack of success, switches to a different policy.
The proofs in this section will make extensive use of results from linear alge-
bra. The mathematical notation used is fairly standard: we will represent real
valued matrices with capital letters, for example A ∈ Rn×m. By Ai j we mean the
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single scalar element of A on the i th row and j th column. By A∗ j we mean the j
th
column of A and similarly for Ai∗. We represent vectors with a bold lowercase
variable, for example a ∈ Rn. Similar to the case for matrices, by ai we mean the
i th element of a. In some situations a matrix or vector may already have other
indexes, in this case we place square brackets around it and then index so as
to avoid confusion. For example, [bπ]i is the i
th element of the vector bπ. We
represent the classical adjoint of a matrix A by adj(A) and the determinant by
det(A).
In order to express the Markov chains as matrices, we need to be able to
index the actions and perceptions with natural numbers. This could be achieved
by a simple numbering scheme; here we will just assume that this has already
been done. That is, without loss of generality we assume that X := {1, . . . ,n1}
and A := {1, . . . ,n2} for n1,n2 ∈ N. The difficulty with this is that each percep-
tion x is still associated with an observation o and a reward r. To recover the
reward associated with x we write r(x) ∈ R , and similarly for o(x) ∈ O . Both
R and O are finite, as always, but otherwise unspecified.
Let π be a stationary policy such that ∀ax<kak : π(ax<kak) = π(o(x)k−1ak).
That is, under the policy π the distribution of actions depends on only the last
observation in a way that is independent of k. It follows that the equation for
the kth perception xk given history ax<k is,
π(ax<kak)µ(ax<kax k) = π(o(xk−1)ak)µ(o(xk−1)ax k).
Thus, for a given µ and π the next perception xk depends on only the previous
observation o(x)k−1 in a way that is independent of k, that is, π and µ together
form a stationary Markov chain. Given that everything is stationary, we can drop
the index k and write x , a and x ′ for the perception, action and the following
perception.
From the definition of an MDP it is clear that we can represent a (stationary)
MDP as a three dimensional Cartesian tensor D ∈ Rn1×n2×n1 defined ∀x , a, x ′,
Dxax ′ := µ(o(x)ax
′).
Note that the only part of x that plays a part in defining the structure of D is
the associated observation o(x), as required by our definition of an MDP. The
reward associated with x , that is r(x), has no role.
We can now express the interaction of the policy and the environment as a
square stochastic matrix T ∈ Rn1×n1 defined,
Tx x ′ :=
∑
a∈A
π(o(x)a)µ(o(x)ax ′) =
∑
a∈A
π(o(x)a)Dxax ′ . (1)
It should be noted that this characterisation of the interaction between µ
and π as a stochastic matrix T is only possible if µ is a stationary MDP and π
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is a stationary policy. Fortunately this is all we will need for optimality, though
we will briefly have to consider non-stationary policies in Section .3 in order
to prove this. It is worth keeping in mind that when we see a matrix T this
represents the complete system of an agent and environment interacting, rather
than just an environment. That is, it represents the interaction measure π
µ
.
Define a matrix Rxa ∈ R
n1×n2 to be the expected reward when choosing action
a after perception x . Further define the column vector rπ ∈ R
n1 where,
[rπ]x := E(Rxa|x) =
∑
a∈A
π(xa)Rxa.
The advantage of expressing everything in matrix notation is that the full
range of linear algebra techniques is now easy to work with. For example, the
probability of transiting between any two perceptions can be easily computed by
taking powers of T : if we have a perception i then the probability that exactly
m cycles later the perception will be j, is given by [Tm]i j.
.1.1 Definition. For an environment µ and a policy π the expected average
value in cycles k to m given history ax<k is defined to be,
V
πµ
km
(ax<k) :=
1
m
∑
axk:m
π
µ
(ax<kax k:m)
m∑
i=k
r(x i).
Additionally we define the expected long run average value to be,
V
πµ
k∞
(ax<k) := lim
m→∞
V
πµ
km
(ax<k),
when this limit exists.
When k = 1 there is no history, that is, ax<k = ε, the null string. In this case we
simplify the notation slightly by defining V
πµ
1m := V
πµ
1m (ε). Similarly for V
πµ
1∞ .
In matrix notation we can express the expected long run average value for
each initial perception x1 ∈ X = {1, . . . ,n1} as a vector of value functions,
V
πµ
1∞ =

V
πµ
1∞(1)
...
V
πµ
1∞(n1)
 =
 
lim
m→∞
1
m
m−1∑
k=0
T k
!
rπ, (2)
if the limit exists.
.1.2 Definition. For an environment µ the optimal policy, denoted πµ, is
defined as:
πµ := argmax
π
V
πµ
1∞ ,
where the maximum is taken over all policies, including non-stationary ones.
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In some sense the optimal policy is the ideal policy. However, the optimal
policy is usually only optimal with respect to the specific environment for which
it was defined. If we do not know the specific details of the environment that
the policy will face in advance, the best we can do is to have a policy which will
adapt to the environment based on experience. In such a situation the policy is
unlikely to be optimal as it will probably make some non-optimal actions as it
learns about the environment it faces. In this situation the following concept is
useful:
.1.3 Definition. We say that a policy π is self-optimising in an environment
µ if its expected average value converges to the optimal expected average value
as m→∞, that is,
V
πµ
1m −→ V
πµµ
1m .
Intuitively this means that the expected performance of the policy in the
long run is as good as an optimal policy which was designed with complete
knowledge of the environment in advance. Classes of environments which admit
self-optimising policies are important because they are environments in which it
is possible for general purpose policies to adapt their behaviour until eventually
their actions become optimal.
.2 Analysis of stationary Markov hains
In this section we will establish some of the properties of Markov chains that
we will require. Our first lemma shows that the key term (I − αT )−1 can be
expanded using a Taylor series. The proof of this lemma and the following
lemma and theorem are based on the proof of Proposition 1.1 from Section 4.1
of [Bertsekas, 1995].
.2.1 Lemma. For a stochastic matrix T ∈ Rn×n and scalar α ∈ (0,1) there exist
stochastic matrices T ∗ ∈ Rn×n and H ∈ Rn×n such that
(I −αT )−1 = (1−α)−1T ∗+H +O(|1−α|)
where limα→1O(|1−α|) = 0.
Proof. Define the n× n matrix,
M(α) := (1−α)(I −αT )−1.
Applying the matrix inversion formula we see that
M(α) = (1−α)
adj(I −αT )
det(I −αT )
,
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where the determinant det(I − αT ) is an nth order polynomial in α and the
classical adjoint adj(I − αT ) is an n× n matrix of n−1th order polynomials in
α. Therefore M(α) can be expressed as an n× n matrix where each element is
either zero or a fraction of two polynomials in α that have no common factors.
We know that the denominator polynomials of M(α) cannot have 1 as a root
as this would imply that the corresponding element of M(α) → ∞ as α → 1.
This cannot happen because,
(1−α)−1M(α)rπ = (I −αT )
−1rπ
where ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} :
(I −αT )−1rπi ≤ (1−α)−1maxk [rπ]k. Clearly then
the absolute value of the elements of M(α)rπ are bounded by maxk
[rπ]k for
α < 1. Therefore we can express the i j th element of M(α) as,
Mi j(α) =
γ(α−φ1) · · · (α−φp)
(α−ψ1) · · · (α−ψq)
where γ,φi,ψ j ∈ R for all i ∈ {1, . . . p} and j ∈ {1, . . .q}.
Using this expression we can take a Taylor expansion of M(α) about 1 as
follows. Firstly, define the matrix T ∗ ∈ Rn×n as,
T ∗ := lim
α→1
M(α)
and the matrix H ∈ Rn×n as
Hi j := −
∂
∂ α
Mi j(α)]

α=1
. (3)
That is, H is a matrix having as it i j th element the first derivative of −Mi j(α)
with respect to α evaluated at α= 1.
From the equation for a first order Taylor expansion,
M(α) = T ∗+ (1−α)H +O((1−α)2)
where O((1−α)2) is an α-dependent matrix such that
lim
α→1
O((1−α)2)
1−α
= 0.
Dividing through by (1−α) we get
(1−α)−1M(α) = (1−α)−1T ∗+ H +O(|1−α|)
where limα→1O(|1 − α|) = 0. The result then follows as (I − αT )
−1 = (1 −
α)−1M(α) by definition. 2
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We will soon show that T ∗ as defined above plays a significant role in the
analysis. Before looking at this more closely, we will firstly prove some useful
identities.
.2.2 Lemma. It follows from the definitions of T ∗ and M(α) that,
T ∗ = T ∗T = T T ∗ = T ∗T ∗
and for k ∈ N
(T − T ∗)k = T k − T ∗.
Proof. By subtracting the identity αI = α(I − αT )(I − αT )−1 from the identity
I = (I −αT )(I −αT )−1 we see that,
(1−α)I = (I −αT )(1−α)(I −αT )−1
and thus,
αT (1−α)(I −αT )−1 = (1−α)(I −αT )−1+ (α− 1)I .
Taking α→ 1 gives,
lim
α→1
αT · lim
α→1
(1−α)(I −αT )−1 = lim
α→1
(1−α)(I −αT )−1+ lim
α→1
(α− 1)I
which, using the definition of M(α), becomes,
T · lim
α→1
M(α) = lim
α→1
M(α).
Finally using the definition of T ∗ this reduces to just,
T T ∗ = T ∗.
Using essentially the same argument it can also be shown that T ∗T = T ∗. It then
immediately follows that ∀k ∈ N : T kT ∗ = T ∗T k = T ∗.
From the relation T T ∗ = T ∗ it follows that T ∗ − αT T ∗ = T ∗ − αT ∗ and so
(I −αT )T ∗ = (1−α)T ∗ and thus,
T ∗ = (1−α)(I −αT )−1T ∗.
Taking α→∞ gives,
lim
α→1
T ∗ = lim
α→1
(1−α)(I −αT )−1 · lim
α→1
T ∗,
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which by the definition of T ∗ is just,
T ∗ = T ∗T ∗.
This establishes the first result.
The second result will be proven by induction. Trivially (T − T ∗)1 = T 1− T ∗
which establishes the case k = 1. Now assume that the induction hypothesis
holds for the kth case and consider the (k+ 1)th case:
(T − T ∗)k+1 = (T − T ∗)k(T − T ∗)
= (T k − T ∗)(T − T ∗)
= T k+1− T kT ∗− T ∗T k + T ∗T ∗
= T k+1− T ∗.
The second line follows from the induction assumption and the final line from
the results above. 2
Wewill use these simple relations frequently in the proofs that follow without
further comment. Now we can prove a key result about the structure of T ∗: it is
the limiting average distribution for the matrix T .
.2.3 Theorem. For a stochastic matrix T ∈ Rn×n and ∀m ∈ N,
T ∗ =
1
m
m−1∑
k=0
T k +
1
m
(Tm− I)H.
where H ∈ Rn×n is the matrix that satisfies Lemma .2.1.
Proof. As T is a stochastic matrix, from Lemma .2.1 we see that there exist
matrices H ∈ Rn×n and T ∗ ∈ Rn×n such that,
H = (I −αT )−1− (1−α)−1T ∗−O(|1−α|) (4)
where α ∈ (0,1) and limα→1O(|1−α|) = 0.
However from the geometric series equations it follows that,
(I −αT )−1− (1−α)−1T ∗ =
∞∑
k=0
αkT k − T ∗
∞∑
k=0
αk =
∞∑
k=0
αk(T k − T ∗)
= I − T ∗+
∞∑
k=1
(α(T − T ∗))
k
= I − T ∗+
α(T − T ∗)
I −α(T − T ∗)
= (I −α(T − T ∗))−1− T ∗.
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Substituting this result into Equation (4) and taking α→ 1,
H = lim
α→1

(I −α(T − T ∗))−1− T ∗−O(|1−α|)

= (I − T + T ∗)−1− T ∗.
Multiplying by (I − T + T ∗) and then T ∗ we see that,
(I − T + T ∗)H = I − (I − T + T ∗)T ∗
H − TH − T ∗H = I − T ∗+ T T ∗− T ∗T ∗ = I − T ∗
T ∗H − T ∗H − T ∗H = T ∗− T ∗
T ∗H = 0.
It now also follows that H − TH = I − T ∗ and so T ∗+ H = I + TH.
Multiplying by T k on the left for k ∈ N0 now gives,
T ∗+ T kH = T k + T k+1H.
Summing over k = 0,1, . . . ,m−1 and cancelling equal terms and dividing through
by m produces,
mT ∗+
m−1∑
k=0
T kH =
m−1∑
k=0
T k +
m−1∑
k=0
T k+1H
mT ∗+ H =
m−1∑
k=0
T k + TmH
from which the result follows as m 6= 0. 2
This establishes bounds on the convergence of 1
m
∑m−1
k=0
T k to T ∗ that we will
need. As H is bounded, simply taking m→∞ yields the following:
.2.4 Corollary. For a stochastic matrix T ∈ Rn×n,
T ∗ = lim
m→∞
1
m
m−1∑
k=0
T k.
By applying this result to Equation (2) we can now express the expected long
run average value very simply in terms of T ∗,
V
πµ
1∞ :=
 
lim
m→∞
1
m
m−1∑
k=0
T k
!
rπ = T
∗rπ. (5)
Thus by the existence of T ∗ we can infer that the expected long run average
value also exists in this case.
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.2.5 Corollary. Let µ be a stationary MDP environment and π a stationary policy.
∀m ∈ N, Vπµ1∞ − Vπµ1m = O

1
m

.
Proof. Let T ∈ Rn×n represent the Markov chain formed by the interaction of µ
and π. From Theorem .2.3 we see that ∀m ∈ N,
T ∗−
1
m
m−1∑
k=0
T k =
1
m
(Tm− I)H.
Multiplying by rπ on the right gives
T ∗rπ−
 
1
m
m−1∑
k=0
T k
!
rπ =
1
m
(Tm− I)Hrπ,
and thus the result follows as the elements of both Tm and H are bounded. 2
Of course this result is not surprising as we would expect the expected aver-
age value to converge to its limit in a reasonable way when both the environment
and policy are stationary.
Finally let us note some technical results on the relationship between T and
T ∗.
.2.6 Lemma. For an ergodic stochastic matrix T ∈ Rn×n the row vectors of T ∗ are
all the same and define a stationary distribution under T .
This is a standard result in the theory of ergodic Markov chains. See for
example Chapter V of [Doob, 1953] or any book on discrete stochastic processes
for a proof.
The following result shows that the limiting matrix T ∗ is in some sense con-
tinuous with respect to small changes in T . This will be important because it
means that if we have an estimate of T that converges in the limit then our
estimate of T ∗ will also converge.
.2.7 Theorem. For an ergodic stochastic matrix T ∈ Rn×n the matrix T ∗ ∈ Rn×n
is continuous in T in the following sense: If Tˆ ∈ Rn×n is a stochastic matrix where
maxi j
Ti j − Tˆi j is small, then ∃cT > 0 which depends on T, such that maxi j T ∗i j −
Tˆ ∗
i j
≤ cT maxi j Ti j − Tˆi j.
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Proof. For an ergodic square matrix T ∈ Rn×n the row vectors of T ∗ are all the
same and correspond to the stationary distribution row vector t∗ ∈ R1×n. That
is,
T ∗ =

t∗
...
t∗
 (6)
where t∗T = t∗ and for all distribution vectors t ∈ R1×n we have tT ∗ = t∗. Thus
T has an eigenvalue of 1 with t∗ being the corresponding left eigenvector.
From linear algebra we know that ∀T ∈ Rn×n,
adj(I − T ) (I − T ) = det(I − T )I .
However as T has an eigenvalue of 1, det(I − T ) = 0 and thus,
adj(I − T ) T = adj(I − T ),
or equivalently, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,n},
[adj(I − T )]i∗T = [adj(I − T )]i∗.
Because {t∗} is a basis for the eigenspace corresponding to the eigenvalue 1,
[adj(I − T )]i∗ must be in this eigenspace. That is, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, ∃ci ∈ R:
[adj(I − T )]i∗ =
 
cof1i(I − T ), . . . , cofni(I − T )

= cit
∗
where the cofactor is defined cof ji(I − T ) := (−1)
j+i det(minor ji(I − T )).
As T has an eigenvalue of 1 with geometric multiplicity 1 it follows that
I − T has an eigenvalue of 0 also with geometric multiplicity 1. Thus the nullity
of I − T is 1 and so rank(I − T ) = n− 1. While we define the rank of a matrix
to be the dimension of its column or row space, it also can be defined as the
size of the largest non-zero minor and the two defintions can be proven to be
equivalent. As the adjoint is composed of order n − 1 minors it immediately
follows that adj(I − T ) 6= 0 and thus ∃k, which depends on T , such that ck > 0.
As minor jk(I−T ) is an (n−1)×(n−1) sub-matrix of (I−T ) the determinant
of this is an order n−1 polynomial in the elements of T . Thus, by the continuity
of polynomials, ∃c′ > 0 such that for a sufficiently small ǫ > 0 change in any
element of T we will get at most a c′ǫ change in each cof jk(I − T ). However we
know that t∗ = 1
ck
[adj(I − T )]k∗, and so an ǫ change in the elements of T results
in at most a c
′
ck
ǫ change in the elements of t∗ and thus T ∗. Define cT :=
c′
ck
to
indicate that this constant depends on T and we are done. 2
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We now turn our attention to optimal policies. While our analysis so far has only
dealt with stationary policies, in general optimal policies need not be stationary.
As non-stationary policies are more difficult to analyse our preference is to deal
with only stationary policies if possible. In this section we prove that for the class
of ergodic finite stationary MDP environments an optimal policy can indeed be
chosen so that it is stationary. This will simplify our analysis in later sections.
However, in order to show this result we will need to briefly consider policies
which are potentially non-stationary. The proofs in this section follow those of
Section 4.2 in [Bertsekas, 1995].
Let us assume that the policy π is deterministic but not necessarily stationary,
that is, π := {π1,π2, . . .}. Thus in the k
th cycle we apply πk. Define pi(x) :=
argmaxy∈A πi(xa) to be the action chosen by policy π in cycle i. Clearly this is
unique for deterministic π.
In order to make some of the equations that follow more manageable we
need to define the following two mappings. For any function f : X → R and
deterministic policy π := {π1,π2, . . .} we define the mapping Bπk for any k ∈ N
to be ∀x ∈ X ,
(Bπk f )(x) := Rxpk(x)+
∑
x ′∈X
µ( x pk(x) x
′ ) f (x ′).
Of interest will be the policy that simply selects the action which maximises this
expression in each cycle for any given x . For this we define for any function
f :X → R and ∀x ∈ X ,
(B f )(x) :=max
a∈A

Rxa + ∑
x ′∈X
µ(xax ′) f (x ′)

 .
Clearly this policy is stationary as the maximising a depends only on x and is
independent of which cycle the system is in. By (B2 f )(x) we mean (B(B f ))(x)
and similarly higher powers such as (Bi f )(x) and (Bi
πk
f )(x). The equation B f =
f is the well known Bellman equation [Bellman, 1957].
An elementary property of the mappings Bπk and B is their monotonicity in
the following sense.
.3.1 Lemma. For any f , f ′ : X → R such that ∀x ∈ X : f (x) ≤ f ′(x) and
for any possibly non-stationary deterministic policy π := {π1,π2, . . .}, we have
∀x ∈ X , ∀i, k ∈ N,
(Bi
πk
f )(x)≤ (Bi
πk
f ′)(x)
and
(Bi f )(x)≤ (Bi f ′)(x).
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Proof. Clearly the cases B1 and B1
πk
are true from their definitions. A simple
induction argument establishes the general result. 2
Define the column vector e := (1, . . . , 1)t ∈ Rn×1. Using these mappings
we can now prove that the optimal policy can be chosen stationary if certain
conditions hold.
.3.2 Theorem. Let µ be a finite stationary MDP environment. If λ ∈ R is a scalar
and h ∈ Rn×1 a column vector such that ∀x ∈ X ,
λ+ [h]x =max
a∈A

Rxa + ∑
x ′∈X
µ(xax ′)[h]x ′

 (7)
or equivalently,
λe+ h= Bh,
then
λ = V
∗µ
1∞ :=maxπ
V
πµ
1∞ .
Furthermore, if a stationary policy πµ attains the maximum in Equation (7) for
each x then this policy is optimal, that is, V
πµµ
1∞ = λ.
Proof. We have λ ∈ R and h ∈ Rn×1 such that for any (possibly non-stationary)
policy π= {π1,π2, . . .} and cycle m ∈ N and ∀xm ∈ X ,
λ+ [h]xm ≥ Rxmpm(xm)+
∑
xm+1∈X
µ( xm pm(xm) xm+1 )[h]xm+1 .
Furthermore, if πm attains the maximum in Equation (7) for each xm ∈ X then
equality holds in the mth cycle and pm(xm) is optimal for this single cycle. The
main idea of this proof is to extend this result so that we get a policy which is
optimal across all cycles.
Using the mapping Bπm we can express the above equation more compactly
as,
λe+ h≥ Bπmh.
Applying now Bπm−1 to both sides and using the monotonicity property from
Lemma .3.1 we see that,
λe+ Bπm−1h≥ Bπm−1Bπmh.
However we also know that λe+ h≥ Bπm−1h and so it follows that,
2λe+ h≥ Bπm−1Bπmh.
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Repeating this m times we get
mλe+ h≥ Bπ1Bπ2 · · ·Bπmh,
where equality continues to hold in the case where πk attains the maximum in
Equation (7) in each cycle k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. When this is the case we see that π is
optimal for the cycles 1 to m.
From the definition of Bπk we see that,
[Bπ1Bπ2 · · ·Bπmh]x1 = E
(
[h]xm+1 +
m∑
k=1
Rxkpk(xk)
x1,π,µ
)
is the total expected reward over m cycles from the initial perception x1 to the
final perception xm+1 under policy π and environment µ. Thus ∀x1 ∈ X ,
mλ+ [h]x1 ≥ E
(
[h]xm+1 +
m∑
k=1
Rxkpk(xk)
x1,π,µ
)
where equality holds if πk attains the maximum in Equation (7) in each cycle.
Dividing by m, gives ∀x1 ∈ X ,
λ+
1
m
[h]x1 ≥
1
m
E
¦
[h]xm+1 |x1,π,µ
©
+
1
m
E
(
m∑
k=1
Rxkpk(xk)
x1,π,µ
)
. (8)
Taking m→∞ this reduces to ∀x1 ∈ X ,
λ≥ lim
m→∞
1
m
E
(
m∑
k=1
Rxkpk(xk)
x1,π,µ
)
,
or equivalently,
λ≥ V
πµ
1∞ ,
where equality holds if πk attains the maximum in Equation (7) for each cycle.
When this is the case, π is optimal and thus V
πµ
1∞ =maxπ V
πµ
1∞ = λ. Furthermore,
we see that this optimal policy is stationary because in Equation (7) the action
a only depends on the current perception x and is independent of the cycle
number. We call this optimal stationary policy πµ. 2
The above result only guarantees the existence of an optimal stationary pol-
icy πµ for a stationary MDP environment µ in the case where there is a solution
to the Bellman equation λe+ h = Bh. Fortunately for ergodic MDPs it can be
shown that such a solution always exists (our definition of ergodicity implies
condition (2) of Proposition 2.6 in [Bertsekas, 1995] where the existence of a
solution is proven). It now follows that:
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.3.3 Theorem. For any ergodic finite stationary MDP environment µ there exists
an optimal stationary policy πµ.
This is a useful result because the interaction between a stationary MDP en-
vironment and a stationary policy is much simpler to analyse than the non-
stationary case. We will refer back to this result a number of times when we
need to assert the existence of an optimal stationary policy.
One thing that we have not shown is that the optimal policy with respect
to a given MDP can be computed. Given that our MDP is finite and therefore
the number of possible stationary deterministic policies is also finite we might
expect that this problem should be solvable. Indeed, it can be shown that the
Policy Iteration algorithm is able to compute an optimal stationary policy in this
situation (see Section 4.3 of Bertsekas, 1995).
.4 Convergene of expeted average value
Our goal is to find a good policy for an unknown stationary MDP µ. Because
we do not know the structure of the MDP, that is µ, we create an estimate µˆ
and then find the optimal policy with respect to this estimate, which we will call
πµˆ. Our hope is that if our estimate µˆ is sufficiently close to µ, then πµˆ will
perform well compared to the true optimal policy πµ. Specifically we would likeVπµˆµ1∞ − Vπµµ1∞ = 0.
In the analysis that follows we will need to be careful about whether we are
talking about the true environment µ, our estimate of this µˆ, or various com-
binations of environments interacting with various policies. Sometimes policies
will be optimal with respect to the environment that they are interacting with,
sometimes they will only be optimal with respect to an estimate of the environ-
ment that they are actually interacting with, and in some cases the policy may
be arbitrary. Needless to say that care is required to avoid mixing things up.
As defined previously, let D ∈ RX×A×X represent the chronological system
µ and Dˆ ∈ RX×A×X the chronological system µˆ. From Equation (1) we know
that the matrix T ∈ RX×X representing the Markov chain formed by a policy π
interacting with µ is defined by,
Tx x ′ :=
∑
a∈A
π(xa)Dxax ′ .
We can similarly define Tˆ from π and Dˆ. It now follows that if Dˆ is close to D, in
the sense that ǫ :=maxxax ′ |Dxax ′− Dˆxax ′ | is small, then for any stationary policy
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π the associated matrices T and Tˆ are close:
max
x x ′
Tx x ′ − Tˆx x ′ = max
x x ′
∑
a∈A
π(xa)
 
Dxax ′ − Dˆxax ′

≤ max
x
∑
a∈A
π(xa)ǫ
= ǫ.
This is important as it means that we can take bounds on the accuracy of our
estimate of the true MDP and imply from this bounds on the accuracy of the
estimate Tˆ for any stationary policy.
For any given stationary policy this bound also carries over to the associated
expected long run average value functions in a straightforward way:
.4.1 Lemma. For stationary finite MDPs such that ǫ := maxxax ′ |Dxax ′ − Dˆxax ′ | it
follows that for any stationary policy π,Vπµ1∞ − Vπµˆ1∞ = O(ǫ).
Proof. Let T and Tˆ be the Markov chains defined by D and Dˆ interacting with a
stationary policy π. By the argument above we see that maxx x ′ |Tx x ′ − Tˆx x ′| ≤ ǫ.
Thus by Theorem .2.7 we know that there exists cT such that maxx x ′ |T
∗
x x ′
−
Tˆ ∗
x x ′
| ≤ cTǫ, where cT depends on T . By Equation (5) we see that,Vπµ1∞ − Vπµˆ1∞ = (T ∗− Tˆ ∗)rπ= O(ǫ). (9)
2
From this lemma we can show that the optimal policies with respect to µ and
µˆ are bounded:
.4.2 Theorem. For a stationary finite MDP such that ǫ := maxxax ′ |Dxax ′ − Dˆxax ′ |
it follows that, Vπµµ1∞ − Vπµˆµˆ1∞ = O(ǫ),
where πµ and πµˆ are optimal policies that are also stationary.
Proof. For any two functions f , f ′ : D → R such that ∀x ∈ D : | f (x)− f ′(x)| ≤ δ
it follows that |maxx∈D f (x) −maxx ′∈D f
′(x ′)| ≤ δ. From Lemma .4.1 it then
follows that, maxπ Vπµ1∞ −maxπ′ Vπ′µˆ1∞
= O(ǫ)
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where π and π′ belong to the set of stationary policies. However by Theorem
.3.3 we know that the optimal policies for µ and µˆ can be chosen stationary and
thus the result follows. 2
We now have all the necessary results to show that if µˆ is a good estimate of
µ then our policy πµˆ that is based on µˆ will perform near optimally with respect
to the true environment in the limit.
.4.3 Theorem. Let µ and µˆ be two ergodic stationary finite MDP environments
that are close in the sense that ǫ := maxxax ′ |Dxax ′ − Dˆxax ′ | is small. It can be
shown that for m ∈ N, Vπµˆµ1m − Vπµµ1m = O

1
m

+O(ǫ)
where πµ is an optimal policy for the true distribution µ, and πµˆ is an optimal
policy with respect to the estimate of the true distribution µˆ.
Proof.
From Theorem .3.3 we see that πµˆ can be chosen stationary. From the trian-
gle inequality and the results of Corollary .2.5 (with π  πµˆ), Lemma .4.1 (with
π  πµˆ) and Theorem .4.2 we see that,Vπµˆµ1m − Vπµµ1∞  = Vπµˆµ1m − Vπµˆµ1∞ + Vπµˆµ1∞ − Vπµˆµˆ1∞ + Vπµˆµˆ1∞ − Vπµµ1∞ 
≤
Vπµˆµ1m − Vπµˆµ1∞ + Vπµˆµ1∞ − Vπµˆµˆ1∞ + Vπµˆµˆ1∞ − Vπµµ1∞ 
= O

1
m

+O(ǫ).
Now from Corollary .2.5 (with π  πµ) and the triangle inequality again,Vπµˆµ1m − Vπµµ1m  = Vπµˆµ1m − Vπµµ1∞ + Vπµµ1∞ − Vπµµ1m 
≤
Vπµˆµ1m − Vπµµ1∞ + Vπµµ1∞ − Vπµµ1m = O

1
m

+O(ǫ).
2
Denitions of Intelligene
“Viewed narrowly, there seem to be almost as many definitions of
intelligence as there were experts asked to define it." R. J. Sternberg
quoted in [Gregory, 1998]
Despite a long history of research and debate, there is still no standard def-
inition of intelligence. This has lead some to believe that intelligence may be
approximately described, but cannot be fully defined. We believe that this de-
gree of pessimism is too strong. Although there is no single standard definition,
if one surveys the many definitions that have been proposed, strong similarities
between many of the definitions quickly become obvious.
Here we take the opportunity to present the many informal definitions that
we have collected over the years. Naturally, compiling a complete list would be
impossible as many definitions of intelligence are buried deep inside articles and
books. Nevertheless, the 70 odd definitions presented below are, to the best of
our knowledge, the largest and most well referenced collection there is.
.5 Colletive denitions
In this section we present definitions that have been proposed by groups or
organisations. In many cases definitions of intelligence given in encyclopedias
have been either contributed by an individual psychologist or quote an earlier
definition given by a psychologist. In these cases we have chosen to attribute
the quote to the psychologist, and have placed it in the next section. In this
section we only list those definitions that either cannot be attributed to specific
individuals, or represent a collective definition agreed upon by many individuals.
As many dictionaries source their definitions from other dictionaries, we have
endeavoured to always list the original source.
1. “The ability to use memory, knowledge, experience, understanding, rea-
soning, imagination and judgement in order to solve problems and adapt
to new situations.” AllWords Dictionary, 2006
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2. “The capacity to acquire and apply knowledge.” The American Heritage
Dictionary, fourth edition, 2000
3. “Individuals differ from one another in their ability to understand complex
ideas, to adapt effectively to the environment, to learn from experience,
to engage in various forms of reasoning, to overcome obstacles by taking
thought.” American Psychological Association [Neisser et al., 1996]
4. “The ability to learn, understand and make judgments or have opinions
that are based on reason” Cambridge Advance Learner’s Dictionary, 2006
5. “Intelligence is a very general mental capability that, among other things,
involves the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, com-
prehend complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience.” Com-
mon statement with 52 expert signatories [Gottfredson, 1997b]
6. “The ability to learn facts and skills and apply them, especially when this
ability is highly developed.” Encarta World English Dictionary, 2006
7. “. . . ability to adapt effectively to the environment, either by making a
change in oneself or by changing the environment or finding a new one
. . . intelligence is not a single mental process, but rather a combination of
many mental processes directed toward effective adaptation to the envi-
ronment.” Encyclopedia Britannica, 2006
8. “the general mental ability involved in calculating, reasoning, perceiving
relationships and analogies, learning quickly, storing and retrieving infor-
mation, using language fluently, classifying, generalizing, and adjusting to
new situations.” Columbia Encyclopedia, sixth edition, 2006
9. “Capacity for learning, reasoning, understanding, and similar forms of
mental activity; aptitude in grasping truths, relationships, facts, meanings,
etc.” Random House Unabridged Dictionary, 2006
10. “The ability to learn, understand, and think about things.” Longman Dic-
tionary or Contemporary English, 2006
11. “: the ability to learn or understand or to deal with new or trying situations
: . . . the skilled use of reason (2) : the ability to apply knowledge to ma-
nipulate one’s environment or to think abstractly as measured by objective
criteria (as tests)” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2006
12. “The ability to acquire and apply knowledge and skills.” Compact Oxford
English Dictionary, 2006
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13. “. . . the ability to adapt to the environment.” World Book Encyclopedia,
2006
14. “Intelligence is a property of mind that encompasses many related men-
tal abilities, such as the capacities to reason, plan, solve problems, think
abstractly, comprehend ideas and language, and learn.” Wikipedia, 4 Oc-
tober, 2006
15. “Capacity of mind, especially to understand principles, truths, facts or
meanings, acquire knowledge, and apply it to practise; the ability to learn
and comprehend.” Wiktionary, 4 October, 2006
16. “The ability to learn and understand or to deal with problems.” Word
Central Student Dictionary, 2006
17. “The ability to comprehend; to understand and profit from experience.”
Wordnet 2.1, 2006
18. “The capacity to learn, reason, and understand.” Wordsmyth Dictionary,
2006
.6 Psyhologist denitions
This section contains definitions from psychologists. In some cases we have not
yet managed to locate the exact reference and would appreciate any help in
doing so.
1. “Intelligence is not a single, unitary ability, but rather a composite of sev-
eral functions. The term denotes that combination of abilities required for
survival and advancement within a particular culture.” Anastasi [1992]
2. “. . . that facet of mind underlying our capacity to think, to solve novel
problems, to reason and to have knowledge of the world." Anderson [2006]
3. “It seems to us that in intelligence there is a fundamental faculty, the
alteration or the lack of which, is of the utmost importance for practi-
cal life. This faculty is judgement, otherwise called good sense, practi-
cal sense, initiative, the faculty of adapting ones self to circumstances.”
Binet and Simon [1905]
4. “We shall use the term ‘intelligence’ to mean the ability of an organism to
solve new problems . . . ” Bingham [1937]
172 .6 Psyhologist denitions
5. “Intelligence is what is measured by intelligence tests.” Boring [1923]
6. “. . . a quality that is intellectual and not emotional or moral: in measuring
it we try to rule out the effects of the child’s zeal, interest, industry, and
the like. Secondly, it denotes a general capacity, a capacity that enters into
everything the child says or does or thinks; any want of ‘intelligence’ will
therefore be revealed to some degree in almost all that he attempts;” Burt
[1957]
7. “A person possesses intelligence insofar as he has learned, or can learn,
to adjust himself to his environment.” S. S. Colvin quoted in [Sternberg,
2000]
8. “. . . the ability to plan and structure one’s behavior with an end in view.”
J. P. Das
9. “The capacity to learn or to profit by experience.” W. F. Dearborn quoted
in [Sternberg, 2000]
10. “. . . in its lowest terms intelligence is present where the individual ani-
mal, or human being, is aware, however dimly, of the relevance of his
behaviour to an objective. Many definitions of what is indefinable have
been attempted by psychologists, of which the least unsatisfactory are 1.
the capacity to meet novel situations, or to learn to do so, by new adap-
tive responses and 2. the ability to perform tests or tasks, involving the
grasping of relationships, the degree of intelligence being proportional to
the complexity, or the abstractness, or both, of the relationship.” Drever
[1952]
11. “Intelligence A: the biological substrate of mental ability, the brain’s neu-
roanatomy and physiology; Intelligence B: the manifestation of intelli-
gence A, and everything that influences its expression in real life behavior;
Intelligence C: the level of performance on psychometric tests of cognitive
ability.” H. J. Eysenck.
12. “Sensory capacity, capacity for perceptual recognition, quickness, range
or flexibility or association, facility and imagination, span of attention,
quickness or alertness in response.” F. N. Freeman quoted in [Sternberg,
2000]
13. “. . . adjustment or adaptation of the individual to his total environment, or
limited aspects thereof . . . the capacity to reorganize one’s behavior pat-
terns so as to act more effectively and more appropriately in novel situ-
ations . . . the ability to learn . . . the extent to which a person is educable
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. . . the ability to carry on abstract thinking . . . the effective use of concepts
and symbols in dealing with a problem to be solved . . . ” W. Freeman
14. “An intelligence is the ability to solve problems, or to create products, that
are valued within one or more cultural settings.” Gardner [1993]
15. “. . . performing an operation on a specific type of content to produce a
particular product.” J. P. Guilford
16. “Sensation, perception, association, memory, imagination, discrimination,
judgement and reasoning.” N. E. Haggerty quoted in [Sternberg, 2000]
17. “The capacity for knowledge, and knowledge possessed.” Henmon [1921]
18. “. . . cognitive ability.” Herrnstein and Murray [1996]
19. “. . . the resultant of the process of acquiring, storing in memory, retriev-
ing, combining, comparing, and using in new contexts information and
conceptual skills.” Humphreys
20. “Intelligence is the ability to learn, exercise judgment, and be imaginative.”
J. Huarte
21. “Intelligence is a general factor that runs through all types of performance.”
A. Jensen
22. “Intelligence is assimilation to the extent that it incorporates all the given
data of experience within its framework . . . There can be no doubt either,
that mental life is also accommodation to the environment. Assimilation
can never be pure because by incorporating new elements into its earlier
schemata the intelligence constantly modifies the latter in order to adjust
them to new elements.” Piaget [1963]
23. “Ability to adapt oneself adequately to relatively new situations in life.”
R. Pinter quoted in [Sternberg, 2000]
24. “A biological mechanism by which the effects of a complexity of stimuli
are brought together and given a somewhat unified effect in behavior.” J.
Peterson quoted in [Sternberg, 2000]
25. “. . . certain set of cognitive capacities that enable an individual to adapt
and thrive in any given environment they find themselves in, and those
cognitive capacities include things like memory and retrieval, and problem
solving and so forth. There’s a cluster of cognitive abilities that lead to
successful adaptation to a wide range of environments.” Simonton [2003]
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26. “Intelligence is part of the internal environment that shows through at
the interface between person and external environment as a function of
cognitive task demands.” R. E. Snow quoted in [Slatter, 2001]
27. “. . . I prefer to refer to it as ‘successful intelligence.’ And the reason is that
the emphasis is on the use of your intelligence to achieve success in your
life. So I define it as your skill in achieving whatever it is you want to attain
in your life within your sociocultural context — meaning that people have
different goals for themselves, and for some it’s to get very good grades in
school and to do well on tests, and for others it might be to become a very
good basketball player or actress or musician.” Sternberg [2003]
28. “. . . the ability to undertake activities that are characterized by (1) diffi-
culty, (2) complexity, (3) abstractness, (4) economy, (5) adaptedness to
goal, (6) social value, and (7) the emergence of originals, and to maintain
such activities under conditions that demand a concentration of energy
and a resistance to emotional forces.” Stoddard
29. “The ability to carry on abstract thinking.” L. M. Terman quoted in [Stern-
berg, 2000]
30. “Intelligence, considered as a mental trait, is the capacity to make impulses
focal at their early, unfinished stage of formation. Intelligence is therefore
the capacity for abstraction, which is an inhibitory process.” Thurstone
[1924]
31. “The capacity to inhibit an instinctive adjustment, the capacity to rede-
fine the inhibited instinctive adjustment in the light of imaginally experi-
enced trial and error, and the capacity to realise the modified instinctive
adjustment in overt behavior to the advantage of the individual as a social
animal.” L. L. Thurstone quoted in [Sternberg, 2000]
32. “A global concept that involves an individual’s ability to act purposefully,
think rationally, and deal effectively with the environment.” Wechsler
[1958]
33. “The capacity to acquire capacity.” H. Woodrow quoted in [Sternberg,
2000]
34. “. . . the term intelligence designates a complexly interrelated assemblage
of functions, no one of which is completely or accurately known in man
. . . ” Yerkes and Yerkes [1929]
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35. “. . . that faculty of mind by which order is perceived in a situation previ-
ously considered disordered.” R. W. Young quoted in [Kurzweil, 2000]
.7 AI researher denitions
This section lists definitions from researchers in artificial intelligence.
1. “. . . the ability of a system to act appropriately in an uncertain environ-
ment, where appropriate action is that which increases the probability of
success, and success is the achievement of behavioral subgoals that sup-
port the system’s ultimate goal.” Albus [1991]
2. “Any system . . . that generates adaptive behviour to meet goals in a range
of environments can be said to be intelligent.” Fogel [1995]
3. “Achieving complex goals in complex environments.” Goertzel [2006]
4. “Intelligent systems are expected to work, and work well, in many different
environments. Their property of intelligence allows them to maximize the
probability of success even if full knowledge of the situation is not avail-
able. Functioning of intelligent systems cannot be considered separately
from the environment and the concrete situation including the goal.” Gud-
win [2000]
5. “[Performance intelligence is] the successful (i.e., goal-achieving) perfor-
mance of the system in a complicated environment.” Horst [2002]
6. “Intelligence is the ability to use optimally limited resources – including
time – to achieve goals.” Kurzweil [2000]
7. “Intelligence is the power to rapidly find an adequate solution in what
appears a priori (to observers) to be an immense search space.” Lenat and
Feigenbaum [1991]
8. “Intelligence measures an agent’s ability to achieve goals in a wide range
of environments.” Legg and Hutter [2006]
9. “. . . doing well at a broad range of tasks is an empirical definition of ‘intelligence’ ”
Masum et al. [2002]
10. “Intelligence is the computational part of the ability to achieve goals in the
world. Varying kinds and degrees of intelligence occur in people, many
animals and some machines.” McCarthy [2004]
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11. “. . . the ability to solve hard problems.” Minsky [1985]
12. “Intelligence is the ability to process information properly in a complex
environment. The criteria of properness are not predefined and hence not
available beforehand. They are acquired as a result of the information
processing.” Nakashima [1999]
13. “. . . in any real situation behavior appropriate to the ends of the system
and adaptive to the demands of the environment can occur, within some
limits of speed and complexity.” Newell and Simon [1976]
14. “[An intelligent agent does what] is appropriate for its circumstances and
its goal, it is flexible to changing environments and changing goals, it
learns from experience, and it makes appropriate choices given perceptual
limitations and finite computation.” Poole et al. [1998]
15. “Intelligence means getting better over time.” Schank [1991]
16. “. . . the essential, domain-independent skills necessary for acquiring a wide
range of domain-specific knowledge – the ability to learn anything. Achiev-
ing this with ‘artificial general intelligence’ (AGI) requires a highly adap-
tive, general-purpose system that can autonomously acquire an extremely
wide range of specific knowledge and skills and can improve its own cog-
nitive ability through self-directed learning.” [Voss, 2005]
17. “Intelligence is the ability for an information processing system to adapt to
its environment with insufficient knowledge and resources.” Wang [1995]
18. “. . . the mental ability to sustain successful life.” K. Warwick quoted in [Aso-
han, 2003]
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